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INTRODUCTION
In the financial arena, the year 2000 will be remembered best as the year
the technology stock market bubble burst at the seams. Mutual fund investors,
many of whom had counted their chickens before they were hatched, watched
in distress as the value of their tech fund investments plummeted. So, too, did
investors in three of the mutual funds of Heartland Group Inc. ("Heartland").
But unlike the tech funds' sharp decline, the decline of these Heartland funds
occurred in a single day. Moreover, these funds were not laced with
technology and other speculative stocks; rather, they were bond funds-funds
normally associated with safe, prudent investing.'
On October 13, 2000-Friday the 13th no less-Heartland's High-Yield
Municipal Bond Fund, Short Duration High-Yield Municipal Bond Fund, and
Taxable Short Duration Municipal Bond Fund (collectively, the "Funds")
experienced one-day ?rice drops of seventy percent, forty-four percent, and six
percent, respectively. These drops did not result from the erosive effect of
market forces on the value of the Funds' portfolios of bonds. Rather, they
occurred because Heartland had stumbled severely by delaying determinations
about the fair value of many of the illiquid bonds it held in the portfolios of the
1 See John Waggoner, If Fund Directors Doze, Investors Can Lose Out, USA TODAY, June 20, 2001, at
lB (stating, with respect to Heartland's losses, that "Itihose are horrific losses for a stock mutual fund, much
less a normally stodgy bond fund").
2 See Karen Damato, Deals & Deal Makers: SEC Gets Court Order Freezing Assets of 3 Heartland
Funds amid Investigation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2001, at C15; Paul Gores, Heartland Bond Funds Plummet;
One Falls Over 70% After Pricing Method Change, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 17, 2000, at ID; Russ
Wiles, Heartland Mutual Funds Plummet; Disaster Points to Run on Assets, ARIZ, REPUBLIC, Oct. 19, 2000, at
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Funds. 3  Correcting its own missteps resulted in the severe one-day price
drops.
4
Importantly, as an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 ("ICA"),5 Heartland was required to engage in fair
value pricing with respect to the bonds it held for which market quotations
were not "readily available." 6 But instead of ascertaining the fair value of its
illiquid bonds, Heartland engaged in "hopeful bond pricing," 7 i.e., pricing
bonds at what it "hoped" it could receive for them rather than what it actually
could obtain for them. 8  Ultimately, Heartland's valuation of those bonds,
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(A) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2000) (both defining "value"
with respect to assets of registered investment companies for which market quotations are not readily available
as fair value as determined in good faith by the board of directors). For the SEC's guidance on fair value
pricing of portfolio securities, see Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act.
Lexis 543 (Apr. 30, 2001), and Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter, [1999-2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,658, at 76,383 (Dec. 8, 1999).
4 Heartland was not the only fund family experiencing problems with its high-yield municipal bond
funds at that time. Strong Capital Management Inc.'s Strong High-Yield Municipal Bond Fund also
encountered problems stemming from deteriorating credit quality of the bonds in its portfolio. In some cases,
this deterioration led to defaults and heavy investor redemptions. See Karen Damato, Strong Capital Fund
Suffers Muni Blues, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2001, at C19.
15 U.S.C. § 80a (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
6 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(A) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2000).
7 Jacob Fine, Knocks to Heartland Funds Spur Discussion of Pricing Methods, THE BOND BUYER, Mar.
19, 2001, at 7 (quoting Douglas Watson, Managing Director of Moody's public finance group). Expanding on
this point, Karen Damato of The Wall Street Journal wrote:
The Heartland meltdown called attention to the fact that most high-yield munis trade infrequently,
making the bonds sitting in portfolios difficult to value. Fund companies typically rely on outside
pricing services to calculate the value of such bonds. Those pricing services, in turn, rely heavily
on institutional investors, including fund managers, to pass along material information about the
financial condition of the borrowers and the status of projects such as nursing homes and hospitals
that are financed by high-yield munis.
Ms. Bourbulas [fund manager for Strong Capital Management Inc.'s Strong High-Yield Municipal
Bond Fund] said Strong ... has always been diligent about passing along such information, even
when it is likely to lead a pricing service to reduce its calculated value for a bond in Strong High-
Yield Muni's portfolio. Some other investors "like to be more optimistic," she said, and not report
the first indication of possible problems at an issuer. In some instances, she said, when Strong has
passed along such information, pricing officials have said "they have not gotten the same
information from the other firms that hold the same positions."
Damato, supra note 4. For general survey results on how market participants, including mutual funds, engage
in fair value pricing, see CAPITAL MARKET RISK ADVISORS, NAV/FAIR VALUE PRACTICES SURVEY OVERVIEW
(May 1998), available at http://www.cmra.com/htmV nav.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2001).
8 Because each Fund's management fee was based on net assets under management, the overvaluation
of the bonds resulted in higher management fees. It is unclear whether this side effect was intended.
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which had gradually built up like a house of cards, collapsed under the weight
of economic reality.
Heartland shareholders who remained invested in the Funds through the
long, gray Winter that followed the October swoon were soon confronted with
the ultimate indignity. On March 21, 2001, at the request of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Conmission") and with the consent of
Heartland itself, Judge Joan Lefkow of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois entered an order of permanent injunction against Heartland
and appointed a receiver to oversee the Funds.9 Judge Lefkow empowered the
receiver to take control of the Funds' assets, manage the Funds, suspend fund
redemptions and, if appropriate, liquidate the Funds.' ° Remaining share-
holders, therefore, were locked into the Funds until the receiver, Chicago
attorney Phillip Stern of Freeman, Freeman & Salzman, decided otherwise.
The receivership remedy is, indeed, severe. The reasons for this are
twofold. First, it displaces fund management entirely. This includes both the
shareholder-elected board of directors and the officers appointed by the board.
Second, the appointment of a receiver eliminates, either temporarily or
permanently, shareholder suffrage. While the receivership remedy is the
ultimate "no confidence" vote in the directors and officers, a court casts that
vote at the SEC's behest rather than shareholders. Likewise, the court at the
SEC's suggestion selects the receiver who will supplant those directors and
officers. In the case of Heartland, that receiver had no previous experience
with the Funds themselves, unlike the Funds' directors and officers.
The district court's appointment of a receiver in the Heartland case comes
at a time when mutual fund governance is at an important crossroad. For the
past eight years, the SEC and its former Chairman, Arthur Levitt, have been
vigorously calling for independent fund directors'2 to assume greater responsi-
9 See SEC v. Heartland Group, Inc., Order of Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief Against
Heartland Group, Inc., Case No. 01C 1984 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2001) ("Heartland General Order").
10 See id. at § IIl; SEC v. Heartland Group, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,938, 74 S.E.C. Docket 1344, 2001
SEC Lexis 513 (Mar. 22, 2001) ("Heartland Release").
11 See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 54 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Equitable receiverships
are drastic remedies which often fall short of their intended objectives."); Connolly v. Gishwiller, 162 F.2d
428, 435 (7th Cir. 1947) (noting that "the power to appoint a receiver is a drastic, harsh and dangerous one and
should be exercised with care and caution"); Tanzer v. Huffines, 287 F. Supp. 273, 274 (D.C. Del. 1968),
aff'd, 408 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1969) (stating that the remedy "is a harsh one, one to which a Court should not
resort in any but the most extreme circumstances").
12 We refer to directors who are not "interested persons" of a fund as "independent directors." See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1994) (defining "interested person").
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bility for the safeguarding of mutual fund shareholders and their investments.13
Congress, of course, had originally imbedded within the ICA itself the policy
of having independent directors serve on a fund's board' 4 as watchdogs to
guard against unscrupulous behavior by, among others, fund advisors. 15 It was
former Chairman Levitt, however, who decided it was high time for these
watchdogs to have their teeth sharpened and put to use, 16 especially given the
SEC's "growing reliance on independent directors to protect fund investors."'
17
13 See, e.g., The SEC and the Mutual Fund Industry: An Enlightened Partnership, Remarks by SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt, Investment Company Institute, Wash., D.C., May 19, 1995; Mutual Fund Directors as
Investor Advocates, Remarks by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, The Second Annual Symposium for Mutual
Fund Trustees and Directors, Washington, D.C., Apr. 11, 1995; SEC DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT,
PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 264-66 (1992). See also
TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 236 (1998) (arguing that
the importance of independent directors has increased during the past twenty-five years, as they have been
vested with increasing responsibilities to supervise the activities of the investment advisor and the insiders in
managing the investment company).
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1994) (stating that "[n]o registered investment company shall have a board
of directors more than 60 per centum of the members of which are persons who are 'interested persons' of
such registered investment company"); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1994) (defining "interested person").
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(2) (1994) (declaring that the national public interest and the interest of
investors are adversely affected "when investment companies are organized, operated, managed, or their
portfolio securities are selected, in the interest of directors, officers, investment advisors . . ., in the interest of
underwriters, brokers or dealers, . . . rather than in the interest of all classes of such companies' security
holders"). See also United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[A] fundamental
purpose [of the ICA] ... is to prevent self-dealing on the part of those managing and controlling investment
companies and to protect shareholders in the funds from dishonest and self-dealing advisors."); SEC v. Fifth
Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[Liegislative
history shows that the purpose of the Investment Company Act was to prevent abuse which may grow out of
the unregulated power of management to use large pools of cash."); Remarks of Paul Roye, Dir. of the SEC's
Division of Investment Management, Delivered to the Investment Company Institute's Workshop for New
Fund Dirs., available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch475.js.htm ("Roye Remarks") (labeling
independent directors the "principal guardians of public trust in the mutual fund industry").
16 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ROUNDTABLE ON THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT
INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS-PART I (Feb. 23, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisionsl
investment/roundtable/iicdmdtl.htm ("SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART I") (noting that Levitt "has been a tireless
advocate of enhancing independent director effectiveness"); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
ROUNDTABLE ON THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS-PART I1 (Feb. 24, 1999),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investmentlroundtable/iicdrndt2.htm ("SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART
II") (where Levitt commented, "I would like to see restless, passionate directors. Directors who cared so much
about the well being of investors that they ask the tough questions that many times corporate management find
difficulty with." He later added: "I will make a personal commitment to everyone here to look very, very
carefully in terms of what the Commission can do to empower those of you in the trenches.").
17 SEC Rel. No. IC-24816, 74 S.E.C. Docket 102, 2001 SEC Lexis 15, at *9 (Jan. 2, 2001). This SEC
Release, together with SEC Release No. IC-24816A, 2001 SEC Lexis 404 (Feb. 27, 2001), which makes
certain corrections to it, is hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Independent Director Adopting Release."
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At a time when effective and proactive independent fund director oversight
is viewed as essential by both regulators and the mutual fund industry, 18 the
SEC's actions in the Heartland matter raise a number of important issues:
Given the new movement towards more effective independent fund directors,
when, if ever, should the SEC seek the receivership remedy and end corporate
democracy for a fund's shareholders? In other words, when should the SEC
armed with a court order push aside the congressionally mandated watchdogs?
What can a receiver do that one or more motivated and competent independent
fund directors represented by independent legal counsel cannot? Can the SEC
achieve what a receivership achieves by employing a less drastic remedy
coupled with meaningful independent director oversight?
This Article addresses these and other important issues. Part I briefly
discusses the authority of the SEC to seek the receivership remedy in the
mutual fund context. It then looks specifically at the factors to which the SEC
has cited in seeking court-imposed mutual fund receiverships since the passage
of the ICA in 1940. Part II examines the genesis of the independent mutual
fund director, the distinction between relational independence, and operational
independence, and the SEC's push for more effective independent directors.
Part III discusses the inherent tension between that push and SEC-initiated
receiverships. It then articulates a standard for when the SEC should work
together with capable independent directors in resolving a mutual fund's crisis
rather than seek the receivership remedy. That standard is designed to benefit
shareholders by supporting the movement towards more effective independent
directors while capturing the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages of
the receivership remedy.
I. THE SEC's AUTHORITY To SEEK THE RECEIVERSHIP REMEDY
What drove the SEC to the "fairly extreme step"' 9 of seeking the appoint-
ment of a receiver in the Heartland case? According to its complaint, the
SEC's biggest concern was that Heartland was depriving the Funds'
18 See, e.g., id. at *15 ("Most commentators supported [the SEC's] goal of enhancing the independence
and effectiveness of funds .... ); Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,826, 59,828 (Nov. 3, 1999) ("Proposing Release") ("We endorse the sentiments of the Roundtable
participants who favor enhancing the effectiveness and independence of fund boards of directors.");
Investment Company Institute ("If') Memorandum No. 12997, Jan. 9, 2001 (on file with authors) (indicating
the ICI's support for most of the fund governance rule changes set forth in SEC Rel. No. IC-24816 (Jan. 2,
2001)).
19 Damato, supra note 2 (quoting Daniel Gregus, Assistant Regional Dir. of the SEC).
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shareholders of statutorily required fundamental financial information. With-
out this information, existing shareholders could not decide to remain invested
20or redeem their shares in the Funds. Prospective investors, of course, also
could not make an informed investment decision with respect to the Funds.
Leading to this informational deprivation was Heartland's failure to send an
annual report for the Funds to the Funds' shareholders on March 1, 2001, and
to file that report with the SEC by March 10, 2001. 21  Heartland's failure
stemmed from the ICA's requirement that an annual report include audited
financial statements certified with an unqualified auditor's opinion.
22
Heartland's auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, refused to provide these
statements. While PricewaterhouseCoopers had commenced an audit, it
promised to disclaim any opinion as to the value of the securities held by the
Funds during fiscal year 2000.2  As Tim Warren, Associate Director of the
SEC's Midwest Office, stated: "[The auditors] could not audit the financial
statements because of questions regarding the value of the securities in the
fund. So shareholders could be redeeming [their shares] .. .at incorrect
values. 24
A. Equitable Relief and the SEC
As discussed below, 25 the SEC has sought to place a fund in receivership or
the equivalent 26 at least twenty-eight times since the passage of the ICA. The
courts have overwhelmingly granted the SEC's request for this equitable relief.
20 See Heartland Release, supra note 10; Kathleen Gallagher, Inventory of Troubled Heartland Funds
Filed; Report Says Many of Their Bonds Are Illiquid, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 29, 2001, at OlD
(quoting Paul F. Roye, Dir. of the SEC's Div. of Investment Mgmt., to the same effect).
21 See Heartland Release, supra note 10; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 80a-29(a), (b)(2) & (e) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999); 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b2-1 & e-1 (2001) (setting forth filing and distribution requirements with
respect to annual reports). In late February 2001, Heartland represented to the SEC staff that its auditors
would not be able to complete in a timely manner its financial statements. On March 1, 2001, Heartland
transmitted to its shareholders and filed with the SEC an annual report for all the funds in its series other than
the Funds. On March 14, 2001, Heartland informed the SEC staff that its auditors would begin an audit of the
Funds, but that the auditors intended to disclaim any opinion as to the value of the securities held by the Funds
during fiscal year 2000. See SEC v. Heartland Group, Inc., Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Case No. 01C 1984 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2001)
("Heartland Complaint").
22 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 80a-29(a) (1994).
23 See Heartland Complaint, supra note 21, at Averments 15-18.
24 See Court Takes over Three Heartland Funds-Troubled Muni-Bond Funds Put into Receivership at
Request of SEC, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 2, 2001, at BI; Heartland Complaint, supra note 21, at
Averments 19-20.
25 See infra Part I.B.
26 See infra note 47.
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One could easily conclude, therefore, that the SEC's authority to request, and
the court's authority to grant, the receivership remedy were indisputable.
Reaching this conclusion, however, is more involved than it appears.
In the Heartland matter, the SEC pointed to Section 42 of the ICA 27 as
giving it the authority to seek a receiver for the Funds and the other equitable
28relief it obtained. Only subsection (d) of Section 42 discusses equitable
relief.29 It states, in relevant part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has
engaged or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a
violation of any provision of [the ICA], or of any rule, regulation, or
order [under the ICA], [the Commission] may ... bring an action in
the proper district court of the United States ... to enjoin such acts or
practices and to enforce compliance .... Upon a showing that such
person has engaged or is about to engage in any such act or practice,
a permanent or temporary injunction or decree or restraining order
shall be granted without bond. In any proceeding under this
subsection to enforce compliance with section 7, the court as a court
of equity may, to the extent it deems necessary or appropriate, take
• ..possession of the investment company . ..involved and the
books, records and assets thereof, wherever located; and the court
shall have jurisdiction to appoint a trustee, who with the approval of
the court shall have power to dispose of any or all of such assets,
subject to such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe.
30
A strict reading of Section 42(d) yields two points. First, the SEC is
specifically authorized to seek an injunction, either temporary or permanent,
against any person that has engaged or is about to engage in any act or practice
constituting a violation of any provision of the ICA or any rule, regulation, or
order thereunder. Thus, the SEC had the statutory authority to seek, and
receive, permanent injunctive relief against Heartland to enjoin Heartland from
27 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1994).
28 See Heartland Complaint, supra note 21, at Averment 4. See also SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital
Mgmt., Inc., Agreed Application for (1) Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and (2) Order Appointing Special
Master and Brief in Support, C.A. No. 3-00CV 1482-D (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2000) ("Rupay-Barrington Agreed
Application") (where SEC cites to Section 42(d) of ICA in support of its request for special master for Rupay-
Barrington Funds, Inc.).
29 See SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609, 619 (D. S.D. 1968). This case refers to "Section
42(e)," which was redesignated as Section 42(d) in 1987. S.E.C. Authorization Act of 1987, title VI, sec. 623,
101 Stat. 1249, 1262 (1987).
30 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(d) (1994) (emphasis added).
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further violations of the ICA. Indeed, this was the SEC's first prayer for relief
in its complaint against Heartland.
31
Second, the SEC lacked explicit statutory authority to seek the appointment
of a receiver for the Funds. Section 42(d) only allows for the appointment of a
"trustee" to dispose of any or all of the assets of a given fund in the context of
an action to enforce Section 7 of the ICA. That section prohibits any entity
that fits within the definition of "investment company" and is not registered as
an investment company under the ICA or otherwise exempt from registration
under the ICA from, among other things, selling and redeeming its own
securities. The Heartland matter, however, did not implicate Section 7, as
the Funds were fully registered under the ICA.33  The SEC also sought and
obtained an order freezing the Funds' assets, a remedy designed to preserve the
status quo while the receiver sorts out the Funds' affairs. This action also
was not explicitly countenanced by Section 42(d).
Despite its lack of explicit statutory authority, the SEC sought and received
a court order appointing a receiver for the Funds. 35  What then was the legal
basis for this? The basis is the inherent equitable power of the federal courts, a
power they wield with wide discretion. Courts believe this power can and
should be used to better effectuate the purposes and improve the enforcement
of the federal securities laws,
37 including the ICA. 3
8
31 See Heartland Complaint, supra note 21, Prayer for Relief No. 1. The district court granted this prayer
for relief. See Heartland General Order, supra note 9, at Sec. I.
32 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a) (1994).
33 Cf SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609, 619 (D.S.D. 1968) (where unregistered investment
company ultimately registered by the time of court proceeding in which SEC requested appointment of
receiver, court stated "[tihe only statutory provision authorizing [the appointment of a receiver] is Section
42(e) [redesignated (d)] of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which is not applicable here").
34 See Heartland Complaint, supra note 21, Prayer for Relief No. 2. The district court granted this prayer
for relief. See Heartland General Order, supra note 9, at Sec. II.
35 See Heartland General Order, supra note 9, at Sec. Ill; see also SEC v. Heartland Group, Inc., Order
Appointing a Receiver, Case No. 01C 1984 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2001) ("Heartland Receiver Order") (detailing
the specific responsibilities, duties, and privileges of the Funds' receiver).
36 See, e.g., SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 358-59 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Wong, 254 F.
Supp. 66, 69 (D.P.R. 1966). See also SEC v. John Adams Trust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Mass. 1968)
(where, in case involving investment advisor receivership and injunctive relief, court noted that "[t]he federal
courts are vested with wide discretion when an injunction is sought to prevent future violations of the statutory
securities laws").
37 See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1984) (confirming authority of district courts to
appoint receivers in SEC actions); SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The federal courts
have inherent equitable authority to issue a variety of 'ancillary relief measures in actions brought by the SEC
to enforce the federal securities laws."); SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972) (upholding appointment
of a receiver to supervise corporate defendant's securities transactions); Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28 (8th
20021
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This power to appoint a receiver for an investment company, having been
embraced by the federal courts for decades, has become unassailable.
39
Indeed, in one of the earliest lines of cases involving an SEC receivership
request under the ICA, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in commenting on
the district court's appointment of a receiver for the Aldred Investment Trust,
stated:
By placing our [receivership] decision on the ground of general
equity jurisdiction, we eliminate the argument hinged on statutory
construction of the Investment Company Act of 1940. Nor do we
think that it was intended that the district court be deprived of this
aspect of its general equity jurisdiction by failing to refer specifically
to it in the statute. Consequently, power did reside in the district
Cir. 1970) (federal equity receivership arising from violation of federal securities laws and to preserve assets
for benefit of investor-creditors of corporation). See also Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Pa.
1982) (in private action to enforce the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA"), court appointed federal
magistrate to oversee company's operations to ensure maintenance of status quo); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Mack, 180 N.E. 412, 413 (111. 1932) ("The appointment of a receiver is a branch of equity jurisdiction not
dependent upon any statute, and rests largely in the discretion of the appointing court."). See generally James
R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1779 (1976).
38 See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 54 (7th Cir. 1972) (commenting on equitable
receiverships, court noted "tt]he purpose of injunctive relief is ... to deter future violations, thus insuring
general compliance with the broad remedial design of the legislation"); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d
741 (2d Cir. 1966) (upholding appointment of receiver in view of prior violations of the ICA, false reports, and
absence of corporate management); SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963) (prima facie showing of
fraud and mismanagement, absent insolvency, is enough to call into play equitable powers of court); Tanzer v.
Huffines, 287 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1969) (motion for appointment of
receiver pendente lite for investment company would be granted for purpose of safeguarding investments of
shareholders in view of management's apparent disregard of its fiduciary responsibilities); SEC v. Midland
Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609, 619 (D.S.D. 1968) (holding federal district court has inherent equitable power to
appoint a receiver upon a prima facie showing of fraud and mismanagement, even when Section 42(e)
(redesignated (d)) of the ICA is inapplicable); SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 714 (D. Del. 1943)
(stating that appointment of receiver to carry out court's order "is a normal process of a court of equity").
39 See George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67
MINN. L. REV. 865, 869 (1983) (stating that "[t]he most persuasive argument for ancillary relief in federal
securities law is that the Supreme Court and many lower courts have approved such relief and that almost no
judicial precedent has questioned it"). In proceedings under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), the courts have cited to Section 22(a) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1994), as giving them the authority to appoint receivers. See, e.g., SEC v. First Fin. Group of Texas, 645 F.2d
429, 438 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The appointment of a receiver is a well-established equitable remedy available to
the SEC in its civil enforcement proceedings for injunctive relief."); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mtg. Exch. v.
SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 182 (9th Cir. 1960) ("We conclude ... as the Supreme Court has stated with respect to
other regulatory statutes, that the Congress must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of
equity to provide complete relief in the light of statutory purposes. As the Supreme Court long ago
recognized, there is inherent in the court of equity a jurisdiction to give effect to the policy of the legislature.").
Interestingly, Section 44 of the ICA is an analog to those sections of the Securities Act and Exchange Act, yet
the SEC does not reference it.
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court to appoint a receiver to reorganize or liquidate the Aldred
Trust.
40
Private litigants, however, traditionally must satisfy three strict equitable
conditions before a court will appoint a receiver. First, the plaintiff has to
assert an existing legal claim to the assets held by the defendant. Second, a
serious danger must exist that the defendant will dissipate those assets.
Finally, no lesser remedy adequate to protect the plaintiff s claim must exist.
41
If the SEC were a private litigant, therefore, a court would require it to
proffer evidence that the three equitable conditions were met. The SEC, of
course, never has a claim to the assets of the defendant investment company,
and thus never satisfies the first of the three traditional conditions for the
appointment of a receiver. Any argument that it could make about "stepping
into the shoes of investors" is undermined by the fact that fund investors in
their own right have, in the past, petitioned for, and received, court orders
42appointing receivers for investment companies.
Nevertheless, the SEC has adeptly sidestepped these private litigant
equitable requirements by arguing successfully that in many instances an
injunction against violations of the federal securities laws cannot by itself
ensure compliance.43 Because the courts have held that "the standards of the
public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety
and need for injunctive relief," 44 the same should hold true in. the case of
ancillary relief. That relief, such as the appointment of a receiver and the
freezing of fund assets, is needed to carry out the primary injunctive relief
40 Baily v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 1947). See also SEC v. Wong, 254 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.P.R.
1966) (In an action involving the ICA, court noted that "[defendant's] second contention, that the [SEC] is
restricted to the remedies expressly provided by statute, does not take into consideration the historical purpose
of Equity to provide the relief which is necessary and proper under the circumstances of the case before the
Court.").
41 See Dent, supra note 39, at 871-73.
42 See, e.g., Tanzer, 408 F.2d 42; Baily, 160 F.2d 78; Connolly v. Gishwiller, 162 F.2d 428 (7th Cir.
1947).
43 See, e.g., First Fin. Group of Texas, 645 F.2d at 438 (stating that appointment of receiver "is a well-
established equitable remedy available to the SEC in its civil enforcement proceedings for injunctive relief");
SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963) (where defendants had committed fraud in raising
capital for unregistered fund, appointment of receiver becomes necessary to implement injunctive relief); SEC
v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 714 (D. Del. 1943) (in a case where the court granted permanent
injunction to enforce Section 22(e) of ICA, appointment of a receiver is proper where directors and fund
advisor had resigned and, thus, there was no one to whom the injunction could effectively run).
44 SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321,331 (1944)).
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granted.45 All that is required is for the SEC to make a proper showing that the
defendants are engaged or about to engage in violative conduct.
46
B. What Triggers the SEC's Request for a Receiver in the Mutual Fund
Context?
Our research revealed that the SEC has sought a court order appointing a
receiver or the equivalent47 for an investment company at least twenty-eight
times since the passage of the ICA in 1940.48 These cases are summarized in
45 See SEC v. Fla. Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,707, at 94,737,
1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978) ("This Court has authority to grant other equitable relief in conjunction with
an injunctive action brought by the Commission, and to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities of
the particular case." (quotation and citation omitted)); SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 714 (D. Del.
1943) ("As is frequently stated, a receivership is an ancillary remedy to carry out the primary relief granted in
a cause."). See also Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mack, 180 N.E. 412, 413 (111. 1932) (appointment of
receiver "had its origin in the English Court of Chancery at an early date, and it was incidental to and in aid of
the jurisdiction of equity to enable it to accomplish, as far as practicable, complete justice among the parties
before it").
46 See SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102, 105 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980).
47 As a matter of terminology, in all but four of these cases the court appointed a "receiver," "trustee," or
"trustee-receiver." With respect to those four other cases, the court in one appointed a "special master" who
had the typical powers of a receiver. See SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No.
16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000). In the second case, the court appointed
a "special officer" whose function was to direct the liquidation and dissolution of the fund in question. See
SEC v. Treasury First, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,094, 50 S.E.C. Docket 381, 1991 SEC Lexis 2632 (Nov. 19,
1991). In the third case, the court appointed a "special master" whose powers "[did] not extend to the plenary
powers of a full receiver." SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,951,
at 95,978, 1979 WL 1238, *7 (D.D.C. 1979). That special master, however, was given more powers than the
powers awarded to an actual "receiver" in another case. Compare id. at *7 (where court authorized special
master to conduct new election of directors and supervise shareholders' and new boards' consideration of
management contract), with SEC v. Boca Raton Capital Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294, 57 S.E.C. Docket
2145, 1994 SEC Lexis 3244 (Oct. 11, 1994) (where court order only authorized receiver to conduct new
election of directors). The court in the last case appointed a "special auditor" and a "special counsel" who,
together, had the typical powers of a receiver. See SEC v. Am. Inst. of Counselors, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8
S.E.C. Docket 587, 1975 WL 160733 (Nov. 25, 1975).
48 One of those cases involved a derivative action brought by a shareholder in which the SEC filed an
amicus curiae brief requesting that the district court's order for a receiver pendente lite be affirmed. See
Tanzer v. Huffines, 408 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1969) (involving B.S.F. Co.).
During our research, we also came across five other cases which we have not included within the
twenty-eight cases discussed. The first case involved a shareholder suit against Cyprus Corporation, a closed-
end investment company. The court appointed a federal magistrate to oversee the company's operations to
ensure maintenance of the status quo. We have not included it because the SEC was not a party to the action,
either directly or indirectly. See Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Pa. 1982). The second case
involved a suit brought by the SEC against a group of foreign companies, including Capital Growth Fund,
S.A., aclosed-end fund incorporated in Costa Rica. Because the SEC sought and received injunctive relief and
the appointment of a receiver solely based on alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
l0b-5 promulgated thereunder, we have not included it given our focus on the ICA. See SEC v. Capital
Growth Co., S.A. (Costa Rica), 391 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The third case involved a suit brought by a
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Annex A. The SEC was successful in twenty-six of those cases, 49 unsuccessful
in only one case, and withdrew its request in the remaining case.
51
We believe three things have contributed to the SEC's remarkable .928
batting average in seeking the receivership remedy. First, as most practitioners
with any experience with the SEC recognize, the SEC chooses its cases very
carefully. Not only does it like cases that it can win hands down, but it also
likes test cases that will send an industry-wide message. Second, when
seeking the receivership remedy, the SEC proffers multiple factors in support
of its petition. The SEC has, on average, cited to approximately four factors
per case from the nineteen different factors to which it has cited for support.
52
Finally, in at least one-third of the cases, the fund in question consented to, did
not oppose, or initiated the appointment of a receiver. It is certainly easier to
win in court when the other side does not put up a fight.
disgruntled shareholder against the Blair Fund and its advisor, Blair & Co., which was in bankruptcy. We
have not included it because the SEC was not a party to the action, either directly or indirectly. See Lowey v.
Vanderbilt, [1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,907, at 90,383, 1970 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9007
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). The fourth case involved the Townsend Growth Fund, Inc. We have not included it because
the court appointed a trustee for the fund only after the fund had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See In re Townsend Growth Fund, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The final case involved the Calumet Bond & Investment Company. We did not include it because the SEC
was not a party to the action, either directly or indirectly. Moreover, the actions of the defendant all occurred
prior to the passage of the ICA and thus were not governed by it. See Connolly v. Gishwiller, 162 F.2d 428
(7th Cir. 1947).
49 In one case included in the "successful" tally, the SEC sought a receiver with plenary powers for a
troubled fund. However, upon consideration the court appointed a "special master" with only some of the
powers ofa receiver. See SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,951, at
95,978, 1979 WL 1238, at *4 (D.D.C. 1979).
50 See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972).
51 In a case involving the Steadman Funds, a group comprised of five registered investment companies,
the SEC originally sought a receiver for the funds in addition to injunctive relief. See SEC v. Steadman, SEC
Lit. Rel. No. 12,167, 44 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1989 SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989). The U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia granted injunctive relief, but stayed its order while the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed it. Because the district court's opinion does not mention the appointment of a receiver, it is unclear
whether the SEC withdrew its receivership request during settlement negotiations that are mentioned in that
opinion. In any event, the receivership issue was effectively mooted when the court stayed its own order. The
court of appeals ultimately reversed the lower court, ending any possibility that the court would appoint a
receiver. See SEC v. Steadman, 798 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D.D.C. 1991) (discussing settlement negotiations),
vacated in part, aff'd in part, 967 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1992); e-mail from Peter J. Nickles of Covington &
Burling, counsel to Steadman, to Prof. Jeffrey J. Haas, dated Aug. 24, 2001 (on file with Prof. Haas).
52 The highest number of factors cited was nine, while the lowest number was only one. Compare SEC
Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963) (citing nine factors in a case involving Continental
Growth Fund, Inc.), with SEC v. Boca Raton Capital Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2145,
1994 SEC Lexis 3244 (Oct. 11, 1994) (citing one factor).
53 See Heartland Release, supra note 10; SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000); SEC v. Boca Raton Capital Corp.,
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The SEC has never publicly set forth the standard it employs when
deciding whether to seek the receivership remedy. This Article sets out,
therefore, to piece together that standard based on the factors to which the SEC
cited when it sought that remedy. In examining each receivership case, this
Article looks only at those factors to which the SEC originally cited in support
of its receivership request, rather than any additional factors that came to light
in later proceedings involving the fund in question and/or any individual
defendants. All told, the SEC has cited to nineteen different factors, typically
in combination, in the twenty-eight receivership cases examined. Not
surprisingly, the SEC cited to certain factors frequently and to others less
frequently.
1. Recurring Factors
For a factor to be considered recurring, we decided the SEC had to cite to it
in at least six, or just over twenty percent, of the twenty-eight receivership
cases. Employing this standard, these factors, and the number of cases in
which the SEC cited to them, are as follows:
a. Fraud (17);
b. Incorrect or Problematic Net Asset Value ("NAV") (11);
c. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (10);
d. Prohibited Affiliate Transactions (9);
e. Reporting Violations (9);
f. Suspension of Share Redemption (6); and
g. Improper Book or Record Keeping (6).
Each of these recurring factors is considered below.
SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2145, 1994 SEC Lexis 3244 (Oct. 11, 1994); SEC v. Alpine Mut.
Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,123, 50 S.E.C. Docket 672, 1991 SEC Lexis 2639 (Dec. 18, 1991); SEC v.
Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331, 45 S.E.C. Docket 256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26,
1989); SEC v. Am. Inst. Counselors, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587, 1975 WL 160733
(Nov. 25, 1975); SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6 S.E.C. Docket 709, 1975 WL 161610
(Apr. 15, 1975); SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6383, 4 S.E.C. Docket 413, 1974 SEC Lexis
3173 (June 4, 1974); In re Shamrock Fund, SEC Rel. No. IC-7044, 1972 SEC Lexis 1224 (Mar. 7, 1972); SEC
Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb. 28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mutual Funds, Inc.).
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a. Fraud
Cited in seventeen of the twenty-eight receivership cases (sixty-one
percent) were examples of fraudulent conduct. 54 The SEC, however, did not
limit itself to highlighting fraudulent activities proscribed by Section 34(b) of
the ICA. 55  It also cited to violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Act, Exchange Act, and Investment Advisors Act of 194056 ("IAA").
For example, in support of its request for a receiver and other ancillary relief in
a case involving the Rupay-Barrington Funds, Inc.,57 the SEC alleged that the
fund, its investment advisor, and an upstream affiliate violated Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act,58 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5
thereunder, Sections 206(1) and (2) of the IAA, and Section 34(b) of theICA. 6 1
Specific examples of fraud mentioned in the seventeen cases include the
following:
54 See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Keller Corp., 323
F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963); Tanzer v. Huffines, 287 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 42 (3d Cir.
1969) (involving B.S.F. Co.); SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968); SEC v. S & P
Nat'l Corp., 265 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000); SEC v. Centurion Growth Fund,
Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,052,56 S.E.C. Docket 1237, 1994 SEC Lexis 1132 (Apr. 14,1994); SEC v. Brenna,
SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,099, 50 S.E.C. Docket 383, 1991 SEC Lexis 2637 (Nov. 19, 1991) (involving four funds
managed by Strategic Mgmt., Inc.); SEC v. Treasury First, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,094, 50 S.E.C. Docket
381, 1991 SEC Lexis 2632 (Nov. 19, 1991); SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No.
12,331,45 S.E.C. Docket 256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989); SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,167,
44 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1989 SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989) (involving five funds managed by Steadman
Security Corp.); SEC v. Fla. Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,707, 1978
WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC v. Am. Inst. Counselors, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587,
1975 WL 160733 (Nov. 25, 1975); SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6 S.E.C. Docket 709,
1975 WL 161610 (Apr. 15, 1975); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5408, 1972 SEC Lexis 1676 (May 25, 1972) (involving
Technical Fund, Inc.); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 3308, 1965 SEC Lexis 65 (Sept. 1, 1965) (involving Puerto Rico
Capital Corp.). See also SEC v. First Fin. Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1981) (in case
involving the Securities Act, court noted that appointment of receiver "is particularly necessary in instances in
which the corporate defendant, through its management, has defrauded members of the investing public"
because "it is likely that, in the absence of the appointment ... to maintain the status quo, the corporate assets
will be subject to diversion and waste").
" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(b) (1994).
56 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
57 See SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089,
2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000).
'8 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994).
59 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
60 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(l), (2) (1994).
61 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(b) (1994).
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" Misrepresentation that a large receivable issued by a fund advisor and
held by the fund in question was being paid off when it was not;
6 2
* Selling fund shares at prices not based on the calculated NAV of those
shares;
63
" Selling unregistered gold-related securities "in near total disregard for,
and in violation of the entire panoply of federal securities laws"; 
64
" Filing false and misleading proxy materials;
65
" Filing false and misleading annual reports; 66 and
* Inducing prospective investors to purchase fund shares based on
67misleading or false information.
b. Net Asset Value Problems
Cited in eleven of the twenty-eight receivership cases (thirty-nine percent)
were events relating to a fund's calculation of its NAV. 68  The funds in
62 See SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089,
2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000).
63 See SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331, 45 S.E.C. Docket 256, 1989
WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989).
64 SEC v. Am. Inst. Counselors, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587, 1975 WL 160733
(Nov. 25, 1975).
65 See SEC v. Brenna, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,099, 50 S.E.C. Docket 383, 1991 SEC Lexis 2637 (Nov. 19,
1991) (involving four funds managed by Strategic Mgmt., Inc.); SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,951, 1979 WL 1238, *4 (D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Zenith Am. Mgmt.
Serv., Ltd., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6650, 5 S.E.C. Docket 798, 1974 SEC Lexis 2080 (Dec. 24, 1974); SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 5408, 1972 SEC Lexis 1676 (May 25, 1972) (involving Technical Fund, Inc.); SEC Lit. Rel. No.
3308, 1965 SEC Lexis 65 (Sept. 1, 1965) (involving Puerto Rico Capital Corp.).
66 See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972); Tanzer v. Huffines, 408 F.2d
42 (3d Cir. 1969) (involving B.S.F. Co.); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 265 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC
v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D.
Fla. 1978).
67 See SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 14,052, 56 S.E.C. Docket 1237, 1994 SEC Lexis 1132 (Apr. 14, 1994); SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 12,167, 44 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1989 SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989) (involving five funds managed by
Steadman Security Corp.); SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., 11979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,951,
1979 WL 1238, *4 (D.D.C. 1979).
68 See SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089,
2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000); In re Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-20204, 56 S.E.C.
Docket 1129, 1994 SEC Lexis 1065 (Apr. 7, 1994); SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101,
50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL 288420 (Nov. 21, 1991); SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 12,331, 45 S.E.C. Docket 256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989); SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 12,167, 44 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1989 SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989) (involving five funds managed by
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question either miscalculated their NAVs, 69 could not calculate them due to• 70 7
insufficient information, or otherwise failed to calculate them.' Sometimes
the miscalculation was tied to an allegation of fraud in that the fund was selling
its securities at intentionally miscalculated NAVs.72  NAV calculation
problems also played a role in the Heartland matter, although not specifically
cited by the SEC. Indeed, a close reading of the SEC's pleadings indicate that
the SEC was clearly concerned about whether the Funds were properly
valued.73
A particularly egregious NAV case involved Fundamatic Investors, Inc.,74 a
fund that could not shoot straight. The SEC alleged that two causes lay behind
Steadman Security Corp.); SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836,6 S.E.C. Docket
709, 1975 WL 161610 (Apr. 15, 1975); SEC Lit. Rel. 5595, 1972 SEC Lexis 1862 (Oct. 31, 1972) (involving
Fundamatic Investors, Inc.); In re Shamrock Fund, SEC Rel. No. IC-7044, 1972 SEC Lexis 1224 (Mar. 7,
1972); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb. 28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mutual
Fund, Inc.); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963) (involving Continental Growth
Fund, Inc.). See also In re Technical Fund Inv. Plans, SEC Rel. No. IC-7393, 1972 SEC Lexis 1388 (Sept. 27,
1972) (although not mentioned in SEC's complaint, receiver suspended share redemption due to inaccurate
NAV).
69 See In re Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-20204, 56 S.E.C. Docket 1129, 1994 SEC
Lexis 1065 (Apr. 7, 1994); SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101, 50 S.E.C. Docket 386,
1991 WL 288420 (Nov. 21, 1991); SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,167, 44 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1989
SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989) (involving five funds managed by Steadman Security Corp.); SEC v. Florida
Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978);
SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6 S.E.C. Docket 709, 1975 WL 161610 (Apr. 15, 1975);
SEC Lit. Rel. 5595, 1972 SEC Lexis 1862 (Oct. 31, 1972) (involving Fundamatic Investors, Inc.); SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963) (involving Continental Growth Fund, Inc.). See also In
re Technical Fund Inv. Plans, SEC Rel. No. IC-7393, 1972 SEC Lexis 1388 (Sept. 27, 1972) (although not
mentioned in SEC's complaint, receiver suspended share redemption due to inaccurate NAV).
70 See In re Shamrock Fund, SEC Rel. No. IC-7044, 1972 Lexis 1224 (Mar. 7, 1992) (insufficient
information to calculate fund's NAV properly because independent directors' frequent requests for portfolio
information were "systematically denied"). Cf. SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,167, 44 S.E.C. Docket
45, 1989 SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989) (involving five funds managed by Steadman Security Corporation.
Upon learning of SEC's investigation of funds based on NAV and other problems, funds' trustees resolved to
liquidate the funds, but individual defendants failed to comply with resolutions and take steps to liquidate).
71 See SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089,
2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000); SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331,45
S.E.C. Docket 256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb.
28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mutual Fund, Inc.).
72 See SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6 S.E.C. Docket 709, 1975 WL 161610 (Apr.
15, 1975).
73 See Heartland Complaint, supra note 21, Background In 19-20 ("Heartland Group's auditors' refusal
to opine on the valuation of the securities held by the Funds raises serious concerns about the value of the
Funds and the securities held by the Funds .... Meanwhile, shareholders have redeemed, and continue to
redeem, shares in the Funds."); supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
74 SEC Lit. Rel. 5595, 1972 SEC Lexis 1862 (Oct. 31, 1972).
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the fund's miscalculation of its NAV. First, the fund had not kept current the
books and records necessary to compute NAV. Second, the fund had no
functioning board of directors to value its portfolio securities for which market
prices were not readily available.75 To make matters worse, the fund redeemed
shares at NAVs computed as of the wrong day.76
c. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Cited in ten of the twenty-eight receivership cases (thirty-six percent) were
breaches of fiduciary duty.77 In most cases, the SEC cited to a violation of
78Section 36(a) of the ICA, which proscribes personal misconduct by, among
others, a fund's directors, officers, or investment advisors. Given that Section
36(a) is a "duty of loyalty" styled provision, it was not surprising to find
references to self-dealing, gross misconduct, and gross abuse of trust in the
79cases.
75 It later came out that the fund did have directors, but that they played no active or material role in the
management of the fund. See In re Richard 0. Bertoli, SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-4618, 1979 SEC Lexis
2450 (June 18, 1979). Instead, one individual defendant "alone directed the Fund's day-to-day operations."
Id. at *8.
76 See SEC Lit. Rel. 5595, 1972 SEC Lexis 1862 (Oct. 31, 1972).
77 See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972); Tanzer v. Huffines, 287 F.
Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1969) (involving B.S.F. Co.); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach
Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963
SEC Lexis 1020 (July 20, 1963) (involving Continental Growth Fund, Inc.); SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, 58 F.
Supp. 724 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 151 F.2d 254 (1 st Cir. 1945); SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC
Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000); SEC v. Treasury First,
Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,094, 50 S.E.C. Docket 381, 1991 SEC Lexis 2632 (Nov. 19, 1991); SEC v.
Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,951, 1979 WL 1238 (D.D.C. 1979); SEC
Lit. Rel. No. 5408, 1972 SEC Lexis 1676 (May 25, 1972) (involving Technical Fund, Inc.); SEC Lit. Rel. No.
5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb. 28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mutual Funds, Inc.). See also United
States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976) (although not mentioned in SEC's complaint, fund's officers
and investment advisor engaged in self-dealing by causing the fund to purchase certain securities in return for
kickbacks); SEC v. Brenna, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,116, 50 S.E.C. Docket 605, 1991 SEC Lexis 2786 (Dec. 10,
1991) (involving four funds managed by Strategic Mgmt., Inc.) (although not part of SEC's prayer for relief,
the court's temporary restraining order also prohibited individual defendants from further violations of Section
36(a) of ICA); In re Richard 0. Bertoli, SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-4618, 1979 SEC Lexis 2450, at *22-24
(June 18, 1979) (in a case involving Fundamatic Investors, Inc., fund officers found to have engaged in self-
dealing transactions although such was not alleged in SEC's original complaint).
71 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(a) (1994).
79 See, e.g., Aldred Inv. Trust, 58 F. Supp. 724; SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5408, 1972 SEC Lexis 1676 (May 25,
1972) (involving Technical Fund, Inc.); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 20, 1963)
(involving Continental Growth Fund, Inc.). Two unique cases involving breach of fiduciary duty are SEC v.
Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970), and SEC v.
Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9196,951, at 95,981, 1979 WL 1238, at *6
(D.D.C. 1979). In Fifth Ave., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York pointed to certain
individual defendants' self-dealing that occurred prior to the time the company in question had inadvertently
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Worthy of discussion on this point is SEC v. Advance Growth Capital
Corporation, the only case in which a court denied the SEC's request for a
receiver. The SEC sought a permanent injunction against the defendant
corporation and two individual defendants, as well as a receiver for the
corporation. The SEC alleged that the defendants had engaged in prohibited
affiliate transactions and had filed annual reports with the SEC that omitted
discussion of those transactions. It further alleged that the two individual
defendants had engaged in a gross abuse of trust within the meaning of Section
36 of the ICA.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in an
unpublished opinion referred to in the appellate opinion, refused to appoint a
receiver. It reasoned that although the two individual defendants had engaged
in acts that could be criticized, they had benefitted shareholders immensely by
turning the corporation's financial affairs around. In discussing whether a
receiver should be appointed, the district court stated:
It would be more than a disservice to [the corporation], its
stockholders and creditors, it would be a disaster to them for this
court to appoint a Receiver ... after [the two defendants] had rescued
[the corporation] from bankruptcy in 1964, and saved it from
dissolution in 1965 and 1966, and have since that time restored most
of the capital that was dissipated in the 1962 binge of the officers and
directors.
81
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, "weighing all the equities, ' 82 agreed
with the district court on this point. It noted that "it is probable that removal
become an investment company as supporting, in part, the appointment of a receiver after the time the
company had become an inadvertent investment company. See Fifth Ave., 289 F. Supp. at 3.
In Fundpack, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia noted in the context of a breach of
fiduciary duties allegation under Section 36(a) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(a) (1994), Fundpack's board of
directors' pattern of routinely renewing its advisory contract with its fund advisor without assessing the merits
of doing so. See Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,981. The court used
this partially to support granting the SEC's request for a receiver. Oddly, the court's reference to a director's
breach of his or her "duty of care" is not what Congress intended when it included the words "breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct" in Section 36(a). Indeed, that section embodies duty of loyalty,
rather than negligence, concepts.
'0 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 54.
82 id.
83 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court on the issue of whether the district court should
issue a permanent injunction against the individual defendants with respect to the affiliated transactions in
which they had engaged in violation of Section 17(a) and (d) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) & (d) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999). The district court had refused to grant an injunction based on its finding that the individual
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of the defendants and the appointment of a receiver would be more detrimental
than beneficial to the investment company and its shareholders, and, as Section
36(a) expressly recognizes, the ultimate benefit of these parties is the primary
objective of the Act."84  It did add, however, that "[w]hether the [individual]
defendants are barred under provisions of § 9(a)(2) ...from serving in their
present capacity or any other capacity with [the corporation] absent exemption
under § 9(c) .. . is an administrative matter within the provisions of the
Commission as to which we express no opinion .... 85
d. Prohibited Affiliate Transactions
Cited in nine of the twenty-eight receivership cases (thirty-two percent)
were improper transactions between funds and their affiliates. 86  These
transactions are generally prohibited by Section 17 of the ICA.87 That section
prohibits any "affiliated person' '88 of an investment company from acting as a
principal in (a) selling securities to, or buying securities from, an investment
company or (b) lending money to, or borrowing money from, an investment
company, in either case, without an exemption granted by the SEC.
8 9
defendants had not engaged in intentional misconduct and that, in any event, the corporation had not been
harmed. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d at 44. The Seventh Circuit, convinced that these
defendants' conduct was neither inadvertent nor harmless, disagreed: "These were not mere 'technical'
violations of regulatory legislation, but continual and extensive violations of provisions which lie at the very
heart of a remedial statute. They provide the opportunity for personal gain by those with fiduciary
obligations-the specific target of the Investment Company Act's prohibitions." Id. at 53-54.
84 Id. at 54.
85 Id. at 55 (citations omitted). Under Section 9(a)(2) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(2) (1994), it is
illegal for any person who has been permanently or temporarily enjoined from acting as, among other things,
an underwriter, broker, dealer, or investment advisor to serve as a director or officer of an investment company
absent an exemption granted by the SEC pursuant to Section 9(c) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(c) (1994).
86 See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Florida Bank Fund,
Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC v. Fifth
Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Rupay-
Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July
10, 2000); SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101,50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL 288420
(Nov. 21, 1991); SEC v. Am. Inst. Counselors, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587, 1975 WL
160733 (Nov. 25, 1975); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5408, 1972 SEC Lexis 1676 (May 25, 1972) (involving Technical
Fund, Inc.); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 3308, 1965 SEC Lexis 65 (Sept. I, 1965) (involving Puerto Rico Capital Corp.);
SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 20, 1963) (involving Continental Growth Fund, Inc.).
81 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). One case also cited to Section 21(b) of the ICA, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-21(b) (1994), which prohibits any registered management company from lending money to a
controlling entity. See SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
88 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1994).
89 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a), (b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Because the main concern is with the investment
advisor taking advantage of the fund it advises, one case, not surprisingly, also cited to a violation of Section
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e. Reporting Violations
Cited in nine of the twenty-eight receivership cases (thirty-two percent)
were reporting violations. 90 All nine cases, including Heartland, cited a failure
on the fund's part to file certain required reports, such as a semiannual or
annual report, with the SEC in violation of Section 30 of the ICA and certain
rules promulgated thereunder.
9 1  In addition, all but one of the nine cases
92
pointed to a fund's failure to deliver certain required reports to the fund's
shareholders in violation of that same ICA section and Rule 30d-1 promulgated
thereunder.
93
f Suspension of Share Redemption
Cited in six of the twenty-eight receivership cases (twenty-one percent)
were illegal suspensions by open-end investment companies of their share-
holders' redemption rights under the ICA.94  As a general matter, the law
requires open-end funds to redeem their shares within seven days of tender by
fund shareholders; the six funds in question failed to do so in violation of
Section 22(e) of the ICA.95
Two cases highlight the importance of this factor. SEC v. Fiscal Fund,
Inc.,96 represented the first case in which the SEC requested, and a district
37 of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37 (1994). See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 3308, 1965 SEC Lexis 65 (Sept. 1, 1965)
(involving Puerto Rico Capital Corp.). That section makes it a crime for any person to embezzle any money or
securities held by a fund.
90 See Tanzer v. Huffines, 287 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1969) (involving
B.S.F. Co.); SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943); Heartland Release, supra note 10; SEC
v. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,052, 56 S.E.C. Docket 1237, 1994 SEC Lexis 1132
(Apr. 14, 1994); SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101, 50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL
288420 (Nov. 21, 1991); SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331, 45 S.E.C.
(Docket) 256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989); SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., 11979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel.
6359, 4 S.E.C. Docket 293, 1974 SEC Lexis 3241 (May 8, 1974); SEC Lit. Rel. 5595, 1972 SEC Lexis 1862
(Oct. 31, 1972) (involving Fundamatic Investors, Inc.).
91 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 17 C.F.R. § 270.30a-1, bI-I & b2-1 (2000).
92 That one case was Tanzer, 287 F. Supp. 273 (involving B.S.F. Co.).
93 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 17 C.F.R. § 270.30d-1 (2000).
94 See SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943); SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital
Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000); SEC v.
Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101,50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL 288420 (Nov. 21, 1991);
SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 6359, 4 S.E.C. Docket 293, 1974 SEC Lexis 3241 (May 8, 1974);
SEC Lit. Rel. 5595, 1972 SEC Lexis 1862 (Oct. 31, 1972) (involving Fundamatic Investors, Inc.); SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb. 28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mutual Fund, Inc.).
95 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e)(1994).
96 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943).
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court granted, a receiver to liquidate a solvent investment company.97  In
addition to pointing to the fund's failure to redeem shares, the SEC highlighted
the fund's complete lack of management and failure to file required reports. In
weighing these three factors, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware stated that the fund's "most crucial violation of the Act has been
Sec[tion] 22(e)." 98  Later, it added that "the violation of which gives theCommission the greatest concern is Sec[tion] 22(e)." 99
In re Shamrock Fund100 also highlighted the seriousness of a Section 22(e)
violation. Here, the independent fund directors had made frequent requests to
the investment advisor for information relating to the fund's portfolio. That
advisor, however, "systematically denied"''° 1 those requests. Through the
directors, the fund asserted that there was not enough information to value the
fund's assets properly. An emergency, therefore, existed under Section 22(e),
and the fund petitioned the SEC for an order to suspend shareholder
redemption privileges pursuant to Section 22(e)(3). Rather than grant the
requested order, the SEC convinced the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the fund
from failing to redeem its shares in violation of Section 22(e) and from selling
its redeemable shares in violation of Section 22(d). 102 Moreover, the district
court, at the SEC's request, appointed a receiver pendente lite to take charge of
the assets and records of the fund for safekeeping.
g. Improper Book or Record Keeping
Cited in six of the twenty-eight receivership cases (twenty-one percent)
were instances of improper book or record keeping.'0 3 The SEC claimed that
97 See SEC Rel. No. IC-434, 1943 WL 30294 (Jan. 19, 1943).
98 Fiscal Fund, 48 F. Supp. at 713.
9' Id. at 714.
'00 SEC Rel. No. IC-7044, 1972 Lexis 1224 (Mar. 7, 1992).
1o Id.
102 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1994).
103 See SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101, 50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL
288420 (Nov. 21, 1991); SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331,45 S.E.C. Docket
256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989); SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 196,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SECv. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587, 1975 WL 160733 (Nov. 25, 1975); SEC Lit. Rel. 5595, 1972 SEC Lexis 1862
(Oct. 31, 1972) (involving Fundamatic Investors, Inc.); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb.
28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mutual Fund, Inc.). See also SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis
1020 (July 30, 1963) (involving Continental Growth Fund, Inc.) (complaint charged defendant custodial bank
with failure to maintain records which accurately set forth the fund's assets).
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must have a majority of independent directors on its board. Boca, however,
only had one independent director on its five-member board. Based on this
factor alone, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, at the
SEC's request and with Boca's consent, appointed a receiver for the company.
The receiver, which was only appointed for sixty days or until further order of
the court, was charged with arranging for shareholders to elect the proper
number of independent directors and to prepare proxy materials to facilitate
that goal.
Cited in five of the twenty-eight receivership cases (eighteen percent) was a
fund's deviation from its stated investment policies. 110  These deviations
violate Section 13(a) of the ICA."' That section prohibits registered invest-
ment companies from, among other things, unilaterally deviating from
fundamental investment policies that can only be changed through a majority
vote of their shareholders. In addition, one fund also made loans in con-
travention of its prospectus, and thus violated Section 21(a) of the ICA ll2 in
addition to Section 13(a)."1
3
Another factor that the SEC cited in five cases (eighteen percent) was the
failure of fund shareholders to approve a fund's management contract
properly;' 14 shareholders' failure to do so violates Section 15(a) of the ICA.''
5
Specifically, that section makes it unlawful for any person to serve as an
investment advisor to a registered investment company except pursuant to a
11o See SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, 58 F. Supp. 724 (D. Mass.), af'd, 151 F.2d 254 (lst Cir. 1945); SECv.
Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101, 50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL 288420 (Nov. 21, 1991);
SEC v. Treasury First, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,094, 50 S.E.C. Docket 381, 1991 SEC Lexis 2632 (Nov. 19,
1991); SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 6359, 4 S.E.C. Docket 293, 1974 SEC Lexis 3241 (May 8,
1974); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963) (involving Continental Growth Fund,
Inc.).
... 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a) (1994).
112 15 U.S.C. § 80a-21(a) (1994).
113 See SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101, 50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL
288420 (Nov. 21, 1991).
14 See SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., [ 1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,951, 1979 WL 1238
(D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,707,
1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,167, 44 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1989
SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989) (involving five funds managed by Steadman Security Corp.); SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 5408, 1972 SEC Lexis 1676 (May 25, 1972) (involving Technical Fund, Inc.); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699,
1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963) (involving Continental Growth Fund, Inc.). See also In re Carob
Securities, Inc., SEC Admin. Proc. File Nos. 3-4890 & 8-20294, 1974 SEC Lexis 2774 (Aug. 30, 1976)
(involving Financial Trends Mutual Fund) (although not in SEC's original complaint, later proceedings noted
that management contract had not been approved by required majority shareholder vote).
15 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(1994).
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the funds in question had violated Section 31(a) of the ICA and Rule 31a-1
promulgated thereunder. 1° 4  That section and rule both discuss the legally
mandated maintenance and retention of specific information and documents.
2. Less Frequently Cited Factors
In addition to the recurring factors discussed above, the SEC less
frequently cited to several other factors when seeking the receivership remedy.
The top five of these factors, and the number of cases in which the SEC cited
them, are listed below followed by a brief discussion:
" Insufficient Number of Independent Directors (5);
" Deviation from Investment Policies (5);
" Management Contract Improperly Approved (5);
" Failure To Register as an Investment Company (4);
" Abandonment by Board of Directors (4); and
" No Fidelity Insurance Bond (3).
Cited in five of the twenty-eight receivership cases (eighteen percent) was a
fund's failure to have a legally sufficient number of independent directors on
its board of directors.' 05 Failure to have a properly constituted board violates
Section 10(a) of the ICA. ° 6  That section requires a board of directors be
comprised of individuals of whom at least forty percent are independent of the
fund's management, underwriter, and administrator. 107
The importance of this factor is highlighted in SEC v. Boca Raton Capital
Corp. 10 8 Boca, a business development company governed by the ICA, lacked
the requisite number of independent directors required to operate that company
legally. Under Section 56(a) of the ICA, 1°9 a business development company
'04 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a) (1994) ; 17 C.F.R. § 270.31a-1 (2000).
105 See SEC v. Boca Raton Capital Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2145, 1994 SEC
Lexis 3244 (Oct. 11, 1994); SEC v. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,052, 56 S.E.C. Docket
1237, 1994 SEC Lexis 1132 (Apr. 14, 1994); SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101, 50
S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL 288420 (Nov. 21, 1991); SEC v. Zenith Am. Mgmt. Services, Ltd., SEC Lit. Rel.
6650, 1974 SEC Lexis 2080 (Dec. 24, 1974) (involving the All American Fund, Inc.); SEC v. Financial Fund,
Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. 6359, 4 S.E.C. Docket 293, 1974 SEC Lexis 3241 (May 8, 1974).
'6 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1994).
107 Although individuals affiliated with a fund's administrator are not technically included in Section
10(a), we believe that the spirit of that section would preclude those individuals from serving as independent
directors of that fund. Indeed, many fund advisors provide the same administrative services that outside
administrators provide. No one would argue that the individuals within the fund advisor providing those
services could serve as independent directors of a fund under Section 10(a).
108 SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294,57 S.E.C. Docket 2145, 1994 SEC Lexis 3244 (Oct. II, 1994).
'09 15 U.S.C. § 80a-55(a) (1994).
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written contract approved by the holders of a majority of the fund's
outstanding voting securities.
Cited in four of the twenty-eight receivership cases (fourteen percent) was
a fund's failure to register as an investment company under the ICA.116 These
funds fell within the definition of "investment company" under Section 3(a)(1)
of the ICA.' 17 Because they had neither registered as an investment company
pursuant to Section 8 of the ICA, l1 8 nor qualified for an exemption from
registration under Section 6,119 they violated Section 7(a)'s 12 prohibition on
unregistered investment company transactions. Importantly, all four district
courts involved in these cases pointed to the specific language of Section 42(d)
of the ICA121 quoted above 122 for their statutory authority to grant ordersappointing receivers.
In four extreme cases (fourteen percent), the SEC cited as a factor a board's
total abandonment of its fund.' z3  In these cases, the SEC obviously had no
choice but to seek a receiver. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in
SEC v. S & P National Corp., 124 "the primary purpose of the appointment [of a
receiver] was promptly to install a responsible officer of the court who could
bring the companies into compliance with the law, ascertain the true state of
116 See SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 265 F. Supp. 993
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC v. Am. Inst. Counselors, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587, 1975 WL
160733 (Nov. 25, 1975). See also SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968) (while SEC
alleged in its complaint that, among other things, company had failed to register under the ICA, company
registered immediately prior to court proceedings in order to placate SEC).
117 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
11 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1994).
119 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
120 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a) (1994).
121 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(d) (1994).
122 See supra text accompanying note 30.
123 See SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9196,707, 1978
WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (board had not met in two years and five months); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 265
F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943); SEC Lit. Rel. 5595,
1972 SEC Lexis 1862 (Oct. 31, 1972) (involving Fundamatic Investors, Inc.). With respect to the Fiscal Fund,
the SEC labeled it an "orphan" investment company. SEC Rel. No. IC-505, 1943 WL 30350 (Jun. 4, 1943).
See also In re Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-20204, 56 S.E.C. Docket 1129, 1994 SEC Lexis
1065 (Apr. 7, 1994) (although fund had not totally abandoned, SEC noted that "the Fund's board ... has had
only one member and appears to be unable.., to take any corporate actions involving corporate governance or
oversight of the management of the Fund").
124 360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1966).
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affairs ... and report thereon to the court and public shareholders and preserve
corporate assets."'
125
In three cases (eleven percent), the SEC cited a fund's failure to maintain a
fidelity insurance bond.' 26  A fund's failure in this regard violates Section
17(g) of the ICA and Rule 17g-1 promulgated thereunder. 127  Under that
section and rule, funds must maintain a fidelity insurance bond covering the
fund against acts of larceny and embezzlement committed by the fund's
officers and employees.
Finally, the SEC cited the following factors twice (seven percent) or only
once (3.5 percent) in the twenty-eight receivership cases:
* Directors Serving Without Proper Shareholder Approval (2);
128
" Directors or Officers Serving While Legally Prohibited from
Doing So (2);
129
* Improper Return of Capital (2);130
* Failure To Follow Custodial Procedures (2);l
31
125 Id. at 750-51 (quotation marks omitted).
126 See SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,951, 1979 WL 1238
(D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,707,
1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963) (involving
Continental Growth Fund, Inc.).
127 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(g) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17g-1 (2000).
128 See SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis
1609 (Feb. 28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mut. Fund, Inc.). Under Section 16(a) of the ICA, it is
unlawful for directors to serve on the board without proper shareholder approval, subject to certain exceptions.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (1994).
129 See SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC
Lexis 1609 (Feb. 28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mut. Fund, Inc.). Under Section 9(a) of the ICA, it is
unlawful for directors to serve on a fund's board if they had previously engaged in, among other things, acts of
personal misconduct specified in that section. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
130 See SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 13,101, 50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL 288420 (Nov. 21, 1991). Under Section 19(a) of the ICA and
Rule 19a-I promulgated thereunder, registered investment companies are prohibited from returning capital to
shareholders unless any such return is accompanied by a written statement adequately disclosing the source of
the money being returned. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19(a) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 270.19a-1 (2000).
131 See SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331, 45 S.E.C. Docket 256, 1989
WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989); SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12167, 44 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1989 SEC
Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989) (involving five funds managed by Steadman Security Corp.). See also SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963) (involving Continental Growth Fund, Inc.) (complaint
charged defendant custodial bank with failure to maintain records which accurately set forth the fund's assets).
Under Section 17(f) of the ICA and Rule 17f-2 thereunder, securities of registered management investment
companies may be maintained in the custody of the companies specified in that section and rule. See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-17(f) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-2 (2000).
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* Sales Without a Legally Valid Prospectus (1); 132 and
* Accountants Serving Without Proper Shareholder
Approval (1). 133
C. Interpreting the SEC's Approach in Mutual Fund Receivership Cases
As noted above, the SEC typically points to multiple factors when seeking
the receivership remedy in the context of a mutual fund.' 34 Because the SEC
has never articulated a standard, however, the question arises as to whether
there is a method to the SEC's approach. By looking at the twenty-eight
receivership cases and the factors the SEC cited, three major themes stand out.
First, instances of misconduct on the part of the fund's investment advisors,
directors, and/or officers greatly increase the chances that the SEC will seek
the receivership remedy. Under the rubric of misconduct are the factors of
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and prohibited affiliate transactions 135 -
instances of conduct where the fund's investment advisors, directors, or
officers put their own interests ahead of those of the fund's current or
prospective shareholders. Twenty-two of the twenty-eight receivership cases,
or seventy-nine percent, involved one or more factors involving misconduct.
Fraudulent activities, whether violative of the Securities Act, the Exchange
Act, the ICA, and/or the IAA, were most prevalent, as they appeared in
seventeen of the twenty-two cases. Breaches of fiduciary duty occurred in ten
of the twenty-two cases, while prohibited affiliate transactions occurred in
nine.
Putting statistics aside, the point here is simple. Individuals who engage in
serious misconduct to the detriment of shareholders' interests should not be in
132 See SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089,
2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000) (highlighting fund's use of prospectus not meeting the requirements of
Section 10 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994), in violation of section 5(b) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994).
"' See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963) (involving Continental Growth
Fund, Inc.) (SEC complaint alleged that fund's directors and officers caused the fund to file financial
statements certified by accountants who had not received proper shareholder approval in violation of Section
32(a) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-32(a) (1994).
134 See supra text accompanying note 52. It is worth noting that courts also have imposed the receivership
remedy in the context of private equity funds. See Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Silver, 114 F.3d 1191 (7th
Cir. 1997) (court appointed a receiver to compel payment of outstanding capital call as well as dissolve private
equity partnership due to mismanagement, fraud, and self-dealing by control person). See also United States
v. Colorado Invesco, Inc., 902 F. Supp 1339 (D. Colo. 1995) (court appointed Small Business Administration
to be a receiver for a small business investment company that received financing from that administration).
135 For a discussion of these factors, see supra Parts I.B.I .a, c, d.
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charge of mutual funds. This, of course, is part of the securities laws' broader
theme that these individuals should not be involved in the securities industry,
period. 136 In the fund context, the SEC typically seeks to enjoin individuals or
entities engaged in misconduct. Because the efficacy of an injunction,
however, depends heavily on having someone responsible and dependable in
charge of the fund, a court will grant ancillary relief in the form of a receiver at
the SEC's request when no one responsible is left. 137 Indeed, as the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has made abundantly clear:
It is hardly conceivable that the trial court should have permitted
those who were enjoined from fraudulent misconduct to continue in
control [of Keller Corp.'s] affairs for the benefit of those shown to
have been defrauded. In such cases the appointment of a trustee-
receiver becomes a necessary implementation of injunctive relief.
38
Given the retail nature of mutual funds, the second theme running through
many of the receivership cases should come as no surprise. That theme is the
seriousness with which the SEC views the redeemable share mechanism of an
open-end investment company. "Mechanism," in our minds, is a two-fold
concept, covering both share pricing and share liquidity. Pricing revolves
around a fund's NAV and the information used in deriving it and disclosing it.
Thus, fifteen of the twenty-eight receivership cases involved funds that: (a)
improperly calculated their NAVs, could not calculate their NAVs, or would
not calculate them at all, and/or (b) failed to disclose publicly accurate NAV• ,- .. 139
supporting information. In terms of share liquidity, six of those fifteen cases
also involved funds that unlawfully suspended redeemable share redemption
privileges. 140
136 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77u(e) (1994) (permitting a court to bar individuals who violated the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Act from serving as officers or directors of public companies); 15 U.S.C. § 78ee
(1994) (permitting a court to bar individuals who violated the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act from
serving as officers or directors of public companies); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(l) (1994) (prohibiting individuals
convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving a purchase or sale of any security within the past ten years
from serving as a fund officer or director); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(2) (1994) (allowing SEC to suspend or revoke
the registration of any investment advisor convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving the purchase or
sale of any security within ten years preceding the filing of any application for registration).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
138 SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963). See also SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc.,
289 F. Supp. 3, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970) (discussing need for responsible person
to take over management of investment company); SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 714 (D. Del.
1943) (same).
139 These fifteen cases are the combination of the cases listed under the "NAV Problems" and "Reporting
Violations" factors. See supra Parts l.Bl.b, e.
140 These six cases fall under the "Suspension of Share Redemption" factor. See supra Part I.B. 1.f.
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What is surprising, however, is what happens when cases involving the
redeemable share mechanism are aggregated with cases involving misconduct.
When this is done, twenty-seven of the twenty-eight receivership cases, or
ninety-six percent, are covered. This certainly underscores the importance of
these two themes to the SEC over the sixty-two years since Congress passed
the ICA. 4 '
The final theme involves four of the factors to which the SEC cited less
frequently. That theme is that the SEC may seek a receiver for any fund that
has a problematic board of directors. This theme encompasses the less
frequently cited factors of an insufficient number of independent directors,
fund abandonment, directors serving without proper shareholder approval, and
142directors serving when prohibited by law from doing so. Eleven of the
twenty-eight receivership cases, or thirty-nine percent, involved one or more of
these four factors. Importantly, one of those eleven cases is the only case that
does not also involve either of the two prior themes. Recall that in SEC v.
Boca Raton Capital Corp., 143 the SEC sought a receiver solely based on the
company's failure to have a legally sufficient number of independent
directors. 144
What the analysis above does not answer is how the SEC should respond in
a situation where errant business entrepreneurs who, while running a fund,
intentionally or unintentionally run afoul of various ICA provisions in a way
that does not harm shareholders. 145  Should the SEC seek the receivership
remedy under those circumstances? Should the SEC allow the fund to operate
under the heightened scrutiny of its independent directors? We believe the
appropriate response would depend on whether the fund has capable
141 In weighing in on the importance of different factors in the SEC's case against the Steadman Funds, a
mutual fund family comprised of five registered investment companies, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit stated:
The charges in this case fall into three distinct categories. Both parties agree that the claims of
willful or reckless securities fraud were at the core of the SEC's case. The negligent fraud charges
and the alleged pricing and disclosure violations were next in order of seriousness. Least serious
were the technical violations of the advisory agreement and account maintenance rules, and the
reporting violations the appellants did not appeal.
SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
142 For a discussion of these four factors, see supra Part I.B.2.
143 SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2245, 1994 SEC Lexis 3244 (Oct. 11, 1994).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
145 Similar circumstances arose in SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972);
see supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
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independent directors who can step in to resolve the crisis.
II. THE RISE OF THE TRULY EFFECTIVE INDEPENDENT MUTUAL
FUND DIRECTOR
The passage of the ICA followed an extensive four-year review by the SEC
to determine whether the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were sufficient
to prevent abuses in the mutual fund industry. 146 In determining that they were
not, Congress passed, and President Roosevelt signed into law, the ICA in
August 940. Senator Robert F. Wagner, of New York, commented on the need
for the ICA:
The underlying purpose of the legislation is not merely to insure
[that] investors receive full and fair disclosure of the nature and
activities of investment trusts and investment companies in which
they are interested, but to eliminate and prevent those deficiencies
and abuses in these organizations which have contributed to the
tremendous losses sustained by their securities holders. 1
47
Section 10(a) of the ICA is one of the cornerstones of investor protection.
That section requires at least forty percent of the members of each fund's board
of directors to be independent. 148  The oddity of that section, however, has
been, and continues to be, that while funds are required to have independent
directors on their boards, the ICA never explicitly states why this is, or what
the general obligations of those directors are. One must look elsewhere for an
explanation.
Legislative history reveals that the independent directors are responsible for
preventing abuses by fund advisors by supplying an independent check on their
actions. These directors are supposed to stand up for fund shareholders in
situations where a fund advisor could exploit the conflicts of interest that are
146 See 86 Cong. Rec. 8842-43 (daily ed. July 21, 1940) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner).
147 86 Cong. Rec. 2844-47 (Mar. 14, 1940) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner on S. 3580).
148 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1994). But see Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17, at
*16-19 (effectively changing the forty percent requirement to a majority on July 1, 2002). Despite Section
10(a)'s requirement of at least forty percent independent directors, it is clear that a large number of fund
families have a higher percentage than forty percent. In addition to those families that naturally believe that a
higher percentage is warranted, the ICA mandates a higher percentage in two circumstances. First, Rule 12b-
1 (c)(I) requires registered open-end investment companies to have a majority of independent directors if those
companies want to implement and continue 12b-1 distribution plans. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(c)(1) (2000).
Second, in the context of a fund advisor merger, where an advisory contract is assigned to the surviving
advisor, Section 15(f)(1)(A) requires that independent directors constitute at least seventy-five percent of the
board for three years after the merger. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f)(I)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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inherent in the fund advisor-investment company relationship. 149  They are,
indeed, supposed to be "watchdogs," as the late Supreme Court Justice
William Brennan famously labeled them.
150
A. The Relational View of "Independence"
The ICA's notion of directorial "independence" is the key element in
protecting fund shareholders. The ICA clearly views "independence" in a
relational context. 51 That is, a director is automatically "independent" if he or
she does not have a relational nexus with the investment advisor, underwriter,
or administratorl 52 that the ICA deems too close. Originally, that nexus was
fairly narrow, as only "persons who are investment advisors of, affiliated
persons of an investment advisor of, or officers or employees of, [a registered
investment company]" were disqualified from being independent directors.
153
Immediately, however, skirmishes erupted over the proper scope of that nexus.
For example, as early as 1941, the SEC expanded the nexus so that attorneys
on general retainer with an investment company were deemed "employees" of
that company and thus would not qualify as independent directors. 1 4
Congress itself significantly altered the scope of the relational nexus in
1970 in response to several private and governmental reports. 155 One of those
149 See SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 11, supra note 16, at 79 (where Gerald McDonough, an independent
director for Fidelity Funds, stated, "The general structure of the mutual fund industry ...demands that
independent trustees effectively represent the shareholders' interests in order to ensure that conflicts of interest
are resolved in favor of the shareholders each and every time they arise."); Interpretive Matters Concerning
Independent Directors of Investment Companies, SEC Rel. No. IC-24083, 70 S.E.C. Docket 2017, 2018, 1999
SEC Lexis 2196, at *5 ("Interpretive Release") (noting that "[aIn investment advisor's interest in maximizing
its own profits for the benefit of its owners may conflict with its paramount duty to act solely in the best
interests of the fund and its shareholders").
150 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (quoting District Judge Frederick van Pelt Bryan in
Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1977), and Investment Trusts and Investment Companies:
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before the House Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 109 (1940) (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, Investment Trust Study, SEC)).
151 See Interpretive Release, supra note 149, at *2-3 (noting that "Section 2(a)(19) of the [ICA] authorizes
the Commission to issue an order finding that a person is an 'interested person' due to a material business or
professional relationship with a fund or certain persons or entities"); SEC Rel. No. IC-214, 1941 WL 37720
(Sept. 15, 1941) ("The purpose of Section 10(a) ... can hardly be accomplished if a person so closely related
to the management is permitted to be included in the minority portion of the board which is designed to check
independently on management activities.").
152 For a discussion of why we believe a fund's administrator would fall within the ambit of Section 10(a),
see supra note 107.
153 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 10(a), ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (Aug. 22, 1940).
154 See SEC Rel. No. IC-214, 1941 WL 37720 (Sept. 15, 1941).
155 See S. Rep. No. 91-184 (1970), 1969 WL 4981, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897.
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reports, The Wharton Study, 156 questioned the "extent to which reliance can be
placed on the independent directors to safeguard adequately the rights of
shareholders in negotiations between the [fund] and the investment advisor."
57
Likewise, the SEC's 1966 PPI Report 158 concluded that while many of the pre-
1940 abuses in the fund industry had been eliminated, investment advisory fees
appeared higher than necessary. It pointed to ineffective independent directors
as one potential culprit.159 Congress reacted by amending the ICA in 1970 to
include the term "interested person" in Section 10(a) and defining it in new
Section 2(a)(19). 1  Use of this newly added term had the effect of widening
the relational nexus, thus allowing fewer individuals to qualify as "in-
dependent."
Despite this fine-tuning, critics of the current system of independent mutual
fund directors have been merciless about its shortcomings. Many argue that
fund directors are overpaid, underworked, and ineffectual "lapdogs" instead of
"watchdogs. ' 6 1 John C. Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group and now a
vocal and often controversial figure in the mutual fund industry, stated that
they "are, to a very major extent, sort of a bad joke."' 62 Critics point to these
156 WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274,
87th Cong., 2d. Sess. 8 (1962).
157 Id.
158 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REP. ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1966).
159 See Interpretive Release, supra note 149, at *10-11 (noting that the SEC's study agreed with the
Wharton study "that the then current standard for director independence was inadequate").
160 See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970).
Congress also added Section 36(b) to the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(b) (1994), in response to the concern that
the structure of the mutual fund industry prevented arm's-length bargaining between the mutual fund and its
investment advisor concerning the amount of the investment advisor's fee. That section imposes a fiduciary
duty upon a mutual fund's investment advisor with respect to fees and other payments received from the
mutual fund. It specifically provides that fund shareholders or the SEC can sue advisors over excessive
management compensation. The legislative history of that section, however, also indicates that Congress
intended a significant role to be played by independent directors in this regard. The Senate Report states,
"[Section 36(b)] is designed to strengthen the ability of the unaffiliated directors to deal with [compensation]
matters and to provide a means by which the Federal courts can effectively enforce the federally-created
fiduciary duty with respect to management compensation." S. REP. No. 91-184, reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4903.
161 See, e.g., Paul H. Dykstra & Paulita Pike-Bokhari, The Yacktman Battle: Manager Bites Watchdogs,
INVESTMENT LAW., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 1; Charles A. Jaffe, Don't Count on Directors To Guard Your
Interests, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 9, 1999, at D19; Tom Lauricella, This Is News? Fund Fees Are Too High,
Study Says, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2001, at Cl; Geoffry Smith, Why Fees Are So High, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 30,
1998, at 126; Waggoner, supra note 1; Russ Wiles, Study Raises Questions About the Vigilance of the Family
Watchdog, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at D5; Jason Zweig, How Funds Can Do Better, MONEY, Feb. 1998, at
42.
162 Smith, supra note 161, at 126.
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directors' failure to keep down management fees, terminate management
contracts with poorly performing advisors, and effectively challenge fund
advisors in an attempt to prevent disasters like Heartland."' In fact, the
chairman of the board of one of the largest mutual fund families in the United
States recently stated that "sixty percent to seventy percent of boards of
directors don't do a good job .... I'm always shocked when I go to industry
meetings and hear what directors don't do,"164
Over the years, many in Congress also have been highly skeptical about the
efficacy of independent directors, particularly on the issue of holding down
management fees. For example, in debating a 1968 bill that would increase the
percentage of independent directors to a majority, Senator William Proxmire
argued, "[D]o you expect these directors, handpicked by management, to fight
management on fees? Can management's own nominees even be expected to
ask embarrassing questions about the fees of those who nominated them?"'
' 65
Senator Clifford Case added, "[E]ven independent directors realize why they
are selected by sponsoring companies. They are independent, yes, but they
know very well that if they are not reasonable, they are not going to be
reappointed at the end of their term. It is perfectly natural that they should be
chosen because they are friends, with a trust of the individual already in
business."'1 66 Senator John Sparkman was, perhaps, the most blunt: "I am not
exaggerating when I say that mutual fund management contracts are almost
always renewed by these unaffiliated directors as a matter of routine."
167
The reason these criticisms of the efficacy of independent directors sting is
simple. The relational independent director ("RID") standard precariously
rests on a fundamental assumption that does not always hold true. That
163 See Lauricella, supra note 161; Waggoner, supra note 1. See also Wyatt, supra note 161 (noting that
Morningstar Inc. had questioned the independence of independent directors after finding that among the
eighty-two largest fund families, the more that directors were paid, the more that shareholders paid in total
fund expenses).
164 See Waggoner, supra note I (quoting John A. Hill, Chairman of the Board of the Putnam Group of
funds).
165 114 Cong. Rec. S23,532 (daily ed. July 26, 1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). But see SEC
ROUNDTABLE-PART I, supra note 16, at 25 (comments of Robert Pozen, Pres. and CEO of Fidelity Mgmt. &
Research, to the contrary).
166 114 Cong. Rec. S23,538 (daily ed. July 26, 1968) (statement of Sen. Chase).
167 114 Cong. Rec. S23,541 (daily ed. July 26, 1968) (statement of Sen. Sparkman). In the recent case
Navellier v. Sletten, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 19167 (9th Cir. 2001), a fund's investment advisor accused the
fund's independent trustees of wrongfully terminating the investment management contract between that
advisor and the fund. In support of its claim, the advisor audaciously argued that "'a Board that was acting




assumption is that every director who stands the legislatively mandated
relational distance apart from the fund advisor will, ipso facto, look out for the
interests of fund shareholders.' 68 No doubt this is a safe assumption for a great
many independent directors. However, that assumption, no matter how well-
intentioned, could break down for other directors. Even the SEC has
recognized that "no law can guarantee that an independent director will be
vigilant in protecting fund shareholders. Fund shareholders therefore must
depend on the character, ability, and diligence of persons who serve as fund
directors to protect their interests.' 69
The RID standard is problematic for five majpr reasons. First, over time,
the distance between the independent directors and the fund advisor narrows
considerably. 17  While technically still falling outside the relational nexus-
and thus statutorily remaining "independent," most independent directors
quickly develop cordial relationships with senior executives of the investment
advisor. To expect otherwise is unrealistic.
Friendship, however, throws a wrench into the RID standard because it has
the ability to divide loyalties. To expect independent directors to rock the boat
in which their new friends are resting comfortably is, in many ways, wishful
thinking.'17  In the fee context, for example, should we expect independent
168 On this point, Leslie Ogg commented:
So while you talk about independence as a concept, and you talk about independence as a legal
requirement, clearly being an interested person or a non-interested person is just a starting point,
The legal definition is not what we're talking about here. What we're trying to do is to create a
structure that creates operative independence.
SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART II, supra note 16, at 66. Aulana Peters, a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and a
former SEC Commissioner, provided these thoughts on this point:
I don't think that we can legislate independence. Independence, really, you either will have an
independent spirit and mind and point of view or you don't, and it doesn't matter how much you're
paid or whether your investment bank does business with the mutual fund. The trick is to have this
nominating committee and the advisor be able to recognize it when they see it. I think that they
will hire it when they see it as well.
Id. at 87.
169 Proposing Release, supra note 18, at 59,831-32.
170 Cf SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART II, supra note 16, at 64 (SEC Commissioner Laura Unger asking:
"Does there come a point in time when you have served a number of years [on a fund's board that] you are no
longer independent, because you've become so intertwined with the management of the company?").
171 One can glean anecdotal evidence of this point by reviewing the situation involving ASM Index 30
Fund and its founder, Steven Adler. Shareholders accused Adler of routing at least $2.7 million intended for
the fund into his capital-starved advisory firm, Vector Index Advisors, Inc. The fund's board of directors,
which was populated with friends of Adler, was finally forced to fire Adler and his firm. Karen Damato of
The Wall Street Journal reported on the directors' sentiments:
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directors to be true bargaining agents on behalf of fund shareholders? 172 The
irony of all this is that while most independent directors are on a chummy first
name basis with the executives of their fund's investment advisor, it is unlikely
that few can list the names of their fund's three largest shareholders.
Second, it is only natural not to bite the hand that feeds you. Independent
directors receive considerable remuneration for what they do. How this
remuneration consciously or unconsciously affects different independent
directors will depend, of course, on each director's personal financial situation
and moral fiber.' 73  While certainly not true for many independent directors,
the Strougo line of cases 174 did, in fact, make a valid point with respect to
others: the possibility exists that some independent directors will become
"house directors" because of the substantial compensation they receive from a
fund advisor. 75 Under the ICA, however, compensation is irrelevant because
"We literally took [Adler's] dream away from him," says Dan Calabria, a 25-year acquaintance of
Mr. Adler's and a member of the ASM fund's board, "but we didn't have any choice."
Jerome Feltenstein, a 65-year-old marketing consultant who was probably Mr. Adler's closest
friend on the board, says he wanted to give Mr. Adler "a swift kick in the you-know-where" for
putting the directors in such a horrible position. But at the same time, he says, "I really just
wanted to call him and say, 'Hey, whatever happens, we are friends."'
Karen Damato, Mutual-Fund Manager, Under Fire, Loses His Dream, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1999, at C 1.
172 In this regard, Professor Ken Scott of Stanford Law School has stated:
[Independent directors are] not interested persons of the advisor. That's what the statute really
simply says. Are [independent directors] supposed to be there as a line of defense against
management overreaching or management failure, a safeguard against the extremes, or are [they]
supposed to be there as bargaining representatives on behalf of the shareholders? And, of course,
those are the polar positions; you can be somewhere along the continuum. If the SEC believes that
it wants the bargaining representative point of view, then I think it should give serious
consideration as to how it might support that.
SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 1, supra note 16, at 16. Professor John Freeman, of the University of South
Carolina, has added that few boards ever challenge a fund's management on how much is paid to the fund's
investment manager. See Lauricella, supra note 161.
173 Cf Interpretive Release, supra note 149, at *21-22 (where, in giving interpretive advice as to when a
director could be considered "interested" because of a material business or professional relationship he or she
had with certain specified persons and entities, including some fund affiliates ("Specified Entities"), the SEC
noted that the "key factors in evaluating whether a director's position with a Specified Entity would tend to
impair his or her independence include the level of the director's responsibility in the position and the level of
compensation or other benefits that the director receives or received from the position" (emphasis added)).
174 See Strougo v. BEA Assoc., [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,457, 1999 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 3021 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Strougo v. Bassini, I F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Strougo v. Scudder,
Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
175 On this point, Professor Ron Gilson, Professor of Law at both Columbia and Stanford Law Schools
and an independent director for the Benham American Century Funds, stated: "The issue of independence with
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of the relational standard it employs. Either you are too close to the advisor,
underwriter, or administrator (and thus not independent) or far enough away
from them (and thus independent).
A third reason the RID standard is not fail-safe is due to directorial
incompetence. There are, to be sure, a great many smart, talented, and
conscientious individuals serving as independent directors. Nevertheless, the
fund business is highly complex, and the law governing it even more so.176
The learning curve is, indeed, very steep for the uninitiated or casually
acquainted. Many independent directors, particularly neophytes, simply are
not up to the task of protecting shareholders by digging into a fund advisor's
actions because they do not understand the reasons for, and ramifications of,
those actions. These directors may be good persons-and stand the requisite
relational distance away from the fund advisor to qualify as "independent"-
but they simply lack the knowledge base needed to be effective watchdogs.
177
A fourth reason to question the efficacy of the RID standard relates to how
investment companies are formed. Traditionally, an aspiring or existing
investment advisor will provide the seed capital needed to start a new mutual
respect to remuneration is present . . . . There is an amount of money that can pose a problem." SEC
ROUNDTABLE-PART II, supra note 16, at 50. But see Wyatt, supra note 161 (quoting Barry Barbash, former
director of the SEC's Division of Investment Management, as saying: "[The SEC's] view is that the amount of
money a director is making does not make him independent or not independent. But shareholders should be
told how much directors are being paid.").
176 Cf. SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 11, supra note 16, at 80 (where Gerald McDonough, an independent
director of Fidelity Funds, stated: 'The role of independent trustees will take on greater significance in the
future and will require that those persons filling the positions be intellectually capable of dealing with complex
financial matters and arcane laws and regulations in an environment where fiduciary responsibility continues
to be obligatory." He later added, "Even a financially trained person coming on [a] board has a learning curve
to go up."); id. at 65 (where Leslie Ogg commented: "[Bleing an independent director in this industry is a
profession. It's not a casual occupation. It's not a retirement annuity. It's a business that really requires a lot
of attention.").
177 On this point, Paul Haaga, the Executive Vice President and Director of Capital Research and
Management, stated: "Directors are smart, conscientious people .... They know how to ask the right
questions, if we just educate them about the business and then give them appropriate information." SEC
ROUNDTABLE-PART I, supra note 16, at 33 (emphasis added). Jessica Bibliowicz, President and Chief
Operating Officer at John A. Levin & Company and an independent director of Eaton Vance Mutual Funds,
commented as follows with respect to her selection as an independent director: "I was formerly president of a
mutual fund company .... [Wihen I sat down with the nominating committee, I said: . . . '[W]hy are you
picking me? Are you sure you mean this?' One of the directors pointed out, 'You know which questions to
ask and you know how to ask them."' Id. at 36. Willie Davis, President of All Pro Broadcasting and an
independent director of the Strong Funds, stated in response to a question as to his biggest challenge as an
independent director: "I think to remain very current and knowledgeable about what is going on to the extent
• . it relates to the shareholders, and at the same time allow yourself to understand management and the
business process at the same time." SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART II, supra note 16, at 56.
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fund. For all intents and purposes, that fund is its baby.178 The advisor forms
it so that the advisor can then provide it with investment management services
while in return reaping the management fee and related benefits. An extremely
strong proprietary relationship exists between a fund and its advisor, and to
expect independent directors to sever that relationship over, among other
reasons, poor investment performance or high fees is unrealistic. This is
particularly true given that, in most cases, it is the fund advisor that selects all
the independent directors of a brand new fund.
179
The final reason for the potential breakdown of the RID standard is one that
has finally garnered the attention it deserves. Until recently, most errors and
omissions ("E&O") insurance policies did not cover litigation between the
independent directors and the fund advisor. 18  To obtain "insured versus
insured" coverage, a director must have known to ask for it and be willing to
have the fund incur the cost of the additional premium. Moreover, that director
must have directed his or her request through the fund advisor, a delicate
matter to say the least. Without proper E&O insurance, independent directors
are unlikely to lock horns with the fund advisor in any significant way.
181
178 On this point, Dick Phillips, a partner at Kirkpatrick and Lockhart, has commented:
The investment adviser tends to look at the mutual fund that it has created and promoted and
financed as its product. It tends to look at the investors, his market, as customers. And he is told
by we lawyers that there's a regulatory pattern and a state law pattern that says, no, it's not his
product. It's a separate entity. Whether it's organized as a corporation, a trust, or even a separate
account, just notations and a set of books, it's separate from your business, Mr. investment adviser.
SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 11, supra note 16, at 67. See also id. at 72 (John Haire, an independent director of
the Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Funds, stating: "[lI]t is perfectly clear that the origin of every mutual fund
which exists came from the advisory company itself .... It does not spring from the independent directors, it
doesn't spring from the brow of Zeus. It comes out of the advisory company."); Independent Director
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *7 n.3 ("As a result of their extensive involvement, and the general
absence of shareholder activism, investment advisors typically dominate the funds they advise.").
179 A better way of selecting independent directors for a new fund-something we would suggest as a
"best practice"-is to have the fund advisor select only one independent director. That director would then
select the other independent directors. The SEC has recognized the importance of having independent
directors select other independent directors: "[W]hen independent directors are self-selecting and self-
nominating, they are less likely to feel beholden to the advisor. Thus, they may be more willing to challenge
the advisor's recommendations when the advisor's interests conflict with those of the shareholders."
Proposing Release, supra note 18, at 59,832.
180 See Interpretive Release, supra note 149, at n.56; Proposing Release, supra note 18, at 59,836. See
also Dykstra & Pike-Bokhari, supra note 161, at 9-10 (describing dilemma that Yacktman independent
directors faced upon learning that their D&O insurance policy did not cover disputes between them and the
fund's advisor).
181 See Interpretive Release, supra note 149, at *39 ('The risk of personal liability could ... deter some
independent directors from making controversial decisions that may benefit the fund and discourage qualified
individuals from serving as independent directors.").
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In sum, the RID standard has the potential to muzzle the ferocity of the
watchdogs. That standard provides independent directors with a few carrots,
but no stick, with which to protect fund shareholders. Making matters worse,
in the two recent cases involving the Yacktman Fund and the Navellier Series
Fund, independent directors went to the mat for their shareholders but then
suffered the fate of Socrates. 182  By confronting very popular fund advisors,
those directors were either ousted by fund shareholders after a bitter proxy
battle, in the case of the Yacktman Fund, 183 or ultimately resigned only to be.... 184
sued by the fund advisor, in the case of the Navellier Series Fund. Prior to
the recent changes adopted by the SEC in January 2001,185 therefore, the best
we could have hoped for is for independent directors to defend shareholders up
to the point where it mildly irritated fund advisors, but no further.'
86
B. The Need for "Operational Independence"
In an ideal world, whenever a fund advisor threatens to take action that
would exploit in its favor the conflicts of interest that exist between it and its
fund, independent directors should not only speak up but take action to prevent
it. These directors would indeed police the situation as warranted., 87  In all
other situations, however, these directors should cooperatively engage the
fund's advisor. After all, watchdogs are only needed when the interests of
shareholders are threatened or potentially threatened, and those situations by
and large are the exception rather than the norm in the fund industry.
188
We believe a new era of independent directors is upon us. This new era
was ushered in by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, a man who was
182 See generally Wyatt supra note 161 (describing the difficult position in which independent directors
find themselves when taking action contrary to the investment advisor).
183 For a detailed description of the Yacktman battle from the independent directors' perspective, see
Dykstra & Pike-Bokhari, supra note 161, at 1.
184 After a three and one-half year legal battle, the trustees prevailed. See Navellier v. Sletten, 2001 U.S.
App. Lexis 19167 (9th Cir. 2001).
185 See Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17.
186 As the attorneys for the Yacktman independent directors have underscored, "real-life perils [await]
independent directors who dare to confront hostile investment advisors apparently determined to entrench
themselves at all costs." Dykstra & Pike-Bokhari, supra note 161, at 8.
187 Cf Interpretive Release, supra note 149, at *7 (stating that "[iIndependent directors play a critical role
in policing the potential conflicts of interest between a fund and its investment advisor").
188 Cf SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 11, supra note 16, at 54 (Willie Davis, President of All Pro Broadcasting
and an independent director of the Strong Funds, stating: "I don't believe that good independent corporate
government has to be confrontational. It might become confrontational. But it doesn't necessarily need to
be.").
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determined to make independent directors more effective.' 89  Recent changes
that the SEC has implemented have laid the groundwork to eliminate or lessen
some of the problems associated with the relational independence standard.
Over time, independent directors increasingly will become operationally
independent,' whereby they will act as agents of targeted opposition when
circumstances warrant it.19 1 And, in the mutual fund industry, "opposition" is
a four-lettered word. 192
The SEC recently adopted changes substantially affecting the system of
independent mutual fund directors.1 93  Those changes "strengthen [the
independent directors'] hand in dealing with fund management." 19  First and
foremost, on or after July 1, 2002, independent directors must make up at least
189 See supra note 16.
190 Leslie Ogg first used the similar term "operative independence" at the SEC's Roundtable on the Role
of Independent Investment Company Directors, and we have coopted it for our own purposes. See SEC
ROUNDTABLE-PART II, supra note 16, at 66.
191 See id. at 80 (Gerald McDonough, an independent director of Fidelity Funds, stating: 'The adversarial
role, not confrontational, but adversarial, role of independent trustees and fund advisors is a healthy and
desirable one.").
192 Cf SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART I, supra note 16, at 41 (Faith Colish, a securities attorney and
independent director of Neuberger Berman Funds, stating that, with respect to the relationship between the
independent directors and the fund advisor, she "certainly hope[s] it doesn't become, it shouldn't be"
adversarial); Remarks of Terry K. Glenn, Chairman of the Investment Company Institute, at the Investment
Company Institute's General Membership Meeting, available at http://www.ici.org-info/glenn_01_report_
speeches.html (commenting that independent directors and fund advisors have worked together "much more as
partners than as adversaries, very much to the benefit of [the mutual fund] industry and [fund] shareholders").
193 See Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17. Additionally, the SEC issued interpretive
guidance designed to enhance the ability of fund directors to own fund shares, thereby further aligning their
interests with those of fund shareholders. See Interpretive Release, supra note 149, at *51-57.
194 Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *5. In order to take advantage of certain
exemptive rules which are essential to the functioning of a sophisticated investment company, funds must
comply with these changes. See id. at *14. Those rules are: Rule 10f-3, 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3 (2000)
(permitting funds to purchase securities in a primary offering when an affiliated broker-dealer is a member of
the underwriting syndicate); Rule 12b-l, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2000) (permitting use of fund assets to pay
distribution expenses); Rule 15a-4(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4(b)(2) (2000) (permitting fund boards to
approve interim advisory contracts without shareholder approval where the advisor or a controlling person
receives a benefit in connection with the assignment of the prior contract); Rule 17a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-7
(2000) (permitting securities transactions between a fund and another client of the fund's advisor); Rule 17a-8,
17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-8 (2000) (permitting mergers between certain affiliated funds); Rule 17d-l(d)(7), 17
C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(d)(7) (2000) (permitting funds and their affiliates to purchase joint liability insurance
policies); Rule 17e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17e-1 (2000) (specifying conditions under which funds may pay
commissions to affiliated brokers in connection with the sale of securities on an exchange); Rule 17g-1j), 17
C.F.R. § 270.17g-l0) (2000) (permitting funds to maintain joint insured bonds); Rule 18f-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.18f-3 (2000) (permitting funds to issue multiple classes of voting stock); and Rule 22c-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.22c-3 (2000) (permitting the operation of interval funds by enabling closed-end funds to repurchase their
shares from investors).
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a majority of the members of a fund's board. 195 Despite the fact that several
key decisions already must be approved by a majority of the independent
directors voting as a separate group, 196 and that most fund boards are
comprised of a majority or even higher percentage of independent directors
currently, 97 the SEC implemented this change to help boost the comfort level
of independent directors making decisions that may run contrary to the
interests of the fund advisor. 198 While not entirely counteracting the "us versus
them" mentality, it ensures that the number of independent directors included
within "us" is greater than the interested directors included within "them."'
99
We believe this change will have the greatest impact on small fund families, as
most large fund complexes already have boards comprised of a majority of
independent directors.
A second important change requires a fund's existing independent directors
to select and nominate prospective independent directors. This change
195 See Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *16-19.
196 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1994) (requiring investment advisory contract to be approved by
majority of independent directors); 15 U.S.C. § 31(a)(1) (requiring independent public accountants to be
approved by majority of independent directors); 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-l (2000) (requiring Rule 12b- I plans to
be approved by majority of independent directors); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17g- 1(e) (requiring the amount of a fund's
joint fidelity bond to be approved by majority of independent directors).
197 Under Section 10(b)(2) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b)(2) (1994), if a fund's principal underwriter
is an affiliate of the fund's advisor, then independent directors must comprise a majority of the fund's board.
Section 15(f)(l) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f)(l) (1994), by contrast, provides a safe harbor for the sale of
an investment advisory business if independent directors constitute at least seventy-five percent of a fund's
board of directors for at least three years following the assignment of the investment advisory contract.
198 Cf SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART II, supra note 16, at 61 (Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. of Columbia
University School of Law arguing that a "critical mass" of independent directors is needed "before they
become an equal negotiator with the investment advisor").
199 See id. at 79 (Gerald McDonough, an independent director for Fidelity Funds, stating: "There is no
valid excuse for independent trustees when constituting a majority of the board, to fail to effectively represent
the shareholders. By definition, if they are a majority, they outvote the interested trustees.").
200 See Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *18 (noting that "most funds already
have a majority of independent directors").
201 See id. at *21-22. Despite this change, the fund's advisor may "suggest independent director
candidates if the independent directors invite such suggestions, and the advisor may provide administrative
assistance in the selection and nomination process." Id. at *22.
Dawn-Marie Driscoll, President of Driscoll Associates and an independent director of several Scudder
Kemper mutual funds, alluded to how fund advisors might react to having independent directors nominate
additional independent directors: "I'm a great believer in independent directors choosing other independent
directors who the advisor does not know. I know that puts chills of fear in some advisors but I think that
independence is one of the most important characteristics of an independent director." SEC ROUNDTABLE-
PART 11, supra note 16, at 21. On this point, Professor Ron Gilson argued: "I would view as quite important a
nominating committee composed solely of independent directors because ... it does provide a mechanism by
which the independent'directors can maintain a quality of the board membership even in those circumstances
in which the advisor may prefer a less independent group." Id. at 57.
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should have an immediate impact on the influence the fund advisor wields in
the selection of new independent directors. Those new directors should, at
least initially, clearly stand at arms-length from fund advisors. It does not,
however, prevent personal relationships from developing over time between
new independent directors and executives of the fund advisor. Nor does it
solve the problem of fund advisors selecting new independent directors when
those advisors establish brand new funds.
202
A third important change is that if the independent directors obtain legal
counsel, then that counsel must be independent. 2°3 Counsel's independence
should ensure that its allegiance runs directly to the independent directors.
Independent counsel could help watchdog directors in several ways. He or she
can immediately enhance the competence of independent directors by helping
them understand management proposals, providing a valuable source of
unfiltered information, and explaining their obligations under the law. He or
she also can help identify potential conflicts of interest, provide the
independent directors with the shareholders' perspective on those conflicts,
and act as a sounding board during discussions of those conflicts. 204 Lastly,
independent counsel can intermediate between the independent directors and
the fund advisor when intermediation is necessary.
A fourth important change is that the SEC, at least partially, solved the
E&O insurance problem. Now, under newly amended Rule 17d-l(d), if a fund
wants to purchase a joint insurance policy for its directors and officers, that
policy cannot exclude coverage for litigation between the fund advisor and the
205independent directors. Directors who are less concerned about their
personal liability will likely be more effective watchdogs. This change,
however, does nothing to resolve the E&O insurance problem for the many
funds that have separate insurance policies for the fund advisor and the
independent directors, as Rule 17d-1(d) is inapplicable in that situation.
206
202 See Proposing Release, supra note 18, at 59,827.
203 See Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *23-37 (the effective date of this change
is July 1,2002). On this point, Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. of Columbia University School of Law has stated:
"[l]ndependent directors can function well as a committee if and probably only if they have the effective
assistance of a truly independent legal counsel who does not generally represent the investment advisor and
who does not have any other conflict." SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART I1 , supra note 16, at 61. The SEC,
however, recently agreed to allow independent counsel to sit as an independent director on a fund's board,
thereby opening up an ethical can of worms previously reserved for traditional operating companies. See
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 SEC No-Act. Lexis 330 (Apr. 3, 2002).
204 See Proposing Release, supra note 18, at 59,833-34.
205 See Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *38-40.
206 Independent directors who find themselves in that situation should insist that their policy include
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A final change that the SEC implemented relates to the information
concerning independent directors that funds provide to shareholders.
According to the SEC:
[S]hareholders have a significant interest in knowing who the
independent directors are, whether the independent directors'
interests are aligned with shareholders' interests, whether the
independent directors have any conflicts of interest, and how the
directors govern the fund. This information helps a mutual fund
shareholder to evaluate whether the independent directors can, in
fact, act as an independent, vigorous, and effective force in
overseeing fund operations.
207
In addition to satisfying other disclosure requirements, funds must disclose:
(a) basic information about directors 208 to shareholders annually so that
shareholders will know the identity and experience of their representatives, (b)
share ownership of each director to help shareholders evaluate whether
directors' interests are aligned with those of the shareholders, (c) information
about directors that may raise conflict of interests concerns, and (d)
information on the board's role in governing the fund.
20 9
As a general matter, we applaud this additional disclosure requirement. It
does, however, raise a concern about the burdens placed on the shoulders of
fund investors. Given the enormous number of mutual fund options available
to those investors, is it realistic to expect them to review the backgrounds of
directors of funds in which they are interested in investing? Should not
investors rightfully expect independent directors to be "independent" in the
operational sense in the first place? And if particular directors turn out not to
act operationally independent, will shareholders of the fund in question have
only themselves to blame for not doing their homework better by anticipating
coverage for controversies arising between them and the fund advisor. Moreover, prudence dictates that those
directors insist that their separate coverage come from an insurance company other than the one insuring the
advisor. Indeed, a failure to do so could result in the insurance company that is separately covering both the
advisor and the independent directors siding with the most deep-pocketed of the two clients (i.e., the fund
advisor) in any dispute between them to the detriment of the independent directors and the fund's shareholders.
207 See Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *45-46.
208 That information includes for each director: (1) his or her name, address and age, (2) current positions
he or she has held with the fund, (3) his or her term of office and length of time served, (4) his or her principal
occupations during the past five years, (5) number of portfolios he or she has overseen within the fund
complex, and (6) other directorships he or she has held outside the fund complex. Id. at *47.
209 Id. at *46-47. These new disclosure obligations became effective on January 31, 2002. See id. at *76.
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future problems?
210
Only time will tell whether the changes the SEC has adopted will lead to
more effective independent mutual fund directors. We believe they will,
although it is far from clear what the degree of added effectiveness will be.
The SEC, of course, could have gone further,2 1 especially in light of the
SEC's view that investors will need to rely increasingly on independent
directors to safeguard their interests. 212 The SEC could have accelerated this
process by requiring that fund boards be entirely comprised by independent
213directors. It also could have mandated that the independent directors retain
214independent legal counsel. Perhaps most importantly, the SEC could signal
that it will stand up for directors that confront fund advisors when facts and
210 A useful analogy is the neighborhood beat cop. Is it realistic for members of the community to
conduct background checks on their local police officers? Or, rather, is that the job of the police department in
hiring new officers? In the case of fund shareholders, they should certainly review the qualifications of
director nominees up for election before they cast their votes. It does not seem fair, however, thereafter to
charge shareholders interested in "hassle free" investments with the responsibility of protecting themselves
through a review of enhanced disclosure documents. Their focus is rightfully on fund performance, and to
require otherwise would likely diminish the desirability of fund products in their eyes.
21 The Investment Company Institute ("ICI") has proposed fifteen "best practices," many of which
exceed the SEC's initiatives. For example, the ICI proposed that independent directors constitute a super-
majority or at least two-thirds of board membership and that independent directors retain independent legal
counsel. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, REP. OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR
FUND DIRECTORS: ENHANCING A CULTURE OF INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 10-12, 18-20 (June 24,
1999), available at http://www.ici. org/issues/fund-govemance.html.
212 Paul Roye, the Director of the SEC's Division of Investment Management, has stated that "[a]s we
work to keep pace and modernize the regulatory structure to accommodate the increased competitiveness and
globalization of the fund industry, we will need to increasingly rely on fund directors to vigorously perform
their 'watchdog' duties." Roye Remarks, supra note 15.
213 In the context of a bank-sponsored mutual fund, where bank officers are prohibited from serving on
the fund's board of directors, Kathleen Dennis, Senior Managing Director of Key Asset Management, Inc.,
stated:
We have eight trustees at the moment on our Victory Funds. All of them, except one, are
independent .... I think because we do not have a management group on the board our trustees
feel much freer to challenge what we want to do to make us justify the recommendations that
we're making to explain any changes that we might want to have. And they don't always approve
everything. We've been, I would say successful in general in terms of where we want to go, but
we certainly don't take anything for granted when we walk into the board meetings.
SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 11, supra note 16, at 40.
214 On this issue, members of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association stated: "The
complexities of the [ICA], the nature of the separate responsibilities of independent directors and the inherent
conflicts of interest between a mutual fund and its managers effectively require that independent directors seek
the advice of counsel in understanding and discharging their special responsibilities." SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND INVESTMENT ADVISORS, COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SECURITIES, SECTION
OF BUSINESS LAW OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N, REP. OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDEPENDENT DIR. COUNSEL:
COUNSEL TO THE INDEPENDENT DIR. OF REGISTERED INVESTMENT COMPANIES 3 (Sept. 8, 2000).
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circumstances warrant it by actually taking appropriate action.
215
III. TOWARDS AN ARTICULATED RECEIVERSHIP STANDARD
Given the push towards truly effective independent mutual fund directors,
the issue arises as to when, if ever, the SEC should displace fund directors in
favor of a receiver. As we move forward and crises inevitably arise, should the
SEC continue to request court-imposed receivers when capable independent
directors are on fund boards? If so, under what circumstances? Or should the
SEC tip its hat to the checks and balances Congress originally installed in the
215 The SEC's official policy on involving itself in disputes between independent fund directors and fund
management is as follows:
The Commission's role, as a general matter, is to interpret, administer and enforce the federal
securities laws for the protection of investors. Accordingly, the Commission's role in connection
with internal fund disputes generally is to provide guidance regarding the requirements of the
federal securities laws, investigate possible violations of these laws, and institute enforcement
actions in appropriate circumstances when the Commission believes that these laws have been
violated. While there may be instances in which the Commission, in fulfilling this role, may
indirectly assist one party in a dispute, the Commission generally will not mediate private disputes,
side with one party over another, or seek to effect a particular outcome. Rather, the Commission
will assist the parties to understand the requirements of the federal securities laws, evaluate all
allegations of violations of those laws, and take appropriate action for the protection of investors.
Interpretive Release, supra note 149, at *61.
Many commentators, however, strongly believe that the SEC should be more aggressive in assisting
independent directors in fulfilling their obligations under the ICA. See, e.g., SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART II,
supra note 16, at 15 (comment of Jay Baris, Esq., partner at Kramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel, indicating that
if the SEC stood up for independent directors by filing amicus briefs, it would greatly benefit them); id. at 51-
52 (Professor Ron Gilson of Stanford University Law School arguing, "When independent directors believe
that there has been a violation of the '40 Act by the advisor .... the right answer is, as a matter of policy, an
investigation [by the SEC] ought to be initiated." He later added, "[flf what the point of part of our exercise
here is to energize independent directors, to take Itheir] regulatory responsibilities seriously, . . . then it
imposes an obligation on the SEC."); id. at 22 (Dr. Joseph Hankin, President of Westchester Community
College and independent director of the Stagecoach Funds and the First Choice Funds, commenting, "We need
the strong support of the Commission in reinforcing our roles as guardians."); id. at 89-90 (David Sturms, a
partner at Vedder, Price, Kaufman and Kammholz, arguing, "A crucial element, in my opinion, of having a
strong independent director structure is having a strong regulator dedicated to the success of that structure."
He later added, "I think the independent directors have been put in the position of being the cop on the street
and been asked to do a lot of things .... [Tihe Commission needs to be prepared to take the type of action that
a police force would take in terms of supporting their cops, their people on the street."); id. at 92 (Tom Smith,
a partner at Brown & Wood, arguing, "I would just endorse ... that the SEC and the staff be supportive of
independent directors when they get into confrontations."); Wyatt, supra note 161 (quoting Leslie Ogg as
saying: "In the end, as a director you've got very little economic leverage. You've only got your prestige.
That's the point where a director has got to be able to say that he has the support of regulators in acting
independently.").
For a discussion of the level of support the SEC gave the independent directors of the Yacktman Fund
during their confrontation with the fund's advisor, see Dykstra & Pike-Bokhari, supra note 161, at 11.
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ICA and let directors resolve problematic situations? We believe firmly that,
while there will be times when the SEC should step in, the SEC should defer
to, or utilize, the watchdogs whenever the "Capable Independent Director"
Standard articulated in Part III.B below is met.
A. Receivers Versus Watchdogs
The appointment of a receiver is a very serious matter. His or her
appointment signals the suspension, either temporarily or permanently, of
shareholder democracy. Shareholders are no longer entitled to have their
elected officials oversee their fund, which is instead now controlled by an
officer of the court 2 6 with no previous experience with or connections to the
fund. During the course of a receivership, shareholders often remain in the
217dark as to what is happening to their investments. The appointment of a
receiver also ends the system of checks and balances in which Congress
believed so strongly. That system established independent directors as the first
218line of defense against heavy-handed fund advisor tactics.
In resolving the debate over receivers and watchdogs, a fundamental issue
needs to be addressed: What, if anything, can a receiver do that a properly
motivated and capable independent director cannot? If the answer to this is
"not much," then the SEC should reconsider when it should seek the
receivership remedy. If, however, the answer is "a lot," then perhaps the SEC
should seek the receivership remedy more aggressively than it has in the past.
In answering this question, we looked at the advantages and disadvantages of a
receiver versus an independent director or directors.
1. Advantages of a Receiver
What are the advantages of a receiver? In answering this, we begin with
the Heartland case. Judge Lefkow granted two orders that 'impacted
Heartland's receivership. In the first order, the Heartland General Order
216 See SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 265 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 360 F.2d 741, 750-51 (2d Cir.
1966); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3,42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
217 See Karen Damato, Heartland Investors Are Waiting To Exhale, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, at Cl.
218 See SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 11, supra note 16, at 51 (Professor Ron Gilson of Stanford University
Law School labeling independent directors "the first line enforcers of [the ICA]"); The SEC and the Mutual
Fund Industry: An Enlightened Partnership, Remarks by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Investment Company
Institute, Wash., D.C., May 19, 1995 (former Chairman Levitt calling independent directors "the investors'
first line of defense against [management] abuses").
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mentioned earlier, 219 she appointed a receiver "to marshal and manage [the
Funds]. ' 22°  She later added that "[t]he receiver is expressly authorized to
suspend the redemptions in the Funds and, if appropriate in the receiver's
discretion, liquidate the Funds."
2 zl
222The second order was the Heartland Receiver Order. It described both
the receiver's obligations and the necessary powers needed to fulfill those
obligations. The Heartland Receiver Order begins:
[The SEC] has requested that the Court appoint a Receiver for the
benefit of investors to marshal, conserve, protect, hold, sell or
otherwise dispose of, all assets of any nature, wherever those assets
may be found, of [the Funds] and all assets in the Funds' custody,
possession or control or in which the Funds have a legal or equitable
interest (collectively "Receivership Property"); and suspend
redemptions, operate and, if appropriate, liquidate the Receivership
Property; and with the approval of the Court, if feasible distribute
Receivership Property to investors.
223
Although this language is described as an "SEC request," the court clearly
views this as a statement of the receiver's obligations. Indeed, just two
sentences later, the court states that "lt]he receiver shall have the following
powers and duties to fulfill his obligations ... ,,224
By cutting through the verbiage of the Heartland General Order and
Heartland Receiver Order, it is clear that Phillip Stern, the Heartland receiver,
has three general obligations. First, he is obligated to maintain and preserve
the current position of the Funds, not move them forward. Words like
"marshal, conserve, protect, hold, sell or otherwise dispose" of Receivership
Property are conservative in nature. Although the word "manage" is used in
the Heartland General Order and "operate" is contained in the Heartland
Receiver Order, when read in light of the language specified in the preceding
sentence, we believe "manage" and "operate" mean keeping each Fund's
engine idling as opposed to putting it into gear. Thus, the Heartland receiver's
obligation in this regard is more akin to a trustee's role as preserver of the trust
219 Heartland General Order, supra note 9.
220 Id. at 2.
221 Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added).
222 See supra note 35.
223 Heartland Receiver Order, supra note 35, at 1.
224 Id. at 2.
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225 226corpus, as opposed to a corporate director's role as business risk-taker.
Second, along the same lines, the Heartland receiver is obligated to suspend
shareholder redemptions. The purpose of this is obvious. It is designed to
preserve the Funds' assets while matters are investigated and sorted OUt.227 It
also ensures fair treatment among shareholders, as no shareholder can
monetize his or her investment before any other shareholder.
Third, the Heartland receiver is obligated to liquidate the Receivership
Property if he believes the Funds cannot be salvaged. If he makes a decision to
liquidate, the obvious next step is to distribute Receivership Property to
creditors and investors. While he must receive court approval to do so, we
believe it is highly unlikely that a court would object given the receiver's
previous decision to liquidate the Receivership Property.
Which of the receiver's three general obligations can one or more
motivated and capable independent directors fulfill? In terms of the first
obligation, nothing would prevent a director from preserving fund assets if the
director determined that "asset preservation" was, at that time, in the best
interests of the fund and its shareholders. While a director's fiduciary
responsibilities are designed to promote business risk-taking in the context of a
fund's investment objective and strategies, he or she has managerial discretion
under extraordinary circumstances so long as he or she acts in the best interests
of the fund's shareholders. Moreover, as a general matter, even risk-taking
directors are prohibited from wasting corporate assets under basic fiduciary
principles.22 8
The second general obligation-suspension of shareholder redemption
rights-clearly cannot be accomplished unilaterally by one or more
independent directors. To do so would violate Section 22(e) of the ICA.
22 9
Nevertheless, directors are entirely within their rights to petition the SEC for
an order calling for such a suspension. Section 22(e)(3) allows the SEC to
suspend the right of redemption for a period of time "as the Commission may
225 See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGART & AMY MORRIS HESS, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 582 (2d rev. ed. 1980 & Supp. 2000).
226 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.1.2, at 279 (2000).
227 A great portion of Phillip Stern's time has been spent on trying properly to value the bonds contained
in the portfolios of the Funds. See Damato, supra note 217.
228 See GEVURTZ, supra note 226, § 4.2.4.a., at 345-46.
229 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1994).
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by order permit for the protection of security holders of the company. ' 23° If
appropriate circumstances existed, therefore, the SEC could suspend
redemption rights at the request of fund directors.23'
The third general obligation relates to fund liquidation and distribution of
assets to creditors and shareholders. Recall that liquidation is within the
discretion of the Heartland receiver. Fund liquidation may sometimes be
accomplished solely through independent director action, depending upon the
state law governing the fund and the fund's articles of incorporation or
declaration of trust. 23z  In those situations in which directors must obtain
shareholder approval under state law prior to any liquidation, they can
certainly seek that approval when circumstances warrant. Shareholders would
likely give their approval if the directors recommended liquidation at a time
when the SEC has authorized the suspension of shareholder redemption rights.
In sum, given the right circumstances, we believe independent directors can
fulfill the same general obligations that a receiver can. To do so, however,
would take the cooperation of the SEC. If investor interests were imperiled, as
they were in the Heartland matter, we believe that the SEC should and would
provide that cooperation.
Judge Lefkow also gave the Heartland receiver seven powers to aid him in
fulfilling his three general obligations. Those seven powers read as follows:
a. Use reasonable efforts to determine the nature, location,
and value of all assets and property owned by the Funds,
in their possession, custody or subject to their control, or
in which the Funds have a legal or equitable interest;
b. Use reasonable efforts to determine the identity of all
shareholders of the Funds;
230 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e)(3).
231 Although not a frequent occurrence, funds at their own volition have filed a Section 22(e)(3) petition
to suspend shareholder redemptions. See, e.g., In re Steadman Fin. Fund, SEC Rel. No. lC-16958, 43 S.E.C.
Docket 1416, 1989 SEC Lexis 888 (May 16, 1989); In re Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Re!. No. IC-
20204,56 S.E.C. Docket 1129, 1994 SEC Lexis 1065 (Apr. 7, 1994); In re OTC-100 Fund, Inc., SEC Rel. No.
16866, 43 S.E.C. Docket 763, 1989 SEC Lexis 484 (Mar. 15, 1989); hi re Am. Fed. of Labor and Congress of
Indus. Organ. Mortg. Inv. Trust, SEC Rel. No. IC-I 1575, 1981 SEC Lexis 2223 (Jan. 21, 1981).
232 Mutual funds are typically organized as either Delaware or Massachusetts business trusts or as
Maryland corporations. Delaware and Massachusetts business trust law does not require shareholder approval
to liquidate a fund. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3808 (2000); State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 41 N.E.2d 30,
34-36 (Mass. 1942) (unless otherwise provided by declaration of trust, trustees manage the trust and
shareholders have no right to dissolve trust). Maryland corporate law, by contrast, has a two-thirds
shareholder approval requirement. See MD. GEN. CORP. L. § 3-403(d) (1999).
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c. Engage and employ a law firm, and with the approval of
the Court, any accounting firms or other necessary
individuals or entities the Receiver deems necessary to
assist in his duties... ;
d. Take such action as necessary and appropriate to prevent
the dissipation or concealment by the Funds or any of
their affiliates of any funds or assets constituting
Receivership Property and otherwise preserve any such
funds and assets;
e. The Receiver shall have the authority to issue subpoenas
to compel testimony of persons or production of records,
consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, concerning any subject
matter relating to the identification, preservation,
collection and/or liquidation of the Receivership Property
or otherwise related to the discharge of the Receiver's
duties;
f. Oversee the operations of any and all businesses owned or
controlled by the Funds, or otherwise constituting a part
of the Receivership Property; and
g. The Receiver may bring such legal actions based on law
or equity in any state, federal, or foreign court as he
deems necessary or appropriate in discharging his duties
as Receiver or on behalf of investors whose interests he is
protecting.
233
Of the seven powers listed above, each clearly helps in preserving the
Funds' assets. Therefore, they help with the receiver's first general obligation.
Three of the seven powers (b, c, and e) also help in the context of a liquidation,
the receiver's third general obligation. While none of the powers specifically
aid in suspending shareholder redemptions, the receiver's second general
obligation-none are essential once the receiver suspends the right of
redemption.
Do directors have the same panoply of powers at their disposal that Judge
Lefkow provided the Heartland receiver? Those powers were viewed as
essential by the court in order for the Heartland receiver to achieve his
objectives. We believe that, except in one situation, directors also have those




Directors already exercise the first four powers (a-d) enumerated in the
Heartland Receiver Order. Indeed, these powers are fundamental powers that
enable directors to play their role as fund watchdogs. Directors are responsible
for knowing the nature, location, and value of all assets and property owned by
their fund. They also are responsible for ensuring that an accurate shareholder
list is maintained. Furthermore, directors already engage and employ law
firms accounting firms, or other necessary individuals or entities to serve their
shareholders' interests. Finally, directors are required to guard against the
dissipation or concealment of fund assets.
The last two powers (f and g) also fall within the directorial ambit.
Overseeing operations constituting fund assets is what directors do. Directors
also are entitled to bring legal actions in law or equity in any state, federal, or
foreign court they deem necessary or appropriate to discharge their duties and
protect the interests of their shareholders. Again, these are quintessential
watchdog powers.
The only power a director does not have is the fifth power (e). That power
allows the Heartland receiver to issue subpoenas to compel testimony
concerning the identification, preservation, collection, and/or liquidation of the
Funds or otherwise related to his duties. Directors, however, have this power
indirectly. To use it, they must file a lawsuit against a person or entity that has
wronged the fund or its shareholders and seek to compel testimony during the
discovery and trial phases of the litigation. Of course, a court, at the directors'
request, issues subpoenas and thus ultimately controls the subpoena process.
Moving away from the Heartland matter, the twenty-six other cases in
which a receiver was appointed shed additional light on the general obligations
235and powers of a receiver. For the most part, the three general obligations of
234 One receivership case not included within the twenty-eight cases analyzed in this Article indicated that
it is the SEC's standard practice to open up its files to a receiver. In Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d
Cir. 1980), the SEC sought and received a court-appointed receiver for a fund organized outside the United
States solely pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 thereunder, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1994) & 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000). On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted: "Shortly after
the appointment of [the receiver], the SEC made its investigatory files available to him, in accordance with its
practice, we are informed in its brief, of assisting 'the efforts of receivers who have been appointed by the
courts in Commission law enforcement actions.' Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 435. If an independent director
meets the standard we espouse in Part III.B. and is left in charge of a troubled fund, the SEC should do the
same to aid the efforts of that director if in fact this is SEC policy.
235 Recall that in one of the twenty-eight receivership cases, the SEC's request for a receiver was denied.
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the Heartland receiver are reflected in the other receivership cases. Covered
completely is the first general obligation to operate the fund and preserve its
assets. All twenty-six cases charged the receivers with this obligation, either236 .. 237
directly236 or b implication, although one court took a circuitous route in
arriving there.
Those cases, however, provided mixed signals on the second general
obligation relating to the suspension of share redemptions. One would expect
that, at a minimum, the courts in all ten cases in which a fund's NAV was
problematic and a receiver was appointed would either suspend fund
redemptions outright or empower the receivers to do so. Yet, only two courts
See SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972). In another case, the SEC's request
for a receiver was effectively mooted. See supra note 51.
236 See SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,707, 1978
WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Tanzer v. Huffines, 287 F. Supp. 273, 274 (D. Del. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 42 (3d
Cir. 1969) (involving B.S.F. Co.); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609, 619 (D.S.D. 1968); SEC v.
Wong, 42 F.R.D. 599, 600 (D.P.R. 1967) (involving Puerto Rico Capital Corp.); SEC v. Continental Growth
Fund, Inc., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), 1964 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8890, at *7; SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C.
Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000); SEC Rel. No. IC-18,688, 51 S.E.C. Docket 638, 1992
WL 102254 (May 1, 1992) (involving Municipal Lease Securities Fund, Inc.); SEC v. Brenna, SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 13,116, 50 S.E.C. Docket 605, 1991 SEC Lexis 2786 (Dec. 10, 1991) (involving four funds managed by
Strategic Mgmt., Inc.); SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587,
1975 WL 160733 (Nov. 25, 1975); SEC v. All Am. Fund, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6 S.E.C. Docket 709, 1975
WL 161610 (Apr. 15, 1975); SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6383,4 S.E.C. Docket 413, 1974
SEC Lexis 3173 (June 4, 1974); In re Fundamatic Investors, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-7692, 1973 SEC Lexis
1894 (Feb. 27, 1973); In re Technical Fund Investment Plans, SEC Rel. No. IC-7393, 1972 SEC Lexis 1388
(Sept. 27, 1972); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5362, 1972 SEC Lexis 1630 (Mar. 21, 1972) (involving Shamrock Fund);
SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb. 28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mutual Fund,
Inc.). See also BOCA RATON CAPITAL CORP., FORM 10-KSB (Apr. 1, 1996), at F-il (auditors stating that "the
appointed receiver, Daniel H. Aronson, was granted full and exclusive power, duty and authority to administer
and manage the Company's affairs").
237 See SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 265 F. Supp. 993, 998-99 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.
1966); SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, 58 F. Supp. 724 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945); SEC v.
Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (D. Del. 1943); SEC v. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 14,052, 56 S.E.C. Docket 1237, 1994 SEC Lexis 1132 (Apr. 14, 1994); SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust,
SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,123, 50 S.E.C. Docket 672, 1991 WL 288651, 1991 SEC Lexis 2639 (Dec. 18, 1991);
SEC v. Treasury First, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,094, 50 S.E.C. Docket 381, 1991 SEC Lexis 2632 (Nov. 19,
1991); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2468, 1962 SEC Lexis 882 (Dec. 28, 1962) (involving Keller Corp.).
238 In SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., the SEC did seek the appointment of a receiver with traditional powers.
SEC Lit. Rel. No. 8698, 1979 SEC Lexis 1927 (Mar. 22, 1979). However, the court instead appointed a
"special master" with more limited powers. SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,951, 1979 WL 1238, at *7. Nevertheless, another court order was issued soon thereafter that, in
many ways, superseded the previous order and appointed a "special counsel" rather than a special master with
much broader powers. Fundpoack, Ind., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,125, 1979
U.S. Dist. Lexis 9440 (D.D.C. 1979).
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did so at the outset. 239 A third court granted a special master the power, in its
sole discretion, to suspend redemptions, although if the master did so, he
nevertheless could "honor redemption requests where it appears that honoring
the request is necessary to avoid undue hardship to any shareholder." 240 In
four other cases, the courts did not suspend share redemptions but did issue
injunctions freezing the assets of the funds, 24 1 thus, effectively preventing
shareholders from redeeming. As for the final three cases, the first involved a
242fund that was not redeeming shares in the first instance, so an order
suspending redemptions may have been viewed as unnecessary. In the second
case, 243 the receiver petitioned the SEC for an order to suspend redemptions
244 245pursuant to Section 22(e)(3) of the ICA, which the SEC granted. The last
case is puzzling because, based on the limited information available, the court
246neither froze assets nor empowered the receiver to suspend redemptions.
The Heartland receiver's third general obligation was his duty to consider
whether to liquidate the Funds. Most of the other twenty-six receivership
cases, by contrast, took a different approach. In four of those cases, the court
239 See SEC v. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14052, 56 S.E.C. Docket 1237, 1994 SEC
Lexis 1132 (Apr. 14, 1994); In re Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-20204, 56 S.E.C. Docket
1129, 1994 SEC Lexis 1065 (Apr. 7, 1994) (suspending share redemptions outright after the SEC had
previously granted the fund's request to suspend share redemptions in a Section 22(e)(3) proceeding); SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 5362, 1972 SEC Lexis 1630 (Mar. 21, 1972) (involving Shamrock Fund) (empowering receiver to
suspend share redemptions). In another case not included in the nine cases, a court granted a receiver's request
to suspend redemptions a short time after it appointed the receiver. See In re Technical Fund Inv. Plans, SEC
Rel. No. IC-7393, 1972 SEC Lexis 1388 (Sept. 27, 1972).
240 SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., Order Appointing Special Master, C.A. No. 3-
ooCV 1482-D (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2000), at 5 ("Rupay Special Master Order"). The special master in that case,
AIM Advisors, Inc., did suspend all share redemptions. See SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc.,
Application for an Order Approving Plan of Distribution and Providing for Discharge of Special Master, C.A.
No. 3-00CV1482-D (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2000), at 5 ("Rupay Discharge Application").
241 See SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101, 50 S.E.C. Docket 386, 1991 WL
288420 (Nov. 21, 1991); SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331,45 S.E.C. Docket
256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989); SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9196,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July
30, 1963) (involving Continental Growth Fund, Inc.).
242 See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb. 28, 1972) (involving Financial Trends Mutual
Fund, Inc.).
243 See In re Fundamatic Investors, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-8022, 25 S.E.C. Docket 540, 1973 SEC Lexis
556 (Oct. 4, 1973); In re Fundamatic Investors, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-7692, I S.E.C. Docket 14, 1973 SEC
Lexis 1894 (Feb. 27, 1973).
244 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e)(3) (1994).
245 See In re Fundamatic Investors, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-7742, I S.E.C. Docket 18, 1973 SEC Lexis
1707 (Mar. 28, 1973).
246 See SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6 S.E.C. Docket 709, 1975 WL 161610 (Apr.
15, 1975).
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simply directed the receiver to liquidate the funds. 24 7 The receiver in question
had absolutely no discretion. In another case involving four orphaned funds,
248
the SEC petitioned for a court order directing that the funds be liquidated if
their independent directors ultimately failed to find a new advisor by a certain
date. The court, however, refused to grant the order, stating that the SEC could
simply renew its liquidation request if the directors failed to find a new
advisor. The court in another case simply ordered the receiver to find a merger
partner for the fund in question rather than liquidate.249
More in line with Heartland on the liquidation point, but providing
250seemingly more flexibility, were eight of the twenty-six receivership cases.
These cases basically charged the receiver with the responsibility of coming up
with alternatives that would resolve the crises faced by the funds in question.
While the specific language varied, phrases such as "pursue alternatives for the
,,251,
constitution, operation, and management of [the fund], prepare . . .
recommendations as to what action may be appropriate, including but not
limited to . . . [a liquidation], 252 "make a determination as to the final
disposition of the [flund,''253 'recommend any action, ' 254 "merge [the fund]
247 See SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943); SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital
Mgmt., Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July 10, 2000); SEC v.
Treasury First, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13094, 50 S.E.C. Docket 381, 1991 SEC Lexis 2632 (Nov. 19, 1991);
SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,123, 50 S.E.C. Docket 672, 1991 WL 288651, 1991
SEC Lexis 2639 (Dec. 18, 1991). See also In re Fundamatic Investors, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-8143, 3 S.E.C.
Docket 271, 1973 SEC Lexis 66 (Dec. 19, 1973) (the court ultimately approving plan of liquidation); In re
Fundamatic Investors, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-8022, 2 S.E.C. Docket 605, 1973 SEC Lexis 556 (Oct. 4, 1973)
(while unclear whether court ordered receiver to liquidate fund, receiver nevertheless submitted a plan of
liquidation to the court).
248 See SEC v. Brenna, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,116, 50 S.E.C. Docket 605, 1991 SEC Lexis 2786 (Dec. 10,
1991) (involving four funds managed by Strategic Mgmt., Inc.); SEC v. Brenna, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,099, 50
S.E.C. Docket 383, 1991 SEC Lexis 2637 (Nov. 19, 1991).
249 See SEC Rel. No. IC-21000, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,428, 1995 SEC Lexis 894 (Apr. 12, 1995) (involving
Centurion Growth Fund, Inc.).
250 See SEC Rel. No. IC-18,688, 51 S.E.C. Docket 638, 1992 WL 102254 (May 1, 1992) (involving
Municipal Lease Securities Fund, Inc.); SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., 11979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 96,707, 1978 WL 1131 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6
S.E.C. Docket 709, 1975 WL 161610 (Apr. 15, 1975); SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6359,4
S.E.C. Docket 293, 1974 SEC Lexis 3241 (May 8, 1974); SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5362, 1972 SEC Lexis 1630 (Mar.
21, 1972) (involving Shamrock Fund); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, 58 F. Supp. 724 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 151 F.2d 254
(1st Cir. 1945).
251 SEC Rel. No. IC-18,688, 51 S.E.C. Docket 638, 1992 WL 102254 (May 1, 1992) (involving Municipal
Lease Securities Fund, Inc.).
252 SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,707, 1978 WL
1131, at *7 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
253 SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6 S.E.C. Docket 709, 710, 1975 WL 161610 (Apr.
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into another ... or ... liquidate [it], '255 "clean up the past and ... prepare for
the future, ' 256 and "either . . .reorganize the capital structure of the Trust or
liquidate the Trust" 257 are representative.
Leaving aside the three general obligations, it should be noted that five of
the twenty-six receivership cases provided one or more objectives or powers
not discussed in the Heartland matter. In two of those cases, the court
essentially tasked the receiver with providing for the orderly selection of a
newly constituted board of directors. 258  In pursuit of that objective, each
receiver was to prepare proxy materials to facilitate a shareholder vote. Oddly
enough, the court in one of those two cases also required the receiver, after the
election of the new board, to watch the new watchdogs. Indeed, the court
ordered the receiver to supervise the "consideration by shareholders and the
new Board of Directors of renewing [the existing advisor's] advisory contract.
. . in view of the lapse of [the contract] and the previous Board's failure to
consider the merits of renewing the contract when it became obvious that [the
existing advisor had engaged in self-dealing]."
259
The court in the third case ordered certain ancillary relief, including the
appointment of new independent trustees to the boards and executive
committees of two corporate defendants. 26  It was unclear, however, whether
the court itself appointed these individuals or left it up to the newly appointed
special counsel and special auditor to handle the matter. The court in the
fourth case ordered the receiver "to act in the capacity of an equity Receiver, as
may be appropriate in the circumstances[,]" in addition to providing a laundry
list of duties for the receiver. This would imply that the receiver could take
action going beyond that laundry list if circumstances warranted.
261
15, 1975).
254 SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6359, 4 S.E.C. Docket 293, 1974 SEC Lexis 3241
(May 8, 1974).
255 SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5362, 1972 SEC Lexis 1630 (Mar, 21, 1972) (involving Shamrock Fund).
256 SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, 283 F. Supp. 3, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
257 SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, 58 F. Supp. 724, 733 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945).
258 See SEC v. Boca Raton Capital Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2145, 1994 SEC
Lexis 3244 (Oct. I1, 1994); SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,951,
1979 WL 1238, at *7 (D.D.C. 1979).
259 SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., 1.1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,951, 1979 WL 1238, at
*7 (D.D.C. 1979).
260 See SEC v. Am. Inst. Counselors, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587, 1975 WL
160733 (Nov. 25, 1975).
261 See SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,707, 1978
WL 1131, at *7 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
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In the last case, SEC v. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc.,262 the court gave the
receiver the general powers of a receiver as well as those of the board of
directors and shareholders. The receiver alone, therefore, could make all
necessary decisions subject to court supervision. In this case, the fund in
question was floundering because it had no investment advisor, counsel,
underwriter, president, secretary, or treasurer. It also had an improperly
263constituted board of directors. The receiver located a merger partner for the
fund. He then argued to the court that it made no sense to put together an
expensive disclosure document to secure shareholder approval for the merger
because he alone had been given the power to approve the merger by the court.
He would be drafting a disclosure document deliverable only to himself.
264
The court agreed, noting that "[n]o vote, consent, or other action by [the
fund's] shareholders was required or solicited in connection with the [merger]
due to the Court's jurisdiction and broad powers of equity.,
265
Can one or more independent directors accomplish the tasks given to
receivers in these additional receivership cases? Certainly, the added flexi-
bility provided by several of these cases is within the ambit of an independent
director. He or she continually considers alternatives that would strengthen a
fund and benefit fund shareholders. Moreover, requiring a receiver to hold an
election for new independent directors, as three of these cases did, is a task that
independent directors already handle. Directors oversee elections and the
proxy process as part of their current duties.
In sum, we believe that a receiver's obligations and powers are not
meaningfully different than those of independent directors. As discussed
above, an independent director can achieve the three general objectives of the
Heartland receiver. In doing so, however, that director will sometimes need
the help of either the SEC and/or the courts. Other receiver obligations provid-
ed by receivership cases other than the Heartland case are not unique and can
be adequately handled by an independent director without the aid of any court
or governmental authority.
262 SEC Lit. Re]. No. 14,063, 56 S.E.C. Docket 1572, 1994 SEC Lexis 1281 (Apr. 28, 1994).
263 See id.
264 Telephone Interview with Daniel H. Aronson, Esq. of Greenberg Traurig LLP (July 24, 2001).
265 SEC Rel. No. IC-21000, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,428, 1995 SEC Lexis 894 (Apr. 12, 1995).
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2. Disadvantages of a Receiver
When weighing the disadvantages of a receiver against those of an
independent director, one must evaluate both tangible and intangible costs.
Tangible receiver costs would include cash outlays to pay receiver fees and to
reimburse the receiver for his or her out-of-pocket costs and expenses.
Intangible receiver costs would include, among others, time delays incurred
while the receiver learns about and develops an understanding for the problems
at a given fund. Even more intangible, but nevertheless significant, would be
any loss of faith in the fund industry at the shareholder or creditor level when a
court appoints a receiver.
With respect to tangible costs, empirical data from the receivership cases is
266far from complete. Each case is idiosyncratic, as the fees for any particularreceiver depend primarily on what the court asks him or her to do. Some
266 A sampling of tangible receiver costs stemming from cases over the last ten years shows the
idiosyncratic nature of these costs. In the case involving Municipal Lease Securities Fund, Inc., the court
charged the receiver, Richard Lindrooth, with pursuing alternatives for the constitution, operation, and
management of the fund and to submit them to the fund's shareholders. See SEC v. Municipal Lease Sec.
Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331, 45 S.E.C. Docket 256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989). Ultimately,
the receiver submitted a plan of liquidation, and the shareholders approved it. See SEC Rel. No. IC-18,688, 51
S.E.C. Docket 638, 1992 WL 102254 (May I, 1992). The receiver submitted expenses of approximately
$187,718, which were payable by the fund. Of those expenses, $88,364 was received by the fund's attorneys
and auditors. Of the remaining $99,354, approximately $54,000 was paid to the receiver himself, $30,000
went to other personnel that assisted with the liquidation, and the remainder went for administrative costs and
expenses. See id.
In the litigation involving Treasury First, Inc., the "special officer," Edward Gelfand, was responsible
for supervising and directing the liquidation of the fund and its advisor, as well as the deregistration of the
fund under the ICA. See SEC Rel. No. IC-20436, 57 S.E.C. Docket 794, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,401, 1994 SEC
Lexis 2394 (Aug. 2, 1994). The special officer withheld $150,000 of the fund's assets for payment of
expenses incurred in connection with winding up the fund. The special officer estimated his compensation and
expenses to be $35,019, and those of the fund's accountants to be $60,551. The special officer would
distribute any remaining amount to shareholders. See id.
A most unusual case involved the Rupay-Barrington Funds, Inc. The court appointed A I M Advisors,
Inc. as "special master," and charged it with liquidating the portfolios of three series funds. The special master
was clearly entitled to charge a fee for its services, as well as be reimbursed for its out-of-pocket expenses.
See Rupay Special Master Order, supra note 240, at 1-2. Other than seeking reimbursement for certain minor
tax payments made on behalf of two of the portfolios, however, the special master charged no fee and did not
seek further expense reimbursement. See Rupay Discharge Application, supra note 240, at 4. When posed
with the obvious question of "why," A I M's Assistant General Counsel, Renee Friedli, responded that given
what the unfortunate shareholders had been through, A I M did not believe it should add to their burden.
Moreover, she added that A I M did not believe it should profit from another advisor's mistakes. See
Telephone Interview with Renee A. Friedli, Esq., Assistant General Counsel, A I M Advisors, Inc. (Aug. 3,
2001). Cf SEC v. John Adams Trust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Mass. 1988) (where, in a case
involving the receivership of an investment advisor, "In]either the diligent receiver nor his able counsel sought
or obtained any monetary compensation for his work").
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receivers move their funds toward liquidation immediately. Others expend
significant time on a lengthy investigation and then additional time searching
for a merger partner or new fund advisor.
We believe the tangible costs of a receiver resolving a fund's crisis and an
independent director doing so would, as a general matter, be equivalent. This
conclusion stems mostly from the fact that the actions necessary to resolve a
fund's crisis would likely be very similar whether a receiver or an independent
director undertook them. Ultimately, the fund pays a receiver's bill or an
independent director's fee. Whether that bill is based on an hourly rate or is
calculated on a "per meeting" basis or otherwise is not, as a practical matter,
relevant.
Tangible receiver costs may, however, lean in favor of an independent
director and against a receiver in certain instances. A receiver's education is
not free of charge. The greater the particular receiver's learning curve is, the
greater the tangible costs associated with that receiver will be. In addition,
because accountants and lawyers typically do a fair amount of the educating,
the fund in question incurs additional advisory expenses. By contrast, an
independent director already has significant experience with the fund in
question and its accountants, lawyers, and other service providers. The
independent director's learning curve, therefore, should be substantially flatter
than that of a receiver, thus lowering tangible costs.
In terms of intangible costs, time delays incurred while the receiver learns
about and develops an understanding for the problems at a given fund could
negatively impact that fund and its shareholders in two ways. First, a long
delay could lead to a substantively worse outcome for shareholders.
267
Available solutions to a fund's crisis could evaporate if the health of the fund
declines as delays mount.
Another significant intangible cost is the negative effect a court's
appointment of a receiver has on a fund's shareholders and creditors. 2" This
267 In this regard, the less experience a receiver has with the fund industry, in general, and the fund itself,
in particular, the greater the chance he or she will make a substantive mistake when analyzing options and
making recommendations as to the future direction of the fund.
268 Karen Damato of The Wall Street Journal relates the experience of Gregory Patchen, an investor in the
Heartland Funds:
[F]ive months ago, the Securities and Exchange Commission stepped into the [Heartland] situation
by getting a court order to take away management of the funds from Milwaukee-based Heartland
Advisors. But while the SEC intervention was supposed to help Heartland bond-fund investors,
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appointment has to tear at the fabric of investor and creditor confidence in the
mutual fund industry.269 Suddenly, an outsider is in charge of the fund, rather
than the directors the shareholders elected. Shareholder democracy and the
congressionally mandated system of checks and balances are either per-
manently or temporarily suspended. The only real check on the receiver is a
judge who may or may not be familiar with the workings of the fund industry.
Moreover, the appointment of a receiver runs contrary to the SEC's highly
publicized initiative to empower independent directors.
While it is unrealistic to expect that the mutual fund industry can avoid
Heartland-type crises entirely, the SEC and the industry do have some control
over how they handle them. The advantages of replacing an independent
director with a receiver do not appear to be significant. Moreover, it is likely
that the combined tangible and intangible costs of a receiver exceed,
sometimes significantly, those of an independent director. The SEC, therefore,
should seek to minimize its use of the receivership remedy as outlined in the
next section. By doing so, fund crises will be managed in a way that is least
likely to shake investor and creditor confidence in the troubled fund, in
particular, and the fund industry, in general.
Mr. Patchen hasn't seen it yet. Instead, the monthly dividend distributions have been barred.
Furthermore, fund shareholders haven't gotten any word since March from the SEC or the court-
appointed receiver on what their remaining investment might be worth or when they will be able to
get their hands on their money .... [Aiccording to Mr. Patchen[,] "The lack of communication to
shareholders by a public agency about something they seized for our own good is disturbing," he
says. Adds Patrick Lemons, another Heartland investor: "It has been a long and frustrating wait."
Damato, supra note 217, at Cl. See generally SEC v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 904 (5th Cir.
1980) (in context of an operating company, court noting that "the imposition of a receivership on a corporation
is a drastic measure, the detrimental business effects of which should be carefully considered").
269 On the issue of trust, Mickey Roth, CEO of USAA Investment Management Company, opined:
The key thing here I think ... lisI the great trust that has grown up, that has propelled the mutual
fund industry to become the premier financial intermediary for the American people. And I think
what the Commission can do, number one, priority is to do things to preserve that trust, to make
sure that it continues to impel us toward things that work toward the benefit of the investors ....
SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 11 , supra note 16, at 15. Dawn-Marie Driscoll, President of Driscoll Associates
and an independent director of several Scudder Kemper mutual funds, added:
In my view, the most important thing that [the mutual fund industry] offers shareholders may
surprise you. It's not performance. It's not low fees. It's not professional management. It's not
outstanding 21st century service. In my view, the most important thing that this industry offers
shareholders is its integrity .... Therefore, in my view, . . . the most important responsibility of
directors, and particularly independent directors, is to oversee the trust of this industry.
Id. at 19.
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B. An Articulated Receivership Standard
1. The "Capable Independent Director" Standard
Three priorities guided the crafting of the receivership standard discussed
below. First, the standard should place the interests of shareholders first.
Second, the standard should embrace the movement towards truly effective
independent mutual fund directors. Finally, the standard should minimize the
costs, particularly the intangible costs, associated with the receivership
remedy. We recommend that the SEC adopt what we refer to as the "Capable
Independent Director" or "CID" Standard. This Standard is simple:
So long as at least one capable independent director is available and
willing to lead a fund through a crisis, the SEC should work with that
director in resolving the fund's crisis rather than seek the appoint-
ment of a third-party receiver. If however, the SEC determines that
the CID Standard is not met during its investigation of the troubled
fund, it should seek the receivership remedy.
The CID Standard has four elements. The first element is the existence of
at least one independent director. While more than one independent director
would be preferable, only one is needed to take charge of a troubled fund.
That director, however, must be truly independent, because shareholder
protection particularly demands it under the circumstances. Indeed, the
likelihood that the director will lock horns with the fund advisor is extremely
high in these cases.
In this context, "independent" means more than not being an "interested
person" under the ICA. 27 The director must have been nominated to the board
by a committee of independent directors, rather than by an interested director
with the blessings of the fund advisor. In addition, that director's remuneration
from the fund must not be material given that director's personal financial
circumstances. Finally, if that director is not already represented by
independent legal counsel, he or she must retain one.
The second element is the most involved element. It requires that the
independent director be "capable," which itself encompasses two concepts.
Capable first means having clean hands. A director being considered to lead a
troubled fund must be loyal to the fund and its shareholders. 271  If the
270 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1994).
271 "Loyalty" is a different concept than "interested." A director, for example, may not be an "interested
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shareholders of that fund have been subjected to fraudulent activities or other
violations of the ICA, that director must not have taken part, or even be
suspected of having taken part, in those activities or violations. The SEC
should exclude from leadership consideration any independent director who
fails this fundamental litmus test.
272
Capable also means being competent. Whether an independent director is
competent is an involved inquiry. This is especially true given that the fund in
question has experienced serious problems during that director's watch.
In our minds, competency embodies both knowledge and alertness. In
terms of knowledge, a director is competent if he or she has the necessary
mutual fund industry experience to understand the fund's troubles and
determine, in consultation with his or her advisors, what to do about them.
Unfortunately, not all independent directors are created equally when it comes
to industry experience. While we strongly believe that the vast majority of
independent directors understand most of what is going on with their particular
funds, it is far less certain whether that same majority can claim truthfully that
273 274it understands the intricacies of fair value pricing, Rule 2a-7, affiliated
transactions, 27 Rule 12b-1, 276 or other complex topics. In this regard, one of
person" under the ICA, and thus qualify as an independent director. Yet that same director may also engage in
fraudulent conduct injurious to shareholders. Thus, the concept of "loyalty," which is embedded within the
element of "capable," is a necessary part of the CID Standard.
272 Cf. SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963) (noting that "[i]t is hardly conceivable that
the trial court should have permitted those who were enjoined from fraudulent misconduct to continue in
control [of Keller Corp.'s] affairs for the benefit of those shown to have been defrauded").
273 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(A) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2000). In discussing the
complexity of fair value pricing, Jean Gleason Stromberg, an independent director of the AARP Investment
Program for Scudder, commented: "[Tihe lawyers and the accountants tell me that I'm the one who needs to
understand all the processes and how the pricing works and everything else, I'm finding a little intimidating,
because I thought they were the ones who understood that, and that they were the ones who would help me
understand it." SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 1, supra note 16, at 85. See generally Should Directors Sit on
Valuation Committees?, FUND DIRECTIONS (Institutional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.) Oct. 2001, at 6,
available at http://www.funddirections.com (discussing the logistical and other impediments to having
directors involved in the fair valuation process).
274 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2000).
275 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
276 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-l (2000). With respect to Rule 12b-l, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
commented: "[I]ndependent directors have special responsibilities under the Investment Company Act when
fund assets are used to pay distribution expenses.... Do directors really understand what payments are being
made to whom and why?" SEC ROUNDTABLE-PART 1, supra note 16, at 3. Faith Colish, a securities attorney
and independent director of Neuberger Berman Funds, added: "[Als a securities lawyer sitting on a board, I
find that this subject is extremely complicated. I think that my fellow directors who are not securities lawyers
are heroic for grappling with them." Id. at 50.
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the authors previously has made a general proposal that, if implemented, would
help ensure that fund boards were made up only of individuals with at least a
basic level of industry knowledge.
277
Competency also means being alert. One inescapable fact in the vast
majority of the receivership cases is that a fund's problems occurred under the
independent directors' noses. Needless to say, this does not instill confidence
in their abilities as watchdogs. Nevertheless, the SEC needs to examine
closely a troubled fund's particular situation. Did the directors spot the
problem and bring it to the SEC's attention? If so, we believe they should not
be excluded from leadership consideration. Likewise, independent directors
who satisfied their fiduciary duty of care, yet failed to discover a problem,
should not be excluded from leadership consideration once the problem comes
to their attention. In both situations, assuming the other elements of the CID
Standard are met, the SEC should give the independent directors the
opportunity and appropriate time frame in which to solve the problem or
develop alternative courses of actions.
The SEC, of course, must make a determination as to whether a particular
independent director is "capable" under the Standard. The SEC is well-
equipped to do so. Currently, the SEC investigates individuals in Section 9
proceedings 278 to determine whether those individuals should be barred from
being directors. An investigation under the CID Standard would involve a
substantially similar investigation and analysis.
The third element of the CID Standard focuses on the desire of one or more
independent directors to take the leadership reins and solve problems. At least
one director must have the time, availability, and willingness to do so.
Shareholders deserve nothing less. No doubt in a crisis situation the
understandable inclination of many independent directors will be to resign and
head for the hills. Others, however, may very well be willing to tackle the
problems directly, utilizing their industry knowledge and personal experience
or expertise with the fund along the way. The SEC will benefit shareholders
by granting those directors the first opportunity to remedy the situation.
The final element of the CID Standard addresses the involvement of the
SEC itself. Independent directors have most, but not all, of the powers of a
277 See Steven R. Howard, A National Association for Independent Directors of Investment Companies: A
Supplement to Current SEC Proposals, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 535 (2001).
278 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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receiver. In particular, they cannot freeze assets and suspend fund redemptions
unilaterally. The SEC, however, has the ability to suspend fund redemptions
upon the request from independent directors. Moreover, the SEC, either alone
or together with independent directors, can petition a court to freeze fund
assets. The important point here is that the SEC needs to work together with
the independent directors if shareholders are to reap the benefits of the CID
Standard.279
In situations in which the SEC believes an independent director satisfies the
CID Standard, it would be preferable if the SEC places him or her in charge of
the fund and foregoes a receivership action. This would minimize the costs
associated with a fund in crisis. To the extent there is an insufficient number
of directors remaining on the fund's board to govern in accordance with state
law and the fund's by-laws, then the remaining director could appoint new
additional directors who would serve until the next election of directors. Any
director remaining in charge of the fund should ensure that he or she is
properly covered by E&O insurance. To the extent the SEC still believes a
fund should be placed in receivership, the SEC should propose to the court that
it select as receiver an independent director who satisfies the CID Standard.
We believe the benefits of the CID Standard are many. It is more
respectful of the congressionally established system of checks and balances. It
supports and enhances the SEC's initiative to empower independent directors.
It is less harmful to shareholder democracy. It minimizes the negative impact
on shareholders' confidence by ensuring that someone they elected remains in
charge of the fund to sort out and solve its problems. Finally, it is likely more
cost-effective, in that it minimizes the intangible costs and possibly even some
of the tangible costs associated with the receivership remedy.
2. Applying the CID Standard
The purpose of this section is to ascertain how the CID Standard would
work in practice. Accordingly, we viewed it light of the three themes gleaned
from examining the factors to which the SEC cited in seeking receivers in the
279 Currently, the SEC appears to approach each potential receivership case as a "one off," delegating the
handling of the matter to the appropriate regional office. Whether the SEC adopts the CID Standard or not, we
believe a different approach is warranted. In our view, the SEC should designate one or more individuals in its
Washington headquarters as receivership experts. These individuals would stay involved with the cases. Over
time, therefore, they would develop an invaluable institutional knowledge base about receiverships that could
be of great assistance to future receivers.
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twenty-eight receivership cases. Recall that those themes involve misconduct,
the redeemable share mechanism, and problematic boards of directors.
280
The first theme of misconduct covered the recurring factors of fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and prohibited affiliate transactions.281 Twenty-two
of the twenty-eight receivership cases, or seventy-nine percent, involved one or
more of those factors. Under the CID Standard, if all independent directors of
a troubled fund are personally implicated in the misconduct, the SEC should
not consider any of them for a leadership role. Rather, it should simply seek a
third-party receiver.
If a director is not implicated in the misconduct, however, the SEC should
consider him or her for a leadership role. That director, of course, must meet
the remaining elements of the CID Standard. Thus, if, among other things, that
director failed to intervene in the crisis because he or she was asleep at the
switch or did not understand the complexities of what was occurring, the SEC
should not consider him or her for a leadership role.
The second theme running through many of the receivership cases was the
seriousness with which the SEC views the redeemable share mechanism of an
open-end investment company. This theme covered the recurring factors of
incorrect or problematic NAVs, reporting violations, and suspension of share
redemptions.282 Fifteen of the twenty-eight receivership cases, or fifty-four
percent, involved one or more of those three factors. None of those factors,
however, implicates the personal conduct of an independent director. Rather,
they implicate that director's oversight capability, competence, and knowledge
base. The SEC, therefore, should consider for a leadership role any
independent director who is demonstrably "capable" under the CID Standard.
If no director qualifies, then the SEC should seek the appointment of a third-
party receiver.
The final theme we gleaned from the receivership cases was the emphasis
the SEC places on having problem-free boards of directors. This theme
covered the less frequently cited factors of an insufficient number of
independent directors, fund abandonment, directors serving without proper
shareholder approval, and directors serving when legally prohibited from doing
280 For a discussion of these themes, see supra Part I.C.
281 For a discussion of these factors, see supra Parts l.B.1.a, c, d.




so. Eleven of the twenty-eight receivership cases, or thirty-nine percent,
involved one or more of those four factors. One of those eleven cases is the
284
only case not also involving either of the two prior themes.
In terms of this final theme, so long as one independent director meets the
CID Standard, the SEC should consider that director for a leadership role. The
SEC should allow that director to oversee the election of additional
independent directors rather than petition a court for a receiver. The SEC
obviously should seek a third-party receiver for those funds that have been
completely abandoned by their boards or that have boards with no properly-
serving independent directors. The SEC needs to show particular sensitivity,
however, if a given fund's issue involves whether it has the requisite number
of independent directors. Deciding whether a particular director is or is not
"interested" has always been a highly factual inquiry. Well-intentioned
individuals have been known to get it wrong from time to time. Thus, an
independent director who fails to discover that another alleged independent
director is really "interested," and, therefore, the board lacks a full complement
of independent directors, should not necessarily be excluded from a leadership
role.
285
Although not included in one of the three themes, one of the factors to
which the SEC cited less frequently deserves honorable mention. That factor
is the failure by an investment company to register under the ICA.2 86 Because
this factor is the only one for which the SEC has explicit statutory authority toS 287.
seek a receiver, it represents a special case. Accordingly, the SEC would be
entirely within its right to seek a receiver for an unregistered investment
company. Moreover, this makes sense in that it is highly unlikely that the
directors of that company were nominated and elected with an eye towards the
ICA's independent director requirement. The probability that any particular
283 For a discussion of these factors, see supra Part I.B.2.
284 See SEC v. Boca Raton Capital Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2145, 1994 SEC
Lexis 3244 (Oct. 11, 1994).
285 The SEC has admonished funds on this point: "Funds and directors should be mindful of their
responsibilities to maintain the required percentage of independent directors, and should monitor director
independence (and other composition issues) accordingly. A fund also could avoid problems . . . by
maintaining a greater percentage of independent directors than the simple majority required by the Exemptive
Rules." Independent Director Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *20 n.29.
286 For a discussion of this factor, see supra Part 1.B.2.
287 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(d) (1994).
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director would naturally qualify as someone other than an "interested person"
under the ICA is, therefore, very low.
288
In light of the CID Standard, did the SEC do the right thing in pursuing the
receivership remedy in the Heartland case? The answer to this query
ultimately depends on a factual analysis of the independent directors of the
Funds and the actions they took and failed to take.289 To date, the SEC has not
charged the independent directors of Heartland with misconduct of any kind-
something that would automatically exclude them from leadership
consideration under the Standard. Thus, the important inquiry is whether any
of Heartland's independent directors meets the other elements of the CID
Standard. It could very well be the case that those directors are not "capable"
under the Standard, something that ongoing shareholder litigation against those
290directors may seek to prove for other purposes. Or, perhaps, none of those
directors were available and willing to take on a leadership role. If either is
true, then the SEC did the right thing in seeking a receiver. If, however, the
elements of the CID Standard are met, we believe the SEC may have made a
mistake by excluding those directors from leadership consideration.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to harmonize the SEC's desire to seek the
receivership remedy in the context of a mutual fund in crisis with its push for
truly effective independent mutual fund directors. Harmonization is important
because the appointment of a receiver disrupts the congressional mandate that
independent directors, rather than a receiver, be the watchdogs looking after
the interests of fund shareholders. Moreover, the appointment of a receiver
carries with it significant costs, including damage to investor confidence.
To provide guidance to the SEC as to when it should seek the receivership
remedy, we carefully analyzed the twenty-eight cases in which the SEC sought
that remedy to determine which factors were most important to it. Once we
288 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1994).
289 As of April 25, 2002, the SEC has not commenced an enforcment action against the independent
directors of the Heartland Funds.
290 The losses at the three Funds of Heartland prompted twenty shareholder lawsuits, nineteen of which
are being consolidated into a single class action lawsuit in federal court in Milwaukee. See Heartland
Inventory, supra note 20. Additionally, the losses apparently have caused the Funds' investment advisor,
Heartland Advisors, to consider putting itself up for sale. See Lawsuits Could Influence Decision To Sell




ascertained those factors, we attempted to develop a standard that would put
shareholders' interests first, maintain an important leadership role for
independent directors, and minimize the costs associated with the receivership
remedy.
The standard we developed is the "Capable Independent Director" or
"CID" Standard. Under the Standard, so long as at least one capable
independent director is available and willing to lead a fund through a crisis, we
believe the SEC should work with that director in resolving the fund's crisis
rather than seek the appointment of a third-party receiver. The CID Standard,
therefore, has four elements. The first element is the existence of at least one
truly independent director. The second element requires that the independent
director be "capable," which itself includes ethical, experiential, and alertness
components. The third element requires that at least one director have the
availability and willingness to take control of a troubled fund and resolve its
problems. The final element of the CID Standard requires the SEC to work
together with the independent director or directors if shareholders are to reap
the benefits of the Standard. If the SEC determines that the CID Standard is
not met during its investigation of a troubled fund, it then should seek the
receivership remedy.
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ANNEX A
SUMMARY OF MUTUAL FUND RECEIVERSHIP CASES
1. Heartland Group, Inc. (2001)
2. Rupay-Barrington Funds, Inc. (2000)
3. Boca Raton Capital Corp. (1994)
4. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc. (1994)
5. Alpine Mutual Fund Trust (1991)
6. Strategic Funds (1991)
7. Treasury First, Inc. (1991)
8. Municipal Lease Securities Fund, Inc. (1989)
9. Steadman Funds (1989)
10. The Fundpack, Inc. (1979)
11. Florida Bank Fund, Inc. (1978)
12. All American Fund, Inc. (1975)
13. American Institute Counselors, Inc. (1975)
14. Financial Fund, Inc. (1974)
15. Fundamatic Investors, Inc. (1972)
16. Financial Trends Mutual Fund, Inc. (1972)
17. Technical Fund, Inc. (1972)
18. Shamrock Fund (1972)
19. Advance Growth Capital Corp. (1972)
20. B.S.F. Company (1968)
21. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. (1968)
22. Midland Basic, Inc. (1968)
23. S & P Nat'l Corp. (1966)
24. Puerto Rico Capital Corp. (1965)
25. Continental Growth Fund, Inc. (1963)
26. Keller Corp. (1962)
27. Aldred Investment Trust (1945)
28. Fiscal Fund, Inc. (1943)
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1. Heartland Group, Inc. (2001) - The SEC filed suit against Heartland
alleging that Heartland was depriving shareholders in three of its funds of
statutorily required fundamental financial information. Without this
information, existing shareholders could not decide to remain invested or
redeem their shares in the funds. The SEC alleged that Heartland also
failed to send an annual report for the funds to shareholders on March 1,
2001 and to file that report with the SEC by March 10, 2001. See SEC v.
Heartland Group, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 16,938, 74 S.E.C. Docket 1344,
2001 SEC Lexis 513 (Mar. 22, 2001). Heartland's failure stemmed from
the ICA's requirement that an annual report include audited financial
statements certified with an unqualified auditor's opinion. Heartland's
auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, refused to provide these statements.
While PricewaterhouseCoopers had commenced an audit, it promised to
disclaim any opinion as to the value of the securities held by the funds
during fiscal year 2000. This led to a situation where shareholders could
be redeeming shares at incorrect NAVs. See SEC v. Heartland Group,
Inc., Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Complaint for
Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Case No. O1C 1984
(N.D. I11. Mar. 21, 2001), at Averments 15-18. With Heartland's consent,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered an order
of permanent injunction against Heartland and appointed a receiver to
oversee the funds. The receiver, Phillip Stern, Esq. of Freeman, Freeman
& Salzman, was empowered to take control of the funds' assets, manage
the funds, suspend fund redemptions, and, if appropriate, liquidate the
funds. See SEC v. Heartland Group, Inc., Order of Permanent Injunction
and Other Equitable Relief Against Heartland Group, Inc., Case No. OC
1984 (N.D. I11. Mar. 21, 2001).
2. Rupay-Barrington Funds, Inc. (2000) - The SEC filed suit against the
fund (a registered series investment company), its investment advisor, and
an upstream affiliate, alleging fraud, mismanagement, and breach of
fiduciary duty. The SEC also alleged sales of securities without a valid
prospectus, violations of net asset valuation requirements, improper loans
to affiliates, and illegal suspension of share redemptions. Specifically, the
advisor caused the fund to carry a worthless receivable from the upstream
affiliate that owned the advisor. The receivable stemmed from the
affiliate's agreement to pay fund expenses that exceeded a certain
percentage of the fund's net assets. The receivable artificially inflated the
NAV of the fund's portfolios by as much as 600% in one instance. This
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led to the series holding the largest portion of the receivable to suspend
redemptions. Defendants consented to the order by the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas appointing a special master (A I M
Advisors, Inc.) to assume management of the fund, to liquidate the fund,
and to make a distribution to the fund's service providers, creditors, and
shareholders. The court also issued a preliminary injunction against the
defendants enjoining them from violating various provisions of the
securities laws. See SEC v. Rupay-Barrington Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC
Lit. Rel. No. 16,623, 72 S.E.C. Docket 2089, 2000 SEC Lexis 1438 (July
10, 2000).
3. Boca Raton Capital Corp. (1994) - The SEC filed suit against the
corporation (a business development company), its directors, officers, and
agents alleging that they violated Section 56 of the ICA. The SEC alleged
that five of the six directors of the corporation were "interested persons,"
thus violating Section 56's requirement that a majority of directors be
independent. With the corporation's consent, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida preliminarily enjoined the corporation, its
directors, officers, and agents from violations of Section 56. The court
also appointed a receiver, froze assets, and prohibited the destruction of
books and records. The purpose of receivership was, among other things,
to ensure an orderly selection of a newly constituted board. The receiver
was instructed to arrange for shareholders to elect a proper number of
disinterested directors and prepare proxy materials to facilitate the process.
The court appointed the receiver, Daniel H. Aronson, Esq., for sixty days
or until further order of the court. See SEC v. Boca Raton Capital Corp.,
SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,294, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2145, 1994 SEC Lexis 3244
(Oct. 11, 1994).
4. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc. (1994) - Prior to the SEC's action, the
fund's sole officer requested the SEC suspend fund redemptions in a
Section 22(e)(3) proceeding. In granting the request, the SEC noted that
"it appears that the Fund's board of directors is unable to take any
corporate action and that the Fund may be redeeming its shares at an
inaccurate net asset value." In re Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Rel.
No. IC-20204, 1994 SEC Lexis 1065 (Apr. 7, 1994). The SEC thereafter
sought injunctive and other ancillary relief against the fund. The SEC
alleged that since 1993 the management of the fund had become
increasingly deadlocked and in disarray. It presently did not have an
investment advisor, counsel, underwriter, president, secretary, or treasurer.
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It also did not have a properly constituted board. The SEC stated that the
fund was delinquent in its filings with the SEC and had not fulfilled its
disclosure obligations to shareholders under the Securities Act and the
ICA, pointing to Section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act and
Sections 30(b)(2) and 30(d) of the ICA and Rules 30b2-1 and 30d-1
thereunder. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted the SEC's request for injunctive relief, froze the assets of the fund,
prohibited the destruction of books and records, suspended the offer, sale,
and redemption of the fund's shares, and granted the SEC's request for a
receiver. See SEC v. Centurion Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No.
14,052, 1994 SEC Lexis 1132 (Apr. 14, 1994). On April 22, 1994, the
court appointed Daniel H. Aronson, Esq. as the receiver. On June 10,
1994, the court directed the receiver to pursue a merger of the fund with
another investment company on terms as advantageous as possible to the
fund's shareholders. The court approved the receiver's merger plan with
The World Funds, Inc. "No vote, consent, or other action by [the fund's]
shareholders was required or solicited in connection with the Plan due to
the Court's jurisdiction and broad powers of equity." SEC Rel. No. IC-
21000, 60 Fed. Reg. 19428, 1995 SEC Lexis 894 (Apr. 12, 1995). The
receiver retained $65,000 of the fund's assets to pay the fund's final costs,
expenses, debts, and liabilities. See id.
5. Alpine Mutual Fund Trust (1991) - This case involved two series funds
investing in municipal obligations: National Municipal Asset Trust
("NMAT") and California Municipal Asset Trust ("CMAT"). With
Alpine's consent, the SEC filed suit against the funds seeking an
injunction to freeze their assets and the appointment of a receiver. In its
complaint, the SEC alleged multiple violations of the ICA by the funds, to
wit: (a) failure to compute accurately the NAV of their shares on a daily
basis in violation of Section 22(c) and Rule 22c-1(a) and (b) thereunder;
(b) failure to make required annual and semiannual reports and filings with
their shareholders and the SEC in violation of Sections 30(a) and (d) and
Rules 30a- 1 and 30d- 1 thereunder; (c) failure to redeem their shares within
seven days of tender in violation of Section 22(e); (d) failure to conduct
shareholder elections of trustees and consequent failure to have requisite
number of independent directors in violation of Sections 16(a), 10(a), and
15(f)(1); (e) loans incurred by NMAT in contravention of its prospectus in
violation of Sections 13(a)(2) and 21(a); (f) NMAT's sale of certain
portfolio assets to affiliated persons in violation of Section 17(a)(2); (g)
the funds' return of capital to shareholders without disclosing that capital
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was being returned in violation of Section 19(a) and Rule 19a-1
thereunder; and (h) failure of the funds to maintain certain books and
records accurately in violation of Sections 31(a) and Rules 31a-l(a),
(b)(1), and (b)(8) thereunder. The U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado froze the funds' assets on November 20, 1991 and appointed a
receiver, Raymond Friedloeb, Esq., on November 25, 1991. The order
appointing the receiver also ordered the liquidation of the two funds. See
SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,123, 50 S.E.C.
Docket 672, 1991 WL 288651, 1991 SEC Lexis 2639 (Dec. 18, 1991);
SEC v. Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,101, 50 S.E.C.
Docket 386, 1991 WL 288420 (Nov. 21, 1991).
6. Strategic Funds (1991) - The SEC filed a complaint against Strategic
Management, Inc. ("SMI"), four funds that SMI managed and certain
individual defendants, on November 19, 1991. The SEC alleged that the
corporate defendants and also two individual defendants violated Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act
and Rules lOb-5 and 14a-9 thereunder, Sections 206(1) and (2) of the IAA,
and Section 20(a) of the ICA. Specifically, the funds had filed proxy
materials with the SEC and distributed them to shareholders that detailed a
proposed assignment of the funds' advisory contracts by SMI to another
advisor, Chesire Hall Advisors, Inc. The assignment was being made in
accordance with SMI's settlement of an SEC enforcement proceeding.
While the proxy materials disclosed that the new advisor was paying
$300,000 to SMI for the assignment, a secret, undisclosed deal for the new
advisor to pay approximately $1.9 million more to SMI existed. The SEC
sought injunctive relief against SMI and the individual defendants and the
appointment of a "special master" for the funds. The SEC wanted the
special master to manage the funds in the ordinary course of business and
to commence an orderly liquidation if, by December 31, 1991, the
independent directors of the funds had failed to assign the advisory
contracts to a new advisor, subject only to shareholder approval. See SEC
v. Brenna, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,099, 50 S.E.C. Docket 383, 1991 SEC
Lexis 2637 (Nov. 19, 1991). The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, while granting the SEC's request for the special master,
rejected the SEC's contingent liquidation plan, stating that the SEC could
renew its request for liquidation if the independent directors were
unsuccessful in finding a new advisor. See SEC v. Brenna, SEC Lit. Rel.
No. 13,116, 50 S.E.C. Docket 605, 1991 SEC Lexis 2786 (Dec. 10, 1991).
Lexington Management Corp. took over management of the funds on
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December 12, 1991. See SEC v. Brenna, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,125, 50
S.E.C. Docket 673, 1991 SEC Lexis 2878 (Dec. 18, 1991). For a related
case, see infra Treasury First, Inc.
7. Treasury First, Inc. (1991) - The SEC filed a complaint against the fund,
its advisor, and an individual defendant (John Hall). The complaint
alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5
thereunder, Sections 206(1) and (2) of the IAA, and Sections 13(a)(3) and
36(a) of the ICA. Specifically, Hall, through the advisor, misappropriated
approximately $2.1 million of the fund's money by purchasing non-
existent commercial paper. Hall planned to use the money to help
purchase the management contract for the Strategic Funds. None of these
actions were disclosed to the fund's shareholders. The U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California froze assets of the fund and its advisor
and later appointed a "special officer" to direct the liquidation and
dissolution of the fund and its advisor. See SEC v. Treasury First, Inc.,
SEC Lit. Rel. No. 13,094, 50 S.E.C. Docket 381, 1991 SEC Lexis 2632
(Nov. 19, 1991). On November 14, 1991, the court appointed Edward S.
Gelfand as the special officer. After distributing assets to shareholders,
Gelfand retained $150,000 for expenses. Expenses were estimated at
$35,019 for the special officer, $60,551 for the fund's accountants, and the
rest as a reserve. See SEC Rel. No. IC-20436, 57 S.E.C. Docket 794, 59
Fed. Reg. 40401, 1994 SEC Lexis 2394 (Aug. 2, 1994). For a related case,
see supra Strategic Funds.
8. Municipal Lease Securities Fund, Inc. (1989) - The SEC filed a
complaint against the fund, its advisor, its underwriter, and Howard
Hutchinson, the president of each of the other corporate defendants. The
complaint alleged violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Act, Sections 22(c), 34(b), 17(f), 30(a), 30(b), and 30(d) of the ICA, and
Rules 22c-1, 31a-1, 17f-2, 30a-l, 30bl-l, and 30d-1 under the ICA.
Specifically, the SEC alleged that the fund through, or with assistance of,
the other defendants sold and redeemed its shares at prices not based on
the calculated NAV of those shares. The complaint also alleged that the
defendants falsely stated in disclosure documents that the prices of shares
were based on the calculated NAV, and omitted to state that the fund had
not calculated the NAV of its shares for at least the last five months. The
complaint further alleged that the fund failed to keep current certain
required books and records, failed to follow proper custodial procedures,
and failed to file certain required reports with the SEC. With the fund's
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consent, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
enjoined sales, redemptions, and repurchases of fund shares, froze fund
assets, and enjoined the destruction of books and records. Also with the
fund's consent, the court appointed a receiver for the fund. Among other
things, the court directed the receiver to assume management
responsibility for the fund, collect and distribute payments as necessary,
pursue alternatives for the constitution, operation, and management of the
fund, and submit such alternatives to the fund's shareholders. See SEC v.
Municipal Lease Sec. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,331, 45 S.E.C.
Docket 256, 1989 WL 992928 (Dec. 26, 1989).
9. Steadman Funds (1989) - After an SEC investigation of the Steadman
Funds, a mutual fund group comprised of five registered investment
companies, the SEC raised with the trustees of the funds issues concerning
undisclosed liabilities relating to the funds' failure to register their shares
under the state blue sky laws in the various states in which they were
offered and sold. The trustees thereafter, on two separate occasions,
resolved to liquidate the funds, but Charles W. Steadman, the president
and chairman of both the funds and their investment advisor, refused to
comply. See SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,167, 44 S.E.C.
Docket 45, 1989 SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989). The trustees then
petitioned the SEC to allow the funds to suspend fund redemptions under
Section 22(e)(3), which petition the SEC granted. See In re Steadman
Financial Fund, SEC Rel. No. IC-16958, 43 S.E.C. Docket 1416, 1989
SEC Lexis 888 (May 16, 1989). The SEC thereafter filed a complaint
seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against the funds, their
advisor and Steadman. The SEC also sought the appointment of a receiver
for the funds. The SEC alleged that the funds incurred material liabilities
by failing to register their securities in the states in which their shares were
offered and sold. The funds did not include those liabilities when
calculating their current NAVs. The SEC also alleged that the defendants
misled fund investors about the implications for those investors stemming
from the failure to register fund shares with the various states. The SEC
also alleged violations by the advisor and the individual defendant relating
to the custody of fund monies, the provision of investment advice without
the approval of fund trustees, and the filing of required reports and
registration forms. Specifically, the SEC alleged violations of: (a) the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act, Exchange Act, the ICA, and the
IAA; (b) Section 17A(d)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17Ad-13
thereunder; (c) Section 15(a) of the ICA; (d) Section 22(c) of the ICA and
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Rule 22c- 1 thereunder; and (e) Section 204 of the IAA and Rule 204-1(a)
thereunder. See SEC v. Steadman, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12,167, 44 S.E.C.
Docket 45, 1989 SEC Lexis 1362 (July 17, 1989). Apparently, during
settlement talks, the SEC dropped its request for a receiver, but pursued its
request for injunctive relief. The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia granted the SEC's request for injunctive relief, only to have the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacate the injunction. See
SEC v. Steadman, 798 F. Supp. 733 (D.D.C. 1991), vacated in part, aff'd
in part, 967 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
10. The Fundpack, Inc. (1979) - The SEC filed a complaint against six
corporate defendants (including Fundpack and two other open-end
investment companies) and twelve individual defendants seeking a
permanent injunction against them. It also sought an order appointing a
trustee "to take possession of, administer and dispose of the assets of, the
Funds subject to the Court's supervision." SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., SEC
Lit. Rel. No. 8698, 17 S.E.C. Docket 73, 74, 1979 SEC Lexis 1927 (Mar.
22, 1979). The SEC alleged violations of the antifraud and registration
provisions of the Securities Act, the antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act, and the IAA, and the antifraud, reporting, proxy, fiduciary obligation,
and investment restriction provisions of the ICA. Specifically, the SEC
detailed how Fundpack's advisor, Fundpack Management, Inc.
("Management"), implemented "switching," whereby an investor in the
funds could transfer his investment into or out of Fundpack or the other
funds with a telephone call. Switching resulted in excessive borrowing
costs, high transaction costs, and investment losses due to the use of
leverage in declining markets. The SEC alleged that the incurrence of
switching costs evidenced self-dealing by Management. None of these
costs were disclosed in the funds' registration statements, prospectuses,
and proxies. In addition to the nondisclosures, the SEC alleged that
Fundpack failed to disclose the lapse of its advisory contract with
Management and that all the funds failed to disclose the cancellation of
their fidelity bond. Finally, the SEC claimed that Fundpack's directors
breached their fiduciary duty involving misconduct by acquiescing in
Management's conduct and by renewing Management's contract in
disregard of Fundpack and its shareholders. The directors also failed to
conduct inquiries and evaluate the switching program and self-dealing
transactions by Management. Id. The U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia essentially agreed with the SEC, particularly noting that the
material omissions in proxy materials resulted in a violation of Section
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20(a) of the ICA. The court therefore exercised its equitable power to void
the proxies solicited and the election of the new board of directors. The
court noted its power to appoint a receiver under Section 42(e) of the ICA,
but stopped short of completely granting the SEC's request in this regard.
Rather, the court believed it could appoint, and it thereafter did appoint, a
"special master" whose powers did not extend to the plenary powers of a
full receiver. The court directed the special master to supervise the
sending out of new proxy materials, the election of a new board of
directors for each fund, and the consideration by the shareholders and new
board of each fund of renewing Management's advisory contract with that
fund in view of what had transpired. See SEC v. Fundpack, Inc., [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,951, 1979 WL 1238
(D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1979). Notwithstanding the court's initial order, it
issued a subsequent order on September 29, 1979 that, in many ways,
superseded its previous order. In particular, a "special counsel"-James
W. Beasley, Esq.-rather than a special master was appointed. The new
order gave the special counsel much broader powers than had been granted
to the special master. Moreover, that order placed four specified
individuals onto each of the boards until an election of directors could be
held. The order further required that when that election was held, each
fund recommend those specific individuals to shareholders. Finally, the
new order required that each board have not less than eighty percent
independent directors for at least a year after the election. See SEC. v.
Fundpack, Inc., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,125, 1979 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9440 (D.D.C. 1979).
11. Florida Bank Fund, Inc. (1978) - The SEC sought a preliminary
injunction against the fund, its investment advisor, and certain individual
defendants and the appointment of a receiver for the fund. The SEC
alleged that the fund violated: (a) Section 17(g) of the ICA and Rule 17g-1
thereunder for failing to maintain a proper fidelity bond; (b) Section 22(c)
of the ICA and Rule 22c-1 thereunder for redeeming shares at an
improperly computed NAV; (c) Section 34(b) of the ICA in that its annual
report contained untrue statements; (d) Section 30(a) of the ICA and Rule
30a-1 thereunder for failing to file annual reports with the SEC; (e)
Section 30(d) of the ICA and Rule 30d-1 thereunder for failing to transmit
annual and semiannual reports to shareholders; and (f) Section 31(a) of the
ICA and Rule 31a-i thereunder for failing to maintain records properly.
The SEC also claimed that the advisor violated: (i) Section 15(a) of the
ICA because it acted as an advisor when its contract was not properly
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approved; (ii) Section 17(a)(3) of the ICA because it engaged in improper
affiliate transactions; (iii) Section 48(b) of the ICA in that, as manager, the
advisor hindered and delayed the fund from filing its annual reports; and
(iv) the antifraud provisions of the IAA. See SEC v. Florida Bank Fund,
Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 96,707, 1978 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 15237 (M.D. Fla. 1978). The U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida granted the requested injunctive relief and the request
for a receiver, noting that the fund "has no functioning board of directors.
. . [and] having no board [the fund] is unable to execute its duties to
shareholders and its obligations under the [ICA] and rules promulgated
thereunder." Id. at *11. The court appointed Frank N. Fleischer, Esq. of
Schiffino & Fleischer as receiver "of all assets and property of, and owned
beneficially by, [the fund], and all assets or property which [the fund] has
in its custody or control." Id. at * 16. He was authorized to take custody of
all books and records of the fund, ascertain the true state of affairs of the
fund, marshal, collect, and take charge of all such assets, prosecute all
claims, and, upon application of the court in accordance with the following
sentence, liquidate the estate of the fund and pay all just claims. He was to
prepare and file a report with the SEC and the court containing the results
of his investigation and recommendations as to what action may be
appropriate, including but not limited to liquidation of the fund, subject to
court approval. He was also to act "in the capacity of an equity Receiver,
as may be appropriate in the circumstances." Id. at *18. The court also
effectively froze the fund's assets by prohibiting the fund advisor, and any
affiliated parties from transferring, selling, assigning, etc. any assets of the
fund. Id.
12. All American Fund, Inc. (1975) - The SEC filed a complaint against the
fund, its advisor, the advisor's parent corporation, and three individual
defendants who were officers and directors of the parent and directors of
the fund. The SEC's complaint alleged that certain defendants had failed
and refused to cause the advisor to pay monies owed by the advisor to the
fund. Because the advisor appeared to be unable to pay the amounts
owing, the fund's shares had been improperly and fraudulently valued.
The SEC also alleged that the fund had distributed false and misleading
proxy material to its shareholders and that more than sixty percent of the
fund's directors were interested persons. The SEC's complaint sought the
appointment of a receiver for the fund. See SEC v. Zenith Am. Mgmt.
Serv., Ltd., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6650, 5 S.E.C. Docket 798, 1974 SEC Lexis
2080 (Dec. 24, 1974). The U.S. District Court for the Central District of
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California appointed Murray L. Simpson, Esq. as receiver of the fund, and
the defendants consented to the appointment. The court ordered the
receiver to take charge of the assets of the fund, make a full investigation
into possible claims on behalf of the fund, obtain an interim investment
advisor, and make a determination as to the final disposition of the fund.
See SEC v. All Am. Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6836, 6 S.E.C. Docket
709, 1975 SEC Lexis 1824 (Apr. 15, 1975).
13. American Institute Counselors, Inc. (1975) - The SEC sought injunctive
and other ancillary relief against a constellation of defendant corporations
(referred to as the "Progress Group," of which American Institute
Counselors, Inc. ("AIC") was one) and certain individual defendants. The
SEC alleged that the defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme and
course of business by distributing numerous types of unregistered gold-
related securities "in near total disregard for, and in violation of virtually
the entire panoply of federal securities laws." SEC v. Am. Inst. of
Counselors, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 7183, 8 S.E.C. Docket 587, 1975 WL
160733 (Nov. 25, 1975). Specifically, certain defendants acted as
investment advisors, investment companies, and broker-dealers without
registering with the SEC in violation of the registration provisions of the
IAA, ICA, and Exchange Act. Certain defendants also engaged in
transactions with affiliates in violation of the IAA and ICA and failed to
make and keep certain books and records required of registrants under the
IAA, ICA, and Exchange Act. Two defendants, AIC and American
Institute of Economic Research ("AIER"), consented to the entry of
permanent injunctions enjoining them from violations of the antifraud and
registration provisions of the Securities Act, the antifraud and broker-
dealer registration requirements of the Exchange Act, the registration
requirements of the ICA, and the registration, reporting, and antifraud
provisions of the IAA. Additionally, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia ordered certain ancillary relief including, among
other things: (a) the appointment of new independent trustees to the boards
and executive committees of AIC and AIER, and (b) the appointment of a
special auditor and a special counsel. The court gave the special auditor
and special counsel certain prescribed duties and responsibilities, including
ensuring fair and equitable treatment to investors and taking control of, the
accounting for, and the preserving of, the funds, securities, and other assets
of the investors. The court also ordered certain defendants to comply with
the registration requirements of the Exchange Act, IAA, and ICA. See id.
In granting ancillary relief, the court relied, in part, on Section 42(e) (now
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(d)) of the ICA that specifically allows the court to appoint a trustee in
connection with violations of Section 7 of the ICA. See SEC v. Am. Inst.
Counselors, Inc., [1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,388, 1975 WL 440, at *20 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 1975).
14. Financial Fund, Inc. (1974) - The SEC filed a complaint against the fund
seeking an injunction to prevent further violations of the ICA and the
appointment of a receiver to take control of the fund, manage and preserve
its assets, render an accounting to the court, and recommend action. The
SEC's complaint alleged that, among other things, the fund: (a) had a
board comprised of more than sixty percent "interested persons"; (b)
deviated from its investment policy without proper authorization; (c)
suspended the right of investors to redeem their shares; and (d) failed to
make accurate and timely reports to investors or to file those reports with
the SEC. See SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6359, 4
S.E.C. Docket 293, 1974 SEC Lexis 3241 (May 8, 1974). The fund did
not contest the SEC's requested relief. The U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington appointed Lloyd Shorett as receiver on
May 24, 1974. See SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6383, 4
S.E.C. Docket 413, 1974 SEC Lexis 3173 (June 4, 1974). The court
issued an order of permanent injunctive relief on July 12, 1974. See SEC
v. Financial Fund, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6442, 4 S.E.C. Docket 621,
1974 SEC Lexis 2955 (July 19, 1974).
15. Fundamatic Investors, Inc. (1972) - The SEC sought preliminary and
final injunctive relief against the fund as well as the appointment of a
"receiver and trustee." See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5595, 1972 SEC Lexis 1862
(Oct. 31, 1972). The SEC's complaint alleged that the fund: (a) violated
Section 22(c) of the ICA and Rule 22c-1 thereunder by (i) not keeping
current the books and records necessary to compute an accurate NAV, (ii)
failing to have a functioning board of directors to value its portfolio
securities, (iii) using the NAV computed as of the wrong day in effecting
shareholder redemptions, and (iv) redeeming shares at prices other than
those based on current NAV; (b) violated Section 22(e) of the ICA in that
it failed to pay redemptions within seven days of receipt of redemption
requests; (c) violated Sections 30(a) and (d) of the ICA and Rules 30a-1
and 30d-1 thereunder by failing to file with the SEC and transmit to its
shareholders its annual report; and (d) failed to keep current certain books
and records in violation of Section 31(a) of the ICA and Rule 31a-1
thereunder. See id. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
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New York appointed Sidney R. Pine, Esq. as receiver and trustee of the
fund's books, records, and assets on November 10, 1972. See SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 5628, 1972 SEC Lexis 1893 (Nov. 13, 1972). The
receiver/trustee then sought, and obtained, SEC approval to suspend share
redemptions by the fund pursuant to Section 22(e)(3) of the ICA. See In re
Fundamatic Investors, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-7742, 1 S.E.C. Docket 18,
1973 SEC Lexis 1707 (Mar. 28, 1973). The receiver/trustee ultimately
submitted a plan of liquidation to the court, which the court approved on
October 5, 1973. See In re Fundamatic Investors, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-
8143, 3 S.E.C. Docket 271, 1973 SEC Lexis 66 (Dec. 19, 1973).
16. Financial Trends Mutual Fund, Inc. (1972) - The SEC sought injunctive
relief against the fund, its advisor, and various individual defendants
(including Robert A. Schilleman, the president of the fund and the advisor)
and the appointment of a receiver for the fund. The SEC alleged the
fund's NAV was not being computed daily, the fund was not redeeming its
shares, and the fund's books and records were not being maintained and
kept current. Also, certain individual defendants were serving as fund
directors without having been elected by fund shareholders. Certain
defendants were also acting as an officer, director, or investment advisor
while subject to a court order enjoining them from engaging in certain
transactions involving the purchase and sale of securities. Certain
defendants also were engaging in breaches of fiduciary duty involving
personal misconduct and converting fund property to their own use. The
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California appointed Kevin
0. Lewand as receiver pendente lite for the fund on February 25, 1972,
which appointment was unopposed by defendants. The court ordered the
receiver to take charge of the properties, assets, and records of the fund.
See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5341, 1972 SEC Lexis 1609 (Feb. 28, 1972). It was
determined later that the management contract between the fund and the
advisor had not become effective because that contract had not been
properly approved by fund shareholders. See In re Carob Sec., Inc. and
Robert A. Schilleman, SEC Admin. Proceedings 3-4980 & 8-20294, 1976
SEC Lexis 2774 (Aug. 30, 1976).
17. Technical Fund, Inc. (1972) - The SEC filed a complaint against the
fund, its president, one of its directors, an alleged undisclosed principal of
the underwriter and advisor, and counsel for the fund. The SEC sought
injunctive relief against the defendants and the appointment of a receiver
for the fund. Its complaint alleged, among other things, that the
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defendants violated the ICA by filing false and misleading proxy material
with the SEC and by engaging in unlawful transactions between the fund
and affiliated persons. The SEC further alleged that the director and
president were guilty of gross abuse of trust by engaging in practices
constituting a breach of fiduciary duty in respect of the fund and that the
management contract had not Len approved by a majority of the fund's
shareholders. The SEC also accused the defendants of violating the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5408,
1972 SEC Lexis 1676 (May 25, 1972). The U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts appointed Ronald F. Kehoe as receiver on May
26, 1972. See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5409, 1972 SEC Lexis 1677 (May 26,
1972). Although not part of the SEC's complaint, the receiver discovered
after his appointment that the fund was not accurately computing NAV.
As a result, the receiver suspended the redemption of the fund's shares.
See In re Technical Fund Inv. Plans, SEC Rel. No. IC-7393, 1972 SEC
Lexis 1388 (Sept. 27, 1972).
18. Shamrock Fund (1972) - The fund held significant amounts of restricted
securities. Because the independent directors' frequent requests for
information concerning the fund's portfolio securities were "systematically
denied," they (and through them, the fund) asserted there was not enough
information to value the fund's assets properly. See In re Shamrock Fund,
SEC Rel. No. IC-7044, 1972 SEC Lexis 1224 (Mar. 7, 1972). An
emergency thus existed under Section 22(e)(2) and (3) of the ICA, and the
fund petitioned the SEC for an order pursuant to Section 22(e)(3) to
suspend share redemption privileges. See id. Thereafter, on the SEC's
motion, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the fund from failing to
redeem its redeemable shares in violation of Section 22(e) and from selling
its redeemable shares to the public at prices other than the current offering
price in the prospectus in violation of Section 22(d). The court also
appointed Harry L. Nelson, Jr. as receiver pendente lite on March 21,
1972. The court empowered him to take charge of the assets and records
of the fund for safekeeping. He also was to perform the duties of the
board, suspend repurchase and redemption of redeemable shares, and
obtain shareholder approval for a new investment advisor, merge the fund
into another, or liquidate it. See SEC Lit. Rel. 5362, 1972 SEC Lexis 1630
(Mar. 21, 1972). As detailed in many subsequent proceedings, the officers
of the fund's advisor had caused the fund to purchase certain securities for
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which they or the advisor received kickbacks. See, e.g., United States v.
Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976).
19. Advance Growth Capital Corporation (1972) - The SEC sought a
permanent injunction against the corporation and its chairman and
president. It also sought the appointment of a receiver for the corporation.
The SEC alleged that the defendants had engaged in unlawful affiliated
transactions and filed annual reports with the SEC that omitted discussion
of those transactions. It further alleged that the two individual defendants
had engaged in a gross abuse of trust within the meaning of Section 36 of
the ICA. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in an
unpublished opinion referred to in the appellate opinion, refused to grant
injunctive relief on the basis that the individual defendants had not
engaged in intentional misconduct, and that in any event the corporation
had not been harmed. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and
issued a permanent injunction against the defendants. The district court
had also refused to grant the SEC's request for a receiver, because
although the two individual defendants had engaged in acts that could be
criticized, they had done much good for the corporation by turning it
around financially. In the appellate opinion, the district court is quoted as
stating that "[i]t would be more than a disservice to [the corporation], its
stockholders and creditors, it would be a disaster to them for this court to
appoint a Receiver . . . after [the two defendants] had rescued [the
corporation] from bankruptcy in 1964, and saved it from dissolution in
1965 and 1966, and have since that time restored most of the capital that
was dissipated in the 1962 binge of the officers and directors." The
Seventh Circuit, "[w]eighing all the equities," held that "it is probable that
removal of the defendants and appointment of a receiver would be more
detrimental than beneficial to the investment company and its
shareholders, and, as Section 36(a) expressly recognizes, the ultimate
benefit of these parties is the primary objective of the Act." It added,
however, that "[w]hether the defendants are barred under the provisions of
§ 9(a)(2) ... from serving in their present capacity or any other capacity
with [the corporation] absent exemption under § 9(c) . . . is an
administrative matter within the provisions of the Commission as to which
we express no opinion. . . ." SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470
F.2d 40, 54, 55 (7th Cir. 1972).
20. B.S.F. Company (1968) - This was a derivative action by a shareholder
requesting the appointment of a receiver pendente lite for the company. In
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granting the request, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
relied on: (1) defendants' gross and deliberate fraud, (2) the company's
non-compliance with Section 29 of the ICA by failing to file an annual
report with the SEC, (3) omissions in materials defendants submitted to
the court, and (4) misleading information in the company's 1967 annual
report to stockholders. The court noted that "the interest of the
stockholders of B.S.F. Company is not only unrepresented but, in fact, is
imperiled by present management's apparent disregard for its fiduciary
responsi-bilities." Tanzer v. Huffines, 287 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Del.
1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1969). Defendants used the company's
assets to purchase controlling stakes in operating companies. Defendants
used these stakes to have themselves appointed directors and officers of
those operating companies, receiving large salaries and other perquisites
there-after. 287 F. Supp. at 274. Defendants appealed the case to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief
requesting the Third Circuit to uphold the district court's appointment of a
receiver pendente lite for the company. The Third Circuit held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a receiver pendente
lite. See 408 F.2d at 42.
21. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. (1968) - The SEC sought injunctive relief
against the corporation and other individual defendants and the
appointment of a receiver for the corporation. It alleged that the
corporation was an unregistered investment company and that, prior to the
time the corporation needed to register, the individual defendants had
engaged in self-dealing and prohibited transactions with affiliates.
Therefore, the SEC argued that because these individual defendants were
still in control of the corporation, they were likely to engage in violations
of the ICA now that the corporation fell within the definition of
"investment company" under the ICA. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the SEC was entitled to injunctive
relief against the corporation and the individual defendants. Pursuant to
Section 42(e) [now (d)] of the ICA, the court appointed a receiver for the
corporation because it required "strong independent management to lead
the company out of its difficulties, to clean up the past and to prepare for
the future .... [T]here is no need for liquidation of [the corporation.] The
need is for constructive management." SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court further stated that it
could not take a chance on allowing the one individual defendant (Bolan)
to whom the injunction did not run to continue operating the company,
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because "[i]t is the court's best judgment that the situation demands the
appointment of a wholly disinterested officer of the court to administer
[the corporation], to prosecute its action against Krock [a director and
control person], to investigate and ascertain whether there are other actions
that can be maintained." Id. The court found that Bolan was too closely
tied to the other individual defendants to be allowed to run the corporation.
See id. The court appointed S. Hazard Gillespie, Esq. as trustee-receiver
on August 12, 1968. See In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., SEC Rel. No.
IC-5667, 1969 WL 95187 (Apr. 29, 1969).
22. Midland Basic, Inc. (1968) - The SEC sought a permanent injunction
against the company and certain individual defendants and the
appointment of a receiver for the company. The SEC alleged that the
individual defendants had engaged in self-dealing and other fraudulent acts
in violation of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and that the
company had failed to register as an investment company under the ICA.
(By the time the court proceedings began, however, the company had
registered under the ICA in order to placate the SEC.) The U.S. District
Court for the District of South Dakota permanently enjoined the individual
defendants and disqualified them from serving as officers and directors of
the company pursuant to Section 9(a) of the ICA. With respect to the
SEC's request for a receiver, the court noted that the only statutory
provision authorizing the appointment of a receiver is Section 42(e) (now
(d)) of the ICA. While that section was not implicated in the case at bar
because the company had registered prior to the court proceeding, the
court nevertheless held that it had inherent equitable power to appoint a
trustee-receiver upon a prima facie showing of fraud and mismanagement.
Because that showing was made, the court appointed a receiver to take
control of all records, claims, and assets of the company for the protection
of its stockholders who had been made the subject of defendants'
fraudulent scheme. See SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609
(D.S.D. 1968).
23. S & P Nat'l Corp. (1966) - This case involved S & P National Corp., a
publicly-traded corporation which in turn controlled two other corporate
defendants. The SEC sought injunctive relief against the three corporate
defendants and a trustee for all three. The SEC alleged that all three
corporate defendants had been unregistered investment companies for
many years, yet had been selling and buying securities in violation of
Section 7(a) of the ICA. In addition, the SEC alleged that S & P had been
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abandoned by its board of directors and filed false annual reports in
violation of the Exchange Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York enjoined the defendants from selling or acquiring
securities or engaging in business in interstate commerce. Pursuant to
Section 42(e) (now (d)) of the ICA and the court's inherent equitable
powers, it also appointed Leslie Kirsch as trustee for all three corporations.
The court noted that the recent appointment of directors and officers by
those in control of S & P was done for the purpose of avoiding a trustee,
and that such "revival" is not sufficient to defeat the court's statutory or
equity power. The court order empowered the trustee to: (a) take
possession and maintain books, records, and assets of the corporate
defendants, wherever located; (b) ascertain the true state of affairs of the
corporate defendants and report thereon to the court and shareholders of S
& P; (c) determine what persons are and have been directors, parents, and
controlling persons of S & P; and (d) cause the corporate defendants to
comply with applicable provisions of the ICA and Exchange Act. See
SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 265 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 360 F.2d
741 (2d Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
lower court's appointment of a receiver was not an abuse of discretion
where long-continuing violations of the Exchange Act and ICA had been
prima facie established, no shareholder meetings had been held for eleven
years, two hasty attempts to dissolve the corporations after the SEC filed
suit occurred, the corporations conducted no substantial business except
for holding securities, and there was an absence of corporate management.
The Second Circuit noted that "the primary purpose of the appointment
was promptly to install a responsible officer of the court who could bring
the companies into compliance with the law, 'ascertain the true state of
affairs . . . and report thereon' to the court and public shareholders and
preserve the corporate assets." 360 F.2d at 750-51 (citation omitted).
24. Puerto Rico Capital Corp. (1965) - The SEC sought injunctive relief
against three individual defendants and the fund, which was a nominal
defendant but not charged with any violations of the securities laws. The
SEC alleged that the individual defendants: (a) caused the fund to invest in
companies owned and controlled by two of them in violation of Sections
17(a) and (d) and 37 of the ICA; (b) made false and misleading statements
in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5
thereunder and Section 34(b) of the ICA; and (c) solicited proxies and
filed reports that were false and misleading in violation of Section 20(a) of
the ICA. See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 3308, 1965 SEC Lexis 65 (Sept. 1, 1965).
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Although the SEC's litigation release does not mention a request for a
receiver, subsequent proceedings indicate that the SEC's complaint did, in
fact, request relief other than injunctive relief. The U.S. District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico appointed Miguel Gonzalez as receiver for the
fund on November 10, 1965. See SEC v. Wong, 42 F.R.D. 599 (D.P.R.
1967); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608, 610-11 (D.P.R. 1966).
25. Continental Growth Fund, Inc. (1963) - The SEC filed a complaint
against the fund and its officers and directors seeking, among other things,
to enjoin the defendants from continuing to act as officers and directors
and to appoint a receiver for the fund's assets. The SEC's complaint
alleged that: (a) Richard Jacobs, a director and president of the fund,
embezzled money from the fund by causing the custodial bank to disburse
monies for sham stock purchases by the fund; (b) Jacobs caused the fund
to deviate from its stated investment policy; (c) directors and officers
permitted the fund to operate for more than a year without a fidelity
insurance bond to indemnify the fund against larceny and embezzlement;
(d) directors and named officers permitted the fund to operate without
necessary books and records; (e) Jacobs and the fund's treasurer permitted
the fund to compute improperly the NAV of the fund's shares; (f) the
directors and officers caused the fund to file financial statements certified
by accountants who had not been approved by fund shareholders; (g) the
directors caused the fund to enter into advisory and underwriting
agreements without the requisite shareholder and director approvals; (h)
the custodial bank (also a defendant) failed to maintain records which
accurately set forth the fund's assets; and (i) Jacobs illegally sold securities
to the fund as a principal. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York immediately froze the fund's assets pending a hearing on the
SEC's application for a preliminary injunction and receiver. See SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 2699, 1963 SEC Lexis 1020 (July 30, 1963). The court appointed
Leon Leighton as receiver on August 9, 1963. See In re Continental
Growth Fund, Inc., SEC Rel. No. IC-5564, 1962 SEC Lexis 882 (Dec. 28,
1962). According to the "Order Appointing Receiver of Cont'l Growth
Fund, Inc., SEC v. Continental Growth Fund, Inc.," No. 63 Civil 2252
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1963), the court directed the receiver to "take
possession of all the assets and properties belonging or in the possession of
the Fund ... and to operate the business and manage the property of the
Fund . . . ." SEC v. Continental Growth Fund, Inc., [1964-66 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), 1964 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 8890, at *7. The related case of SEC v. Continental Growth
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Fund, Inc., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,437
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8890, states that J. Dudley
Devine, a fund director, caused in part the fund to experience losses
through his gross misconduct. He permitted Richard Jacobs to maintain
sole control over the operations of the fund, and thus was inattentive,
neglectful, and failed to recognize and perform his fiduciary duties as
director in a way which facilitated Jacobs' misconduct and gross abuse of
trust. See SEC Lit. Rel. No. 3568, 1966 SEC Lexis 41 (Aug. 19, 1966).
26. Keller Corp. (1962) - The SEC sought injunctive relief against the
corporation, certain individual defendants, and a securities corporation
controlled by those individuals. It also sought a trustee and receiver for
the corporation. The SEC alleged that: (a) the corporation was an
unregistered investment company in violation of Section 7 of the ICA; (b)
certain individual defendants had attempted fraudulently to induce
prospective investors to purchase the corporation's stock based on
misleading or false information; and (c) the one dividend that was paid by
the corporation consisted of a return of capital that was not disclosed
properly. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
issued a preliminary injunction pursuant to the Securities Act and ICA. It
also appointed Edward D. Lewis as "trustee and receiver of all records,
claims and assets of The Keller Corporation pursuant to Section 42(e)
[now (d)] of the [ICA.]" SEC Lit. Rel. No. 2468, 1962 SEC Lexis 882
(Dec. 28, 1962). The trustee-receiver was necessary because the
defendants had committed fraud against shareholders and thus should not
be left in charge. See SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963).
27. Aldred Investment Trust (1945) - The SEC sought injunctive relief
against the trust and certain individual defendants and the appointment of a
receiver for the trust. The SEC alleged that the individual defendants, as
officers or trustees of the trust, engaged in gross misconduct or gross abuse
of trust withing the meaning of Section 36 of the ICA. One defendant had
obtained voting control over the trust, ousted the existing board, and
appointed his relatives, employees, or close personal friends as trustees.
The individual defendants then paid themselves salaries higher than those
previously paid to the officers and trustees. They also violated the stated
investment policy of the trust by pursuing, and acquiring, control of a
horse racing track. The SEC alleged that the individual defendants were
motivated by self-interest and failed to disclose what they were doing to
securityholders. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
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enjoined all the individual defendants except one who had become a
trustee much later on from serving or acting in the capacity of trustee or as
an officer of the trust. It also appointed a receiver with the power to either
reorganize the capital structure of the trust or liquidate the trust and
distribute the assets to the creditors, debentureholders, and shareholders of
the trust. See SEC v. Aldred Inv. Trust, 58 F. Supp. 724 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945). On appeal, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that the individual defendants had engaged in a gross
abuse of trust in violation of Section 36 of the ICA and affirmed the
injunction and the receivership. With respect to the receivership, it held
that "Section 36 invokes the equity power of the Federal Court and that
calls into play its inherent powers where necessary to do justice and grant
full relief. The appointment of receivers in the case at bar was an
appropriate exercise of the court's inherent equity power." Aldred Inv.
Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 1945).
28. Fiscal Fund, Inc. (1943) - The SEC sought a temporary restraining order
against the fund and a temporary receiver for the fund. The SEC alleged
that: (a) the fund failed to redeem its shares in violation of Section 22(e) of
the ICA; (b) the fund failed to file quarterly reports with the SEC in
violation of Section 30(b)(1) of the ICA; (c) the fund failed to send
semiannual reports to shareholders in violation of Section 30(d) of the
ICA; (d) the board of directors had abandoned the fund as four of the five
directors had resigned and the fifth was out of the country serving in the
army; and (e) two new directors appointed by the board had not been
properly elected by the shareholders in violation of Section 16(a) of the
ICA. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware enjoined the
fund with respect to its Section 22(e) violation, noting that the fund's
"most crucial violation of the [ICA] has been Sec[tion] 22(e)." SEC v.
Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 713 (D. Del. 1943). The court also
noted that "the violation of which gives the Commission its greatest
concern is Section 22(e)." Id. at 714. In addition to enjoining the fund
with respect to its violation of Section 22(e), the court appointed a receiver
because the fund "has no functioning management" and, given the court's
desire to enforce compliance with Section 22(e), "there is no one to whom
my injunction can effectively run." Id. at 714. (In this regard, the SEC
labeled the fund as an "orphan" investment company. See SEC Rel. No.
IC-505, 1943 WL 30350 (Jun. 4, 1943)). Importantly, the court con-
sidered whether the fund, which was solvent, should be revived by
appointing a new board of directors or whether it should be liquidated.
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The court held that evidence suggested that the paltry management fee was
not sufficient to attract a new advisor (as the SEC had tried), and that if the
fee were raised in light of the fund's meager income, shareholders would
redeem in droves. It therefore ordered the receiver to liquidate the fund,
stating "[t]here is a well-established power in the Federal Court sitting as a
court of equity to order liquidauon of a solvent corporation where there is
no other course available to remedy a situation which is inequitable to the
stockholders. . . . This power is an obvious corollary of the proposition
that once a court of equity has taken jurisdiction it may and should retain
jurisdiction to complete justice." 48 F. Supp. at 715. Note that this was
the first case in which the SEC requested, and a district court granted, a
permanent receiver to liquidate a solvent investment company. It was also
the first time the SEC obtained a permanent injunction against a fund for
failing to redeem its outstanding shares, furnish semiannual reports to
shareholders, or file quarterly reports with the SEC. See SEC Rel. No. IC-
434, 1943 WL 30294 (Jan. 19, 1943).
